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Abstract
The combined effects of climate change on river flow and growing water demand
cause an increase of water scarcity in many river basins. In transboundary basins
where water is scarce, this development is one of the drivers of both noncom-
pliance with water allocation agreements and conflicts over the property rights
to river water. An unresolved challenge is how cooperation in water allocation
can be improved. Underlying this challenge are the issues of contested property
rights to river water, and the design and stability of international water alloca-
tion agreements. The objective of this thesis is to analyse water allocation in
transboundary river basins, focusing on the strategic interaction between ripar-
ian countries regarding their decisions on water use. The main methodology
applied is game theory. I construct game-theoretic models to analyse coopera-
tive agreements on water allocation, to assess strategic interaction when water is
contested, and to design sharing rules for river water with attractive properties.
The results show that increasing water scarcity may aggravate noncompliance
with water allocation agreements, but that a careful agreement design suffices to
provide stability. Existing claims and property rights to water are important de-
terminants for both the probability of conflict over river water, and the outcome
of negotiations on water allocation. In addition, it is impossible to single out a
unique fair allocation of transboundary river water. Overall, this thesis provides
insight into the strategic aspects that play an important role in the transboundary
water allocation problem and its possible solutions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction∗
The 2009 World Water Day paid particular attention to transboundary waters, its
theme was “Shared Water—Shared Opportunities”. The accompanying brochure
stated:1
There is enough freshwater to meet everyone’s needs. But the world’s
supply of freshwater is not evenly distributed and often not appropri-
ately managed. Many countries are already facing increasing scarcity
of freshwater. By 2025, 1800 million people will be living in countries
or regions with absolute water scarcity, and two-thirds of the world’s
population could be under stress conditions.
This is an unpleasant message that has been broadly discussed in the media
and scientific literature over the last years. Water scarcity, fed by impacts of
climate change and increasing water demand, is an increasing threat to human
welfare and economic development, constraining consumption and production
possibilities.
On a national level, the reliable supply of water to meet the needs of house-
holds, agriculture, and industry is a crucial factor. Because the hydrological
∗Section 1.1 of this chapter is based on Ansink et al. (2005). Anticipated climate, economic and
policy changes and their impacts on European river basins. AquaTerra Deliverable I1.2, Wageningen
University.
1The brochure can be found on-line at http://www.unwater.org/worldwaterday/. World Water
Day is an annual event to celebrate freshwater, initiated at the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development.
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reality often does not match these needs, transboundary cooperation may be
required. The brochure covered this topic too:
With every country seeking to satisfy its water needs from limited
water resources (. . . ), some foresee a future filled with conflict. But
history shows that cooperation, not conflict, is the most common
response to transboundary water management issues. Over the past
60 years there have been nearly 300 international water agreements
and only 37 cases of reported violence between states over water.
In transboundary river basins, countries have been able, on some occasions, to
establish property rights to water and thereby increase the overall benefits of
water use. This is not the complete story, though. International agreements
may not be complied with, conflict over water may occur anyway, and clear
internationally accepted norms for the allocation of river water are lacking.
The turbulent history of water sharing in the Ganges basin by India (upstream)
and Bangladesh (downstream) is a good illustration. After twelve years of ne-
gotiations, cooperation between the two countries started officially in 1972, with
the establishment of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission. In 1976,
however, agreed-upon maximum diversions by India at the Farakka barrage
were vastly exceeded, leading to serious environmental and economic damage
in Bangladesh. Due to lack of internationally accepted rules for water sharing,
intervention by the United Nations could only urge the parties to meet and “ar-
rive at a fair and expeditious settlement”. Short-term agreements were reached
in 1977 and 1985 but were not successful, before the Ganges Treaty was signed in
1996. In the following season already, both countries were involved in a dispute
because India allegedly exceeded its share allocated under the Ganges Treaty.2
In light of this illustration, the following recommendation in the brochure
seems obvious:
Work remains to be done to improve and implement these interna-
tional agreements. In addition, more agreements are required. Of
the world’s 263 international river basins and transboundary aquifer
systems, 158 do not have any type of cooperative management frame-
work in place.
2See Bandyopadhyay (1995); Nishat and Faisal (2000); Tanzeema and Faisal (2001) for more back-
ground information on the sharing of the Ganges river.
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Improvement and implementation are indeed necessary. Unresolved questions
are, however, how cooperation can be improved, and how to design international
agreements such that countries will not break them. Underlying these questions
are the issues of contested property rights to river water and the design of attrac-
tive sharing rules for river water.
This thesis covers these aspects of water allocation in transboundary river
basins, the theme of the 2009 World Water Day. It just as well covers the theme
of the 2007 World Water Day, “Coping with Water Scarcity”, and it touches on
many other themes and issues that are important in the water literature and water
management practice. The main source of the methodology applied to study this
topic is game theory. Game theory is a branch of micro-economic theory that
analyses behaviour in situations of strategic interaction. It is therefore well-suited
to analyse the interaction between riparian countries regarding their decisions
on water use. In chapters 2–5, I construct game-theoretic models to analyse
cooperative agreements on water allocation, to assess strategic interaction when
water is contested, and to design sharing rules for river water with attractive
properties.
Before doing so, in the remaining sections of this introduction I provide
evidence for the scarcity of water, both now and in the future. The current
water scarcity is intensified by two global trends that are likely to accelerate in
the coming decades: climate change effects on river flow and increasing water
demand. Combined, these trends affect the balance of supply and demand of
water, see section 1.1. Subsequently, in section 1.2, I will discuss the institutional
setting of transboundary river sharing. Jointly, these two sections describe the
factors that bring about increasing water scarcity and inefficient water allocation
in transboundary river basins. I will discuss these factors now before moving on
to a brief review of existing approaches and the specific objectives of this thesis
in sections 1.3 and 1.4.
1.1 Water scarcity: supply and demand
Jointly, water supply and demand determine the level of water scarcity. The
scarcity of water is sometimes measured by the concept of “water stress”. Water
stress is defined as the available water volume per capita per year and water
stress is said to occur at levels below 1,000 m3 per capita per year. Estimates of
3
the number of people living in water-stressed river basins range from 1.4 to 2.1
billion (Vo¨ro¨smarty et al., 2000; Alcamo et al., 2003; Bates et al., 2008). Clearly,
water scarcity is an issue that affects a large share of the world’s population. A
number of trends in the supply and demand of water contribute to increasing
water scarcity (cf. IPCC, 2007b; Nations, 2009a). Climate change is affecting
various climate components that ultimately influence the supply of water through
aquifers and water flow in river basins. Changes in driving forces related to
demographic developments affect the demand for water from river basins. I will
discuss the changes in supply and demand using these two trends of climate
change impacts and increasing water demand, starting with climate change.
1.1.1 Climate change
Climate change refers to long-term changes in the average pattern of the weather,
caused by natural or anthropogenic factors. In spite of the many uncertainties
related to climate change itself as well as its consequences, three main effects
of climate change on global water resources can be distinguished. These effects
relate to atmospheric circulation, temperature, and precipitation (Arnell, 1999a,b;
Allen et al., 2000). Jointly, they affect the quantity and variability of river runoff,
the frequency and severity of extreme events, and the quality of water.
Atmospheric circulation is the main control behind many climate components
including temperature, precipitation, and soil moisture, and is closely related to
climate change and climate variability on a regional scale (Ra¨isa¨nen et al., 2004).
Globally, temperature is steadily increasing, as measured by the global surface
temperature (IPCC, 2007b). Projected effects of climate change on temperature
in Europe show that temperatures in Europe since the late 20th century exceed
those of any time during the last five centuries (Luterbacher et al., 2004). Overall,
temperature has increased by 0.95◦C over the last century, with large regional
differences in the extent of warming (Klein Tank and Ko¨nnen, 2003). Precipita-
tion levels have increased and are projected to increase over the coming decades
because of climate change. Since the beginning of the 20th century, global land
precipitation has increased considerably (IPCC, 2007b; Hulme et al., 1998; Schon-
wiese and Rapp, 1997). Next to precipitation levels, the frequency and intensity
of extreme precipitation events have increased too (Easterling et al., 2000). These
increases in extreme precipitation events are closely related to increases in mean
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precipitation (Groisman et al., 1999). Various climate models project a sharp in-
crease in mean precipitation levels and the occurrence of extreme precipitation
events, even in those areas where mean precipitation levels decrease (Ra¨isa¨nen
et al., 2004). An additional effect is increasing mean winter precipitation which,
combined with temperature increases, causes part of winter precipitation to fall
as rain instead of snow (Arnell, 1999a,b).
River runoff changes are caused by the combined effects of temperature in-
crease and changes in evaporation, soil moisture, and precipitation. Relatively
small changes in temperature already have serious impacts on river runoff,
mainly because of its effect on evaporation (Arnell, 1999b). This effect may
even outweigh the effect of increased precipitation (Frederick and Major, 1997).
In snow-dominated river basins, the amounts of snow and rain change when
the temperature increases. The snow-pack season will be considerably short-
ened in many regions as a result of earlier and more rapid snow-melt (Arnell,
1999b). The consequences on river runoff are evident: winter runoff increases
with higher peaks and the peak runoff (that normally occurs in spring) shifts to an
earlier period in the year (Nijssen et al., 2001). Earlier snow-melt in basins with
snow regimes gives room for faster and more intense drying of soil moisture in
spring and summertime. As a consequence, changes in soil moisture storage will
be positive in fall and winter and negative in spring and summer. This process
has a close link to runoff levels in the respective seasons.
Floods and droughts are expected to occur more frequently and be more
intense because of changing precipitation patterns (Arnell, 1994; Milly et al.,
2002; Christensen and Christensen, 2003). The effect of more extreme high and
low flow months within one year can be seen in many parts of the world and may
explain part of the increase in flood frequency and intensity (Lehner et al., 2001).
Climate models generally agree on a continuation of this trend (IPCC, 2007a).
The overall result of climate change on river runoff is a change in the mean
runoff, an increase in runoff variability, both between seasons and between years,
and an increase in the frequency of extreme events (cf. Voss et al., 2002; Milly et al.,
2005). Many areas, especially in arid and semi-arid climates, will see an overall
decrease in water availability (Alcamo and Henrichs, 2002; Arnell, 2004). This
result adds to the already existing stochasticity and uncertainty in the availability
of water resources (Krzysztofowicz, 2001; Montanari and Grossi, 2008). Clearly,
climate change—whether it is caused by natural or anthropogenic factors—adds
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to this stochasticity and is not its single cause. In fact, Hulme et al. (1999) have
shown that the impacts of natural climate variability on environment and society
may be larger than the impacts of climate change (see also Shanahan et al., 2009).
Increases in temperature, floods, and droughts have a pronounced effect on
water quality, through various hydrological and chemical processes. Higher
water temperatures reduce oxygen concentrations and increase the release of
phosphorus. The projected increase in extreme events, including floods and
droughts, increases the amount of suspended solids, decreases the dilution ca-
pacity for contaminants, and enhances the transportation of pollutants (Bates
et al., 2008). The result of these processes is a decrease in the availability of
freshwater, further increasing water scarcity.
1.1.2 Water demand
Water scarcity is related to increasing water demand by various economic sectors,
spurred by economic growth, urbanisation, technological innovation, population
growth, and consumption patterns of this growing population (most notably their
diet).
The four main economic sectors in terms of water demand are agriculture,
industry, energy, and households. Each has its own characteristics and features
different impacts on water quality and quantity, and each has different needs
concerning water quality (Becker et al., 2000). It is important to distinguish
between consumptive and non-consumptive use of water. For example, in the
case of cooling of hydro-power plants, less than 10% of abstracted water is
actually consumed. The vast majority of the abstracted water is redirected to
the water cycle, ready to be used for other purposes. In the literature, the terms
water use and water abstraction usually include both types of water use while
“water consumption” refers to consumptive use only.
Agriculture is the largest water using sector, accounting for 70% of global
water abstraction, ranging from 34% in the EU to 89% in South Asia (Shiklo-
manov and Rodda, 2003). Principal water uses by the agricultural sector include
direct abstraction of groundwater and surface water for irrigation purposes and
watering of livestock. The amount of irrigation water needed and the time of
irrigation depends on the irrigation efficiency, water availability, crop type, and
soil- and climatic conditions. Irrigated agriculture is the economic sector that will
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be affected most strongly by climate change. It is also the sector where changes in
the production efficiency (i.e. irrigation effectiveness) have the strongest effects
on overall water use (IPCC, 2007a). The combined effect of climate change and
irrigation efficiency determines the trend in overall water use in agriculture. Us-
ing a global irrigation model with climatic predictions for the 2020s and 2070s,
Do¨ll (2002) finds that two-thirds of 1995 irrigation area will face modest increased
water requirements by up to 8%. Over the period 1998–2030, the amount of irri-
gated land is projected to increase by 0.6% per year on average, compared with
1.5% over the period 1950–1990 (Nations, 2009a).
Industrial water use accounts for 21% of global water abstraction, ranging
from 5% in Africa and South Asia to 51% in the EU (Shiklomanov and Rodda,
2003). Principal water using industries are ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy,
chemical and petroleum plants, machinery manufacture, and the wood pulp and
paper industry. Actual water use in these industries is very much dependent
on the water supply technology being used. Main water use purposes include
process water, boiler feed water, and cooling water. Although economic growth
correlates with water use in industry, technological progress (i.e. improvements
in water use efficiency), possibly induced by water pricing (cf. Reynaud, 2003),
may weaken this correlation. Water use efficiency reflects the amount of water
used per unit of product. Scenarios developed by Alcamo et al. (2000) project an
annual increase of water use efficiency in the industrial sector in the range from
1% to 3% up to 2025, mainly due to improvements in wastewater recycling. This
progress in efficiency offsets prospected growth of the industrial sector. A similar
result is reported by Cole (2004) in an analysis of the relation between economic
growth and water use, where he finds an environmental Kuznets curve (i.e. an
inverted U-shaped relationship).
Water use for energy production is largely non-consumptive. Except for an
increased temperature of return water and possibly some biocide contamination,
water use for the energy sector has no effects on water scarcity (EEA, 2001).
Household water use accounts for 10% of global water abstraction, ranging
from 6% in South Asia to 19% in Latin America (Shiklomanov and Rodda, 2003).
Principal water uses by households include the direct abstraction of water for
domestic uses, municipal services, public gardening, and small industries (that
are connected to public water supply). The amount of household water use
depends on various factors, including climate, the efficiency of public supply
7
systems, water use habits, technological change and socio-economic conditions.
UN projections for global population indicate that the world population reaches
7 billion in 2012, up from the current 6.8 billion, and reaches 9 billion people by
2050 (Nations, 2009b). Almost all of this 2.3 billion increase occurs in developing
countries, with population in developed countries only marginally increasing
from 1.23 to 1.28 billion by 2050.
Two additional features of this increasing population are relevant. The first
feature is urbanisation. UN projects for urbanisation indicate that the urban pop-
ulation will roughly double between 2007 and 2050, from 3.3 billion to 6.4 billion
(Nations, 2008). Compared with the increase of total population, this implies a
net migration from rural to urban areas. Several problems are related to urban
water use. Urban water use per capita is higher than rural water use, due to
different lifestyles (cf. Bates et al., 2008). Urban water use generally leads to
pollution problems and reduced groundwater recharge , decreasing the amount
of available freshwater (Gleick, 1998; Vo¨ro¨smarty et al., 2000). In addition, ur-
ban water use creates very high local demand, which requires increased water
transportation and infrastructure, leading to evaporation and conveyance loss
(cf. Gleick, 1998; Thompson et al., 2000).
The second feature is the overall change in consumption patterns, habits, and
diet with increasing income. Changing diet has the largest implication. As living
standards increase, the consumption of meat and dairy products increases (meat
consumption per capita has more than doubled in China since 1985) (Nations,
2009a). The production of meat and dairy is very water-intensive though. Liu
et al. (2008) estimate for China that while it takes only 800–1,300 litres of water
to produce a kilogram of cereals, it takes 2,400–12,600 litres of water to produce
a kilogram of meat, a difference of a factor 2–10 (while, compared with cereals,
meat has a lower energy content per kilogram on average). Similar changes occur
in other growing economies (Nations, 2009a).
Comparing projected water use between sectors, Rosegrant and Cai (2002)
conclude that water use will increase rapidly for industry and households, while
agricultural water use will increase only slowly. In absolute levels, however, agri-
culture will remain the largest water user. As stated as one of the key messages
in the United Nations World Water Development Report (Nations, 2009a):
Steadily increasing demand for agricultural products to satisfy the
needs of a growing population continues to be the main driver be-
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hind water use. While world population growth has slowed since
the 1970s and is expected to continue its downward trend, steady
economic development, in particular in emerging market economies,
has translated into demand for a more varied diet, including meat
and dairy products, putting additional pressure on water resources.
Jointly, changes in supply and demand will cause increasing water scarcity
(Vo¨ro¨smarty et al., 2000; Arnell, 2004). Shiklomanov and Rodda (2003) estimate
that total water use increases from 8.4% of global water resources in 1995 to 12.2%
in 2025. Part of this increasing scarcity will be offset by shifts in international
trade patterns, causing some regions to gain from this scarcity (Berrittella et al.,
2007). Regional differences in the anticipated changes are to be expected because
of specific regional climatic and economic conditions. Alcamo et al. (2007) find
that the principal factor that causes increasing water scarcity is the increase
in household water use caused by increasing household income. As a result,
the major share (93%) of increased demand for water is projected to occur in
developing countries, while only limited increases in water supply are feasible
(Rosegrant and Cai, 2002). Overall, up to 2050 water scarcity increases in 62–76%
of total global river basin area, and decreases in 20–29% (Alcamo et al., 2007).
The next section discusses the institutional setting that has evolved in these water
scarce river basins.
1.2 Institutional setting
The institutional setting of water allocation in transboundary river basins is
strongly determined by the hydro-geographical context (cf. Saleth and Dinar,
2005; Dombrowsky, 2007). Relevant institutions in this setting include water
rights, principles for sharing water, joint river basin committees, and water allo-
cation agreements.
The hydro-geographical configuration of transboundary river basins is often
so-called through-border, with one country being located upstream of the other.
Alternative configurations include the case where a river forms the boundary
between two countries and many hybrid configurations (Dinar, 2006). In this
thesis, the focus is on river basins with a through-border configuration. This
geographical setting causes an asymmetry between the countries in terms of being
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able to affect water use in the other country (Van der Zaag, 2007). Asymmetry
may for instance lead to downstream foregone benefits—because the upstream
country uses all available water—or physical damage as a result of low-quality
irrigation return flows or flood management (Zawahri, 2008b). Note that factors
other than geography, such as power distribution, also play a role in the relation
between riparian neighbours (Dinar, 2006; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006).
The stochasticity and uncertainty of river flow, as discussed above, translates
into ever-changing conditions for international water allocation. Various instru-
ments have been applied by countries to allocate water under these conditions.
Water allocation agreements are a common instrument, based on a large variety
of underlying principles for water allocation. Many such agreements, however,
are void because they are not sufficiently flexible to adjust to the hydrological
reality (McCaffrey, 2003; Drieschova et al., 2008). This observation also holds for
other instruments to allocate water (cf. Young and McColl, 2009).
There are two major institutional obstacles for international cooperation on
water allocation. The first obstacle is the absence of well-defined property rights
to water (Richards and Singh, 2001). This situation is caused by river water being
a flowing resource. Two dominant and conflicting principles of water rights have
emerged in international law (Salman, 2007; Dellapenna, 2007). One is “absolute
territorial sovereignty”, which says that every country has the right to all river
water within its territory. The other is “absolute territorial integrity”, which says
that every country has the right to all river water within and upstream of its
territory. In absence of well-defined property rights, water trade cannot resolve
water shortages or inefficient allocation (Holden and Thobani, 1996).
Although formal property rights may be missing, history and custom often
determine some kind of status quo water allocation. Such a process forms the ba-
sis for water rights in the US, called the doctrine of appropriative rights (Burness
and Quirk, 1979). In an international setting, this doctrine is meaningless as there
is no authority to enforce rights. The result is, in many river basins, the presence
of overlapping or conflicting claims to water (Dellapenna, 2007). These claims
can be based on a number of water sharing principles. Wolf (1999) provides an
overview of these principles. They include principles based on historic use, based
on water needs (e.g. irrigation requirements), water rights (e.g. the principles of
sovereignty and integrity introduced above), or based on international water law
(e.g. the Helsinki Rules (1966), the UN Watercourses Convention (1997), and the
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Berlin Rules (2004)) (see also Wolf, 1999; Giordano and Wolf, 2001; Van der Zaag
et al., 2002). The principles introduced above are often used in actual negotiation
processes on water allocation (Beach et al., 2000; Daoudy, 2008). The Nile basin,
for example, has ten riparian countries with Egypt and Sudan being the largest
consumers of the Nile water. The claims of Sudan and Egypt are disputed by
the other riparians. Egypt defends its claim by pointing to the principle of his-
toric rights. Ethiopia and Sudan, upstream of Egypt, defend their claims based
on the principle of “reasonable and equitable use”, a notion introduced by the
Helsinki Rules. In addition, Sudan defends its claim based on economic princi-
ples, because it has a comparative advantage in terms of available land (Just and
Netanyahu, 1998). Clearly, contested claims to water provide the starting point
for possible cooperation or conflict over water (Waterbury, 1997).
The second obstacle for international cooperation on water allocation is the
above-mentioned lack of a supra-national authority (Barrett, 1994b). Such an
authority would be helpful in monitoring and enforcing compliance to some
contract that specifies the allocation of water. In absence of a supra-national
authority, two work-around solutions are dominant in international water allo-
cation. These are joint river basin committees and water allocation agreements.
Joint river basin committees (or international river basin organisations) often
serve as a continuing negotiation table for decisions on water development that
affect the other riparian(s). A prominent example of a successful committee is
the Mekong Committee. The Mekong Committee was established in 1957 by the
four lower riparian states with the UN as a third party, and was re-ratified in 1995
as the Mekong Commission. Its goal is to “promote, coordinate, supervise, and
control the planning and investigation of water resources development projects
in the Lower Mekong basin” (Beach et al., 2000). The Mekong basin is not
facing severe water scarcity, but despite political instability, the committee has
been successful in promoting joint river basin development (Jacobs, 1995). Other
committees have formed in for instance the Danube, Meuse, Se´ne´gal, and La
Plata river basins, and on transboundary rivers in India/Bangladesh, Canada/US,
and Mexico/US.
Dombrowsky (2007) has surveyed 86 joint river basin committees, and demon-
strated their importance for international river basin management. Despite their
prevalence, many river basin committees often lack institutional power. Almost
half of the surveyed committees have no monitoring mechanism, and only a
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small minority has some kind of enforcement mechanism in place (although in
an international setting, enforcement may be a meaningless concept) (Wolf, 1998;
Dombrowsky, 2007).
In addition to these river basin committees, many basins have one or more
water agreements in place. These agreements may cover many issues related to
river basin development, such as hydro-power generation, navigation, and flood
management (Wolf, 1998; Beach et al., 2000). More than a third of these agree-
ments cover water allocation issues; 53 out of 145 agreements surveyed by Wolf
(1998). The far majority is bilateral and lacks clear rules for how available water
is to be shared (Wolf, 1998). This lack of clear sharing rules in international agree-
ments contrasts with common practice in national agreements. International
case study evidence shows that various forms of sharing rules occur frequently
and that monitoring and enforcement is common (Dinar et al., 1997; Bennett and
Howe, 1998). The reason for this difference is that enforcement is possible un-
der national water allocation agreements. This also explains the occurrence of
national or regional water markets (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Bjornlund,
2003; Brewer et al., 2008; Donohew, 2009).
Given the evidence on stochasticity and uncertainty of water supply in sec-
tion 1.1, one would expect water allocation agreements to be flexible instruments.3
The need for this flexibility has been advocated by many (Kilgour and Dinar, 2001;
McCaffrey, 2003; Giordano and Wolf, 2003; Freebairn and Quiggin, 2006; Sgobbi
and Carraro, 2009; Young and McColl, 2009). Few agreements, however, ex-
plicitly include flexibility, and water allocations are seldom clearly delineated in
the agreements (Giordano and Wolf, 2003; Fischhendler, 2004). This results in
agreements that are void when faced with the hydrological reality.
Despite the many river basins that do have one or both work-arounds (river
basin committees or water agreements) in place, they still form a minority. In
addition to the lack of flexibility, cooperating countries face a cascade of problems
in the implementation of desired water allocation schedules. These problems
occur from incomplete contracts, ambiguity in their implementation, and lack of
monitoring and enforcement (cf. Barrett, 1994a; Fischhendler, 2008; Souza Filho
et al., 2008). All in all, the results of cooperation in transboundary river water
allocation are not always positive.
3An alternative solution to cope with stochasticity is to construct dams that allow inter-annual
water storage, see for instance Strzepek et al. (2008).
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An immediate result of failing transboundary cooperation is inefficient water
allocation and the possible emergence of conflicts on water (Gleick, 1993, 2008;
Dinar and Dinar, 2003; Dombrowsky, 2007; Wolf, 2007; Zawahri, 2008b). Ineffi-
ciency is caused by missing property rights so that water may not be used at its
highest value. Conflicts may emerge when the actual allocation of water dam-
ages one of the countries’ economies or is perceived as unfair. Some countries
and river basins are more prone to conflict over river water than others (Toset
et al., 2000; Stahl, 2005; Dinar, 2007). Yoffe et al. (2003) find that the occurrence of
rapid institutional or physical changes in a river basin (e.g. dam construction) is
the most likely cause of conflict. The presence of water agreements is an impor-
tant factor in mitigating conflict (Yoffe et al., 2003). Espey and Towfique (2004)
and Song and Whittington (2004) analyse characteristics of countries that are
successful in agreement formation. One key result is that asymmetry in power
between the riparians may prevent cooperation. This result is in line with the
hydro-hegemony theory of Zeitoun and Warner (2006). This theory stresses the
determinative role of power asymmetry for water allocation and conflict in river
basins.
Some argue though, that conflict over water is a misconception, disqualifying
the possibility of water wars as a “myth” (e.g. Barnaby, 2009). This line of rea-
soning is mainly based on data from the International Water Event Database of
Oregon State University. This database contains information on all water-related
international events from 1948 to 2005. 28% of these events are conflictive in
nature and no war has ever been fought over water (Wolf, 1998; Yoffe et al., 2003).
Hence, it is concluded that international relations over water are “overwhelm-
ingly cooperative”. Though this may be true, it does not imply that the 28%
of events that are conflictive are unimportant or could not aggravate into more
serious conflicts when water scarcity increases (Bernauer, 2002; Siegfried and
Bernauer, 2007; Kundzewicz and Kowalczak, 2009).
Note that conflict does not necessarily refer to open conflict or even warfare.
Various hybrid forms of cooperation and conflict exist or co-exist (Dinar et al.,
2007; Zawahri, 2008a; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008).4 For general overviews
4Case studies of cooperation and conflict in specific river basins include the following: the
Euphrates–Tigris (Zawahri, 2008a), the Columbia (Krutilla, 1967), the Jordan (Haddadin, 2000), the
La Plata (Gilman et al., 2008; Kempkey et al., 2009), the Nile (Dinar and Alemu, 2000; Wu and Whit-
tington, 2006), the Indus (Zawahri, 2009), the Ganges (Nishat and Faisal, 2000; Tanzeema and Faisal,
2001), the Senegal (Vick, 2006), the Orange (Conley and Van Niekerk, 2000; Turton, 2003; Kistin et al.,
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of conflict and cooperation in river basins, see Gleick (1993); Beach et al. (2000);
Wolf (2007). The next section covers existing approaches to analyse conflict and
cooperation over water allocation in transboundary river basins.
1.3 Existing approaches
Existing approaches to the issue of water allocation in transboundary river basins
use very different reference points. I first give a brief overview of three dom-
inant approaches and their applicability to the issues addressed here. Then I
focus on game-theoretic approaches as they are best suited to model and assess
the strategic aspects of water allocation, and are therefore closest related to the
methodology of this thesis.
The first approach is integrated water resources management (IWRM, some-
times called integrated river basin management) (Lee and Dinar, 1996). IWRM
is a concept that was developed in the 1990s as a response to the engineering-
dominated paradigms of water development and water management that it suc-
ceeds. The approach considers engineering, economic, social, ecological, and
legal aspects of water management across four dimensions: (i) the water re-
source itself, (ii) the water users, (iii) the spatial scale, and (iv) the temporal scale
(Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2008). When applied properly, IWRM can provide
a sustainable and efficient management regime for the allocation of water. Ap-
plied to the issue of water allocation in transboundary river basins, however,
decision-making based on IWRM is inherently complex due to a multitude of ob-
jectives and stakeholders. Moreover, IWRM is not a suitable approach to assess
the strategic elements that play a large role in transboundary river basins.
The second approach is hydro-economic modelling. This approach considers
the complete river basin as one entity in which the most favourable options for
water use are to be selected, constrained by water availability, physical feasibil-
ity, minimal flow requirements, and water use technology. Models developed
under this approach typically focus on benefits to different economic sectors,
including agriculture and industry. Heinz et al. (2007), Brouwer and Hofkes
(2008), and Kragt and Bennett (2009) provide concise overviews of this strand
of the literature. Two modelling approaches co-exist: the holistic and the com-
partment approach (Brouwer and Hofkes, 2008). The choice for either of the two
2008), and the transboundary rivers on the Iberian Peninsula (Thiel, 2004).
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approaches is a trade-off between information transfer difficulties in the com-
partment approach versus the necessary simplified hydrological and economic
modelling in the holistic approach (McKinney et al., 1999). The holistic approach
fully integrates the hydrological and economic aspects in one integrated model;
Braat and Van Lierop (1987) pioneered this approach. An example of the holis-
tic approach is provided by Rosegrant et al. (2000), who develop an integrated
economic-hydrologic model to assess water use at the basin scale under different
management instruments (see also Cai et al., 2003). The model considers hydro-
logic, agronomic, and economic factors in a spatial model of water conveyance
to different economic sectors. Other examples include Booker and Young (1994),
Draper et al. (2003), Jenkins et al. (2004), Cai and Wang (2006), and Gu¨rlu¨k and
Ward (2009). The compartment approach keeps the two aspects in separate mod-
els but allows the output of one model to be used as input in the other. An example
of the compartment approach is Lefkoff and Gorelick (1990a,b), who combines
an economic, a hydrologic, and an agronomic component in one integrated sim-
ulation model. The model is used to examine the effect of various agricultural
practices on profits, and the hydrologic and economic effects of introducing a
water market.
Related studies are the following. Albersen et al. (2003) apply capital accu-
mulation theory to hydrological process-based models, which allows to price all
stocks and flows in the model using Lagrange multipliers. This approach gen-
erates the data needed for a river basin authority to allocate water to its highest
value use (see also Ward, 2009). Chakravorty and Umetsu (2003), in a spatial
model of water use and re-use, focuses on the effects of upstream distribution
losses on basin-wide water use. Their results indicate the preferred upstream
and downstream water use technology (surface water abstraction vs. ground-
water pumping) and significant increases in water use and output when water
use is optimised in the basin. Clearly, basin-wide optimisation increases overall
benefits of water use substantially. A related strand of the literature focuses on
how these benefits may induce basin-wide cooperation. Both Sadoff and Grey
(2002) and Fisher and Huber-Lee (2009) develop frameworks to understand and
distribute the gains of optimisation over the countries in the basin. Again, how-
ever, this approach does not capture the importance of strategic behaviour by the
riparian countries.
The third approach is the use of water markets, an instrument to implement
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basin-wide optimisation. In theory, the use of markets for water creates an ef-
ficient water allocation, even in transboundary river basins (cf. Howitt, 1994;
Hearne and Easter, 1996). Institutional impediments may, however, hamper a
fully functioning market (Giannias and Lekakis, 1997; Carey et al., 2002; Dono-
hew, 2009). Moreover, because of the large water losses related to the transport
of water, transfers of water across river basins are rare, and water markets are
usually confined to the riparian countries only. Hence, markets are extremely
thin. In addition, advocates of international water markets ignore the problem
of undefined property rights to water (Brennan and Scoccimarro, 1999) and the
lack of enforcement mechanisms, as discussed in section 1.2.
Other approaches focus on the engineering, economic, or legal aspects of
water allocation. An example is the theory of hydro-hegemony, briefly mentioned
in section 1.2. This positive theory provides an explanation for the situation of
water allocation as we see it today. From a normative point of view, the principles
for water allocation listed in section 1.2, may provide a good starting point for
the allocation of water. An overview of modelling approaches for river basin
management is provided by Chapman et al. (2007). It is clear that the many
aspects of water allocation each ask for a specific approach.
Because in this thesis, the strategic aspects of water allocation are central, we
now focus on the final approach: game-theory applied to water allocation in
transboundary river basins. This approach models riparian countries as agents
who interact with each other in their decisions on water use and related issues.
Both cooperative or non-cooperative game-theoretic models have been used to
model this type of interaction and its outcomes. This confined strand of the
literature developed since the 1980s and has a modest number of applications to
the issue of water allocation in transboundary river basins, listed below.5
Early work was done by Stone (1980) who analysed the case of two countries
sharing a river that flows from country A to country B and then back to A. Water
use decisions are analysed using “resource transformation curves” that present
the relation between border flow volume and net benefits of water use. Using a
case study, Stone (1980) shows that side payments can improve welfare in both
countries and that conflicting interests are not necessarily present. Dufournaud
(1982) applies metagame theory in his analysis of net benefits to riparians of
5A related strand of the literature uses game theory to analyse strategic interaction in transbound-
ary water pollution (cf. Fernandez, 2002b; Ni and Wang, 2007; Fernandez, 2009; Gengenbach, 2009).
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joint water development projects in the Columbia (see Krutilla, 1967) and lower
Mekong river basins. In the case of the Columbia river basin, the analysis com-
pares pay-offs to Canada and the US and argues that the inclusion of benefits
from future joint ventures rationalises seemingly irrational choices made by these
countries. In the case of the Lower Mekong river basin, the analysis shows that
cooperation between the four countries involved would have been beneficial to
all. Nevertheless, the risk that one of the countries at some point in time decided
to withdraw from the project (for political reasons) made each country opt for
sovereign development.
The issue of stability of water allocation agreements has received some atten-
tion. Dufournaud and Harrington (1990) explicitly included the temporal and
spatial distribution of benefits and costs of a joint water development project, us-
ing cooperative game theory, and analysed the stability of cooperation. Kilgour
and Dinar (1995, 2001) developed a model of flexible water allocation between
riparian states in the context of variable flow rates, to identify whether stable
agreements are possible. An application to the Ganges river basin shows that
such a flexible agreement may bring about significant welfare improvements.
Examples of game-theoretic applications to specific river basins are the fol-
lowing. Rogers (1969, 1993) analyses cooperation between India, Bangladesh,
and Nepal in a joint water supply protect, focusing on flood protection and ir-
rigation water storage. Dinar and Wolf (1994) combine physical, economic and
political aspects in their analysis of coalition formation in trading of Nile water
and water saving technologies in the western Middle East (Egypt, Israel, West
Bank, and Gaza). Frisvold and Caswell (2000) assess water management on the
Colorado and Rio Grande rivers along the US-Mexico border, using bargaining
theory. Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann (2004) use cooperative game theory to
analyse stable water allocations in the Euphrates and Tigris river basins (Turkey,
Syria, and Iraq). Bhaduri and Barbier (2008a,b) assess the feasibility of water
transfers in a game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in the Ganges basin.
Compared to non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory has been
applied to a lesser extent. A notable recent exception is Dinar et al. (2006) who de-
veloped cooperative approaches to water allocation, given stochastic river flow.
The only axiomatic6 approach to water allocation in river basins is by Ambec and
6Axiomatic studies use “axioms” or “properties” to uncover or select desirable solutions in a
multi-agent interaction (Thomson, 2001).
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Sprumont (2002). Their approach to water allocation in an (international) river
basin is a compromise between the principles of absolute territorial sovereignty
and absolute territorial integrity. This approach is discussed at length in the
chapters to come.
Two recent review papers on game theory and water allocation have ap-
peared. Parrachino et al. (2006) review the applicability of cooperative game
theory to water allocation, while Carraro et al. (2007) review the non-cooperative
approaches.
Although existing game-theoretic models of water allocation in transbound-
ary river basins have analysed a fair range of topics and river basins, many issues
remain to be researched. To mention a few, the stability of agreements is a topic
that has not been settled completely yet. Also, these analyses do not demonstrate
which factors cause actual negotiations on water allocation to be so cumbersome
and lengthy. In addition, the axiomatic approach has hardly been used to design
attractive sharing rules for water and makes for a wide open research area. The
objectives addressed in this thesis are described in the next section.
1.4 Objectives
In this thesis I analyse water allocation in transboundary river basins. The focus
of the thesis is on the strategic interaction between riparian countries in their
decisions on water use. This interaction determines on the one hand the precon-
ditions for official negotiations and agreements. On the other hand, interaction
occurs in the process of negotiation and bargaining over water itself. Both aspects
of this interaction will be covered.
To be specific, given the background information on water scarcity and the
institutional setting in sections 1.1 and 1.2, and given the existing approaches
reviewed in section 1.3, in this thesis I have four objectives that aim to answer
some of the open questions in this research area. These objectives are described
below.
Stability of water allocation agreements The evidence provided in section 1.2
demonstrates the lack of stability of water allocation agreements. When climate
change effects on river flow occur, as described in section 1.1, agreements need to
be flexible. Many, though, are not. It is unknown what happens when agreements
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with inflexible sharing rules are tested for their resilience against the impacts of
climate change. The objective is therefore to assess the stability of water allocation
agreements when climate change affects river flow.
The methodology to meet this objective is to construct a game-theoretic model
of water allocation in order to analyse the stability of three sharing rules for
water allocation in a two-country setting. Two of these sharing rules allocate
a fixed amount of water to one country. The third sharing rule allocates water
proportionally. In addition, the analysis considers two types of side payments;
one is constant, based on average river flow, and one is flexible, based on actual
river flow. This methodology allows to assess the stability of a wide range of
currently existing designs of water allocation agreements.
Design of self-enforcing agreements on river water Given that many types of
agreements are not stable, an open question is how to design an ex ante stable
agreement. Such an agreement is called self-enforcing. Self-enforcing agreements
have been analysed for many other topics, including the economics of climate
change (cf. Nagashima et al., 2009). A particular feature of agreements on river
water, however, is the hydro-geographical setting, as discussed in section 1.2.
The objective is therefore to analyse self-enforcing water allocation agreements.
The methodology to meet this objective is to construct a two-country repeated
extensive-form game of river water allocation with stochastic river flow. Before
the start of the first stage game, the outcome of a bargaining game determines
the agreement specifications: water allocation and side payments. In each stage
game, as water flows from one country to the other, the countries act sequen-
tially in using water and making side payments. In doing so, they decide to
cooperate or defect; that is to comply with specified agreement actions or not.
This methodology allows to assess under what conditions such agreements are
self-enforcing.
Bargaining over contested water rights With growing population and increas-
ing water demand, as discussed in section 1.1, the competition for water in
transboundary river basins is getting fiercer. Countries make claims to a share
of the water as we saw in section 1.2. This leads to situations where water rights
are contested and a source of conflict. Conflict seems a costly option compared
to settlement of the conflict and defining property rights to water. Yet, conflict
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occurs in many river basins. The question is why? The objective is therefore to
design a theory for continued conflict and undefined property rights to water.
The methodology to meet this objective is the analysis of a conflict model
in which water rights are contested. In the model, countries decide whether to
bargain over the allocation of contested river water or not. If not, they engage
in conflict. In the conflict, countries spend their resources on production, which
also requires water, or on fighting to secure part of the contested water. This
methodology allows to assess for which model parameters countries prefer not
to bargain an efficient allocation, but to engage in conflict.
Sharing rules for river water An axiomatic approach for the allocation of river
water to riparian countries starts with the formulation of the desired axioms.
These axioms capture reasonable or desirable features of an outcome of inter-
action between the countries. The specific hydro-geographical setting of river
basins, discussed in section 1.2 provides a challenging basis for the application
of axioms. The objective therefore is to construct an axiomatic approach for the
design of sharing rules for river water.
The methodology to meet this objective comes from the bankruptcy literature,
an axiomatic approach to solve the allocation of a resource among agents when
there is not enough to satisfy all demands. There are two additional features
in the setting of transboundary water allocation before sharing rules from this
literature can be applied. One is that the resource is distributed over the agents
in the form of rainfall and tributaries. The other is the linear ordering of the
countries along the river. Both features do not occur in bankruptcy problems
and should therefore be resolved appropriately. This methodology allows to
characterise an appropriate redistribution of the endowments of river water that
countries receive, based on a well-established axiomatic approach from a different
strand of literature.
1.5 Reading guide
Chapters 2–5 of this thesis each answer one of the four objectives introduced
above. Chapter 2 assesses the stability of water allocation agreements. Chap-
ter 3 analyses the design of self-enforcing agreements on river water. Chapter 4
designs a theory for continued conflict and undefined property rights to water.
20
Chapter 5 constructs an axiomatic approach for the design of sharing rules for
river water. Finally, in chapter 6, I draw some overall conclusions.
This thesis provides four distinct approaches to analyse water allocation in
transboundary river basins. Each of these approaches is grounded in game
theory, but—depending on parameter values—the outcomes of these approaches
on the allocation of water may differ substantially. One could question which
approach is the right one to meet the overall objective of this thesis. This question
does not have a straightforward answer. Instead, it may be more informative to
delineate the differences in the approaches used in the four subsequent chapters.
These differences are of course manifold, but the chapters can roughly be
classified based on three criteria. The first distinction between chapters can be
made based on the strategic interaction that was discussed in the beginning of
section 1.4. Chapter 4 deals with the preconditions for official negotiations by
analysing the role of lacking property rights over water. The other three chapters
(except maybe for chapter 2) concern the process of negotiation and bargaining
over water itself. The second distinction is the practical focus of the chapters.
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on agreement design and its effects on agreement stability.
Chapters 4 and 5, however, focus on the role of claims in the allocation of trans-
boundary river water. The third distinction concerns the methodological starting
point of analysis. Chapters 2 and 4 are positive, describing the current situation
in transboundary water allocation and its consequences for the efficiency and
stability of water use. Chapters 3 and 5 are more normative. In these chapters,
based on economic theory, an “ideal” water allocation agreement is developed
and sharing rules with attractive properties are constructed.
Although supplementary to each other, each chapter can be read in isolation
of the other chapters. The order of the chapters is according to my own sequence
of research ideas on water allocation in transboundary river basins. I expect it to
be a logical order.
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Chapter 2
The stability of water
allocation agreements∗
We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries.
Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to
be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this chapter we assess
the stability of water allocation agreements using a game-theoretic model. We
consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability.
Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an
agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect
on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed
amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These
results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.
∗This chapter is based on Ansink and Ruijs (2008). Climate change and the stability of water
allocation agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics 41(2), 249–266.
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2.1 Introduction
When countries share a river, they compete over available water resources. The
upstream country has the first option to use water, which may obstruct the
overall efficiency of water use (Barrett, 1994a). Cooperation between upstream
and downstream countries—in the form of a water allocation agreement—may
increase the efficiency of water use. Whether cooperation is stable, however,
depends on the design of the water allocation agreement. The stability of water
allocation agreements is the subject of this chapter.
In the 20th century, 145 international agreements on water use in transbound-
ary rivers were signed; 53 of these agreements cover water allocation issues
(Wolf, 1998). The majority of these water allocation agreements do not take into
account the hydrologic variability of river flow (Giordano and Wolf, 2003). This
is a shortcoming because variability is an important characteristic of river flow.
This variability will even increase in many river basins when the effects of climate
change on temperature and precipitation proceed as projected by climate simu-
lation models (IPCC, 2007b). These effects are expected to increase the variability
of the annual and seasonal flow patterns as well as the frequency of extreme
events in many river basins (Arnell, 1999b; Chalecki and Gleick, 1999; Voss et al.,
2002; Ra¨isa¨nen et al., 2004). Recognition of flow variability in the design of water
allocation agreements can increase the efficiency of these agreements.
Several studies have addressed this issue for two common sharing rules
for water allocation: proportional allocation and fixed flow allocation (for an
overview of sharing rules, see Dinar et al., 1997). Fixed flow allocations are most
common (Wolf, 1998) but tend to be less efficient when flow variability increases.
Bennett et al. (2000) compared the efficiency of fixed flow allocations with pro-
portional allocations and found that, in many situations, proportional allocations
are more efficient. Kilgour and Dinar (1995, 2001) developed a sharing rule that
ensures a Pareto-efficient allocation for every possible flow volume, where the
level of compensation paid by receivers of water is subject to annual bargaining.
Obviously, compared with a proportional or fixed flow allocation, this flexible
allocation is more efficient, but it requires accurate predictions of annual river
flow and flexibility in compensation payments. In a case study of the Colorado
river, Mendelsohn and Bennett (1997) found that the loss of efficiency related
to a change in mean river flow (e.g. because of climate change) is higher for a
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proportional allocation than for a fixed allocation, the main reason being that the
initial proportions used were inefficient. Another result was that the largest im-
pact of climate change on efficiency comes from changes in the mean river flow,
not from changes in the variance. Furthermore, in an analysis of US inter-state
water allocation agreements, Bennett and Howe (1998) found that agreement
compliance is higher for proportional than for fixed flow allocations.
Apart from being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in
order to be effective instruments to increase the efficiency of water use. Efficiency
and stability of agreements are not necessarily linked. Climate change, for in-
stance, may increase the benefits of cooperation to one country while decreasing
those to the other, leaving overall efficiency equal, but possibly giving the country
with decreased benefits an incentive to leave the agreement. Because agreements
are signed between sovereign nations, there is usually no higher level authority
that can enforce compliance. The stability of agreements therefore depends on
the distribution of the benefits of cooperation to the countries involved, which
can be analysed using game theory. Recent studies (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002;
Heintzelman, 2004; Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004; Wu and Whitting-
ton, 2006; Wang et al., 2008; Dinar, 2009) showed that water allocation agreements
can improve the efficiency of water use and that—when benefits of cooperation
are distributed properly—they can be attractive to all countries involved. This
game-theoretic literature, however, does not explicitly consider the effects of
climate change on river flow and agreement stability.
The objective of this chapter is to assess the stability of water allocation agree-
ments when climate change affects river flow. This is done by constructing a
game-theoretic model of water allocation that analyses stability of three sharing
rules for water allocation. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow
decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a
positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream
country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to
other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water
transfers. This chapter adds to the existing literature on flexibility of water al-
location agreements by studying the stability of different agreement designs (cf.
McCaffrey, 2003; Fischhendler, 2004; Drieschova et al., 2008; Kistin et al., 2008).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we present
background information for our model assumptions. In sections 2.3 and 2.4 we
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present our model and assess stability of cooperation. In section 2.5 we assess
stability effects of asymmetric countries. In section 2.6 we illustrate the effects of
climate change on the stability of cooperation for different sharing rules, using
a numerical example. In section 2.7 we discuss the results, and we conclude in
section 2.8.
2.2 Setting the stage
There is no standard water allocation agreement that can serve as a basis for
our model assumptions. Because of historical, hydro-geographical, economic,
and political reasons, the institutional setting of agreements shows a large va-
riety. In this section we provide some evidence for this variety. We focus on
three institutional aspects of water allocation agreements that are important for
our model assumptions: sharing rules, non-water transfers, and reactions to
noncompliance.
Sharing rules The vast majority of international agreements on water allocation
are bilateral. In fact, less than ten multilateral agreements on water allocation
are listed in the International Freshwater Treaties Database (e.g. the 1955 Jordan
agreement based on the Johnston negotiations, that was signed by Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria) (Beach et al., 2000). Because of this limited number of coun-
tries in a typical agreement, sharing rules are usually not complex. Generally,
they are based on a combination of historical rights, economic efficiency and the
principle of “reasonable and equitable sharing”, as defined in the 1966 Helsinki
Rules.
Two basic types of sharing rules are dominant. The first type, which is most
common, applies a percentage rule. An example is the 1975 Euphrates Agreement
(Iran, Iraq) in which the flows of the Bnava Suta, Qurahtu, and Gangir rivers were
divided equally (Beach et al., 2000). The second type guarantees a fixed amount of
water to one or both of the countries. An example is the 1959 Agreement between
Nepal and India on the Gandak irrigation and power project, in which irrigation
water was allocated for 40,000 acres in Nepal and 103,500 acres in India (Beach
et al., 2000). Combinations of these sharing rules are common too. An example
is the Nile Waters Agreement (Egypt, Sudan) that allocates 48,000 MCM/yr to
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Egypt and 4,000 MCM/yr to Sudan, based on acquired rights. Of the remaining
flow, 34% is allocated to Egypt and 66% to Sudan (NWA, 1959).
Non-water transfers In basins where water is scarce, water use by upstream
countries goes at the expense of downstream water use. A downstream country
can acquire additional water from the upstream country, using non-water trans-
fers. These transfers can be lump-sum payments, as in the 1960 Indus Waters
Treaty (India, Pakistan). This treaty—allocating the east tributaries of the river
to India and the west tributaries to Pakistan—included a one-time £ 62 million
lump-sum payment by India (Beach et al., 2000). These transfers can also be
annual payments, as in the treaty between Lesotho and South Africa called the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Under this treaty, South Africa pays non-water
transfers to Lesotho, increasing from e 14 million in 1998, when actual water de-
liveries started, toe 24 million in 2004 (LHDA, 2005). This example is exceptional
because in most cases non-water transfers are constant over time.
Another possibility is the use of transfers in-kind. Monetary payments may
be difficult from a political point of view or because the benefits from water are
hard to monetise. In-kind transfers can be achieved by linking water transfers
to other issues, that provide a benefit to the upstream country. For example, the
Netherlands linked the issue of water allocation in the Meuse river to the issue
of navigation on the Scheldt river. The Netherlands would gain from the water
allocation treaty, while Belgium would gain from the improved access to the
Antwerp harbour. Eventually, the agreement on water allocation in the Meuse
was linked to the routing of an international railway track (Mostert, 2003).
There exist many water allocation agreements where non-water transfers are
not part of the agreement, for various reasons. In the Nile basin, for instance,
the military threat posed by Egypt plays an important role for the absence of
non-water transfers. This threat can, nevertheless, be considered as equivalent
to a non-water transfer (cf. Janmaat and Ruijs, 2006). Another possible reason is
that the countries involved recognise historical water use or the equitable use of
a shared resource.
Reactions to noncompliance In principle, an upstream country can use any
available water whenever it wants, without considering downstream water
needs. History has shown that indeed upstream countries may do this. A
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famous example relates to India’s construction of the Farakka barrage in the
Ganges basin. After the construction, India extended its trial operation of the
barrage throughout the 1975–1976 dry season, diverting water away from the
Ganges and through the new canal at full capacity. This operation led to severe
water shortages in Bangladesh (Beach et al., 2000). A second example relates to
the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. A dispute on water rights
led India to divert all water supply away from Pakistan’s irrigation canals in
1948 (Barrett, 1994a). A third example is Turkey diverting all the water from the
Euphrates for a month to create a reservoir behind the newly constructed Atatu¨rk
Dam in 1990, depriving Syria and Iraq of water.
These examples show that ultimately the upstream country has the power
over shared water resources. Water rights that are specified in a water alloca-
tion agreement cannot be enforced by a downstream country.1 Especially so,
because there is no higher authority that can enforce compliance. In half of the
current water allocation agreements disputes are handled by advisory councils,
governments’ conflict-addressing bodies, the United Nations, or other third par-
ties (Wolf, 1998). The other half of the agreements does not refer to any form of
dispute resolution. The absence of a higher authority that can issue penalties is
clear. As a result, the only reasonable reaction to upstream noncompliance is to
stop or reduce any non-water transfers. This strategy can be most effective when
the issue of water allocation is linked to another transboundary issue between
the two countries (Folmer et al., 1993).
In addition to a possible reduction of non-water transfers, noncompliance is
likely to lead to a temporary pause of the agreement and requests for international
mediation. Examples of this situation have occurred for instance in the Indus
and Euphrates basins. After India diverted water away from Pakistan’s irrigation
canals in 1948, breaking the 1947 “Standstill Agreement”, four years passed before
renegotiations began. Another eight years later and with considerable support
from the World Bank, disagreement was settled and the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty
was signed (Beach et al., 2000). In the Euphrates basin, the 1987 security protocol
between Turkey and Syria guaranteed Syria an annual average minimum flow of
500 cubic meters per second. In return, Syria would cooperate in security matters,
related to its support to the Kurdish Workers’ Party in Turkey. The agreement
did not last long as Turkey continued the construction of a large-scale irrigation
1For an alternative perspective on this issue, see chapter 3.
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project, and Syria did not keep to its promise. Follow-up agreements in 1992 and
1993 failed for the same reason.
2.3 A model of cooperation
Based on the examples presented in section 2.2, we construct a two-country model
of cooperation. A river is shared by two countries i ∈ {u, d}, having its source
in the upstream country u and subsequently flowing through the downstream
country d. Qt denotes the volume of river flow in year t that is available for
use; it excludes the river flow necessary to sustain the environmental functioning
of the river system and other vital services such as navigation. Qt is defined
by probability density function f (Q) (cf. Krzysztofowicz, 2001). Contributions
to river flow in d are negligible as are return flows. Climate change effects on
river flow are included in the model by adapting the probability density function
from f (Q) to f ′(Q).
In year t, country i uses qi,t units of water. Because of the unidirectional flow
of water, u has the first option to use water, which may limit water use by d. All
water that was not used by u, is available for use by d:
0 ≤ qu,t ≤ Qt, (2.1)
0 ≤ qd,t ≤ Qt − qu,t. (2.2)
Benefits Bi,t(qi,t) from water use are increasing and concave with a maximum
at q¯i,t. Clearly, if u maximises benefits of water use, it does not have an incentive
to pass water with a positive marginal value to d. Yet, if the benefit to d of using
more water outweighs the decrease in benefits to u, there is scope for cooperation,
with u passing on water to d, in exchange for non-water transfers. Because we are
interested in such situations, we assume water scarcity such that q¯u,t + q¯d,t ≥ E[Qt].
When the possible gains from cooperation are fully captured, the water allocation
is Pareto-efficient. More specifically, a water allocation plan
(
q?u,t, q
?
d,t
)
is Pareto-
efficient for Qt, when Bu,t
(
q?u,t
)
+ Bd,t
(
q?d,t
)
≥ Bu,t (qu,t) + Bd,t (qd,t) ∀ (qu,t, qd,t). An
efficient agreement, however, is not necessarily stable, as will be illustrated in
section 2.6.
We analyse three common sharing rules:
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Proportional allocation (PA): u receives αQt and d receives (1 − α)Qt, with 0 <
α < 1;
Fixed upstream allocation (FU): u receives min{β,Qt} and d receives max{Qt −
β, 0}, with 0 < β < E[Qt];
Fixed downstream allocation (FD): u receives max{Qt − γ, 0} and d receives
min{γ,Qt}, with 0 < γ < E[Qt].
Because of water scarcity and increasing and concave benefit functions, and
because for each of these sharing rules we have that q′i,t ≥ qi,t if Q′t > Qt, we know
that cooperation increases total benefits of water use:
Bcu,t + B
c
d,t ≥ Bnu,t + Bnd,t ∀ Qt. (2.3)
where superscript c denotes cooperation, n denotes non-cooperation, and water
use—and therefore benefits—depends on the sharing rule agreed upon. Note
that we use Bci,t and B
n
i,t as shorthand notation for Bi,t(q
c
i,t) and Bi,t(q
n
i,t). Cooper-
ative benefits Bci,t are determined by the use of one of the three sharing rules.
Non-cooperative benefits Bni,t are determined by unilateral benefit maximisation.
That is, country i uses qni,t units of water such that B
n
i,t is maximised, subject to
constraints (2.1) and (2.2).
For cooperation to be attractive to u, we need to include non-water transfers mct
paid by d to u. These non-water transfers can be monetary (lump-sum or annual
side payments), in-kind, or based on issue linking, as discussed in section 2.2.
Because of this diversity in possible non-water transfers, we distinguish two
general types of non-water transfers. Type I—denoted by mI—has a constant
value over time, representing non-water transfers that cannot be easily adjusted
over time, such as issue linking. Type II—denoted by mIIt —has a value that
depends on Qt, representing non-water transfers that can be easily adjusted to
river flow in year t, such as monetary transfers. We assume that non-water
transfers are equal to the value of compensation of u for benefits foregone and a
share  of the additional benefits from cooperation. The two types of non-water
transfers, paid by d to u, are calculated as:
mI = E
[
Bnu,t − Bcu,t + 
((
Bcd,t + B
c
u,t
)
−
(
Bnd,t + B
n
u,t
))]
, (2.4)
mIIt = B
n
u,t − Bcu,t + 
((
Bcd,t + B
c
u,t
)
−
(
Bnd,t + B
n
u,t
))
. (2.5)
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with 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and E[mI] = E[mIIt ]. As can be seen from equations (2.4) and (2.5),
the only difference between mI and mIIt is that m
I is calculated based on expected
water use instead of current water use. Therefore, mI is constant while mIIt adjusts
to river flow in year t.
This method to calculate non-water transfers is commonly used in the litera-
ture on international environmental agreements. Chander and Tulkens (1997), for
instance, show that correctly designed side payments—resembling those in equa-
tions (2.4) and (2.5)—can stabilise international environmental agreements in a
setting of uniformly mixing pollutants. This method is also related to the Nash
bargaining solution; a common solution concept from non-cooperative game
theory. The Nash bargaining solution of a game maximises (xu − zu)(xd − zd),
subject to (xu, xd) ∈ F, where F is the feasible set of payoff vectors and (zu, zd) are
non-cooperative payoffs (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Here, the non-water
transfers are calculated according to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
We analyse the stability of cooperation using an infinitely repeated game—
a common approach in the analysis of international environmental agreements
(cf. Finus, 2002)—because water allocation agreements typically do not have
a specified termination date. The stage game in year t is played as follows.
First, a value of Qt is realised from its probability distribution and observed
by the countries. Second, u chooses qu,t. If complying with the agreement,
u plays qu,t = qcu,t according to the selected sharing rule. If not complying,
u plays qu,t = qnu,t = min{q¯u,t,Qt}. Third, d observes u’s action and chooses mt.
If complying with the agreement, d plays mt = mct (which equals m
I or mIIt , as
specified in the agreement). If not complying, d plays mt = mnt = 0. Fourth,
u observes d’s action and both countries receive their payoff.
The decision to comply or not comply in year t is based on the expected
payoff stream: E
[
Πi,t
]
= max
(
E
[
Πci,t
]
,E
[
Πni,t
])
. We re-interpret the common
reactions to noncompliance discussed in section 2.2 to punishment strategies.
We assume that both countries use a trigger strategy: when a country is not
complying, it is punished by the other country in the form of p years non-
cooperative play of the stage game, after which countries expect to return to
cooperative play (i.e. agreement strategies). The type of punishment used here
differs from Bennett and Howe (1998), who used monetary penalties in their
analysis of cooperation between US states. Based on the examples presented in
section 2.2, we assume here that there is no authority that can issue such penalties
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in case of noncompliance. The expected payoff streams to u and d for compliance
in year t equal:
E
[
Πcu,t
]
= Bcu,t + m
c +
∞∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bcu,τ + m
c
τ
])
, (2.6)
E
[
Πcd,t
]
= Bcd,t −mc +
∞∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bcd,τ −mcτ
])
. (2.7)
where δ is the discount factor. The expected payoff streams to u and d for
noncompliance in year t equal:
E
[
Πnu,t
]
= Bnu,t +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bnu,τ
])
+
∞∑
τ=t+p+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bcu,τ + m
c
τ
])
, (2.8)
E
[
Πnd,t
]
= Bcd,t +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bnd,τ
])
+
∞∑
τ=t+p+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bcd,τ −mcτ
])
. (2.9)
The differences, Du and Dd, equal the increase in expected payoffs due to non-
compliance by u or d:2
Du = Bnu,t − Bcu,t −mc +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bnu,τ − Bcu,τ −mcτ
])
, (2.10)
Dd = mc +
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bnd,τ − Bcd,τ + mcτ
])
. (2.11)
Positive values of Di imply that country i has an incentive to deviate from the
agreement. Substituting equations (2.4) and (2.5) into equations (2.10) and (2.11),
we can derive Du and Dd for the two types of transfers, see the Appendix. For
type I transfers, Dd is independent from the level of Qt and therefore constant for
a given probability distribution of Q. Because an agreement would not be signed
if Dd ≥ 0 at the expected value of river flow, we consider only those situations
where Dd is negative for any Qt. Therefore, d will never have an incentive to
deviate from the agreement.
2Note that we calculate Dd assuming that u complies with the agreement. Because we are primarily
interested in the stability of the agreement—and not payoffs or efficiency—it is irrelevant which of
the two countries deviates in a certain year. Any anticipated noncompliance by u (because it expects d
to not comply in that year) does therefore not affect the results.
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For type II transfers, Du depends on a share of non-cooperative benefits minus
cooperative benefits at current river flow plus the negative punishment term.
Because cooperation is attractive—see equation (2.3)—we know that Du < 0,
which implies that u will never have an incentive to deviate from the agreement.
Concluding this section, the type of transfers that is used has implications
for countries’ incentives to comply with the agreement. With type I (constant)
transfers, d never has an incentive to deviate from the agreement, but u may
deviate if gains from non-cooperation outweigh the fixed transfer. With type II
(flexible) transfers, u never has an incentive to deviate from the agreement, but
d may deviate if the transfer outweighs its foregone benefits in the punishment
period. In the next section, we will assess the stability of cooperation with climate
change effects and different sharing rules.
2.4 Analysing stability
The folk theorem tells us that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium as
long as punishments are severe enough. When discounted payoffs of cooperation
outweigh the sum of discounted payoffs of noncompliance in one year and Nash-
payoffs during the subsequent punishment phase, an agreement is stable in that
particular year.
Because of the uncertainty of payoffs in our model, through the stochastic
variable Q, it is not possible to assess whether cooperation is stable or not. It
is, however, possible to assess the probability of stability. To do this, we need
to determine values of Qt for which the agreement is not stable in year t; i.e.
where either Du ≥ 0 or Dd ≥ 0. Let the set Qˆ ⊂ Q contain these values. We
know that Qˆ is a proper subset of Q, because an agreement would not be signed
if Du ≥ 0 or Dd ≥ 0 at the expected value of river flow. Therefore E[Qt] < Qˆ.
Because benefit functions Bi,t(qi,t) are increasing and concave (see section 2.3), we
can derive some properties of Du and Dd that help to specify Qˆ further, using
equations (2.10) and (2.11) and the fact that qnu,t ≥ qcu,t. In case of type I transfers,
Du is a single-peaked function of Qt, and Dd has a constant negative value. In
case of type II transfers, Dd is a single-peaked function of Qt, and Du is always
negative. This implies that, for both type I and II transfers, Qˆ is a continuous set.
Because Qˆ is a continuous set, and because we focus on water scarcity, we assume
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that Qt < E[Qt] ∀Qt ∈ Qˆ. This assumption is based on the idea that scarcity is the
cause of instability of water allocation agreements, as discussed in section 2.2.
Having specified Qˆ, we can express the probability of stability as Pr[Qt <
Qˆ]. Given that f (Q) is the probability density function of Q, we can calculate
Pr
[
Qt < Qˆ
]
as the area under f (Q) where Qt < Qˆ. Denote lower and upper
bounds of Qˆ by Qˆ− and Qˆ+, then the probability of stability of an agreement
equals:
Pr
[
Qt < Qˆ
]
= 1 −
∫ Qˆ+
Qˆ−
f (Q)dQ. (2.12)
Equation (2.12) is illustrated in figure 2.1. In the remainder of this chapter we will
use this expression as our stability indicator and refer to it simply as “stability”.
Qˆ− Qˆ+ Q⋆ ≈ E(Qt) Q
f(Q)
Figure 2.1: An example of a (gamma) probability density function for Qt. Stability
is calculated according to equation (2.12); it equals the area under f (Q) excluding
the shaded area.
We are interested in probability density functions of Q without and with
climate change. A comparison of the stability in each situation shows how climate
change affects the stability of cooperation. Because Qˆ− and Qˆ+ are constant (i.e.
independent from Qt), we can compare stability of an agreement for f (Q) (no
climate change) and f ′(Q) (climate change). Stability in a situation with climate
change is lower when it decreases Pr
[
Qt < Qˆ
]
, increasing the size of the shaded
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area in figure 2.1. Climate change is expected to affect river flow through the
combined effects of changes in temperature, evaporation, soil moisture, and
precipitation. Two general results of climate simulation models are (i) increased
runoff variability, both within seasons and within years, and (ii) an increase of
river flow in cold river basins and a decrease in warmer regions (cf. Arnell,
1999b; Ra¨isa¨nen et al., 2004; IPCC, 2007a). For the probability distribution of Q
this implies a change in the mean river flow and an increased variance of river
flow.
Note that climate change effects do not affect stability if Qˆ = ∅. If an agreement
is stable for f (Q), it is stable for any f ′(Q) , f (Q). If Qˆ , ∅, climate change effects
on stability depend on whether they affect the size of the shaded area in figure 2.1.
Note that the exact location and size of this shaded area depend on whether type I
or type II transfers are used.
Recall that we assume Qt < E[Qt] ∀ Qt ∈ Qˆ. Clearly, the functional form
of f (Q) has implications for climate change effects on stability. Commonly applied
distributions in the literature on probabilistic hydrological forecasting include the
gamma and (log-) normal distributions (cf. Bobee and Ashkar, 1991). In a survey
of close to 1000 sites worldwide, Finlayson and McMahon (1992) found that
the annual streamflow of about 60% of these sites can be approximated by the
normal distribution. This implies that f (Q) is continuous, increasing up to E[Qt],
and symmetric by approximation (figure 2.1 depicts a gamma distribution that
is approximately symmetric).
An increased variance of river flow implies that more weight is given to the
tails of the probability density function. The effect of increased variance therefore
depends on the size and location of Qˆ. The only information on the lower and
upper bounds of Qˆ we have is that Qˆ− ≤ Qˆ+ < E[Qt]. The size and location of Qˆ
are bounded only by the lowest value of Q and E[Qt]. Therefore, the effect of
increased variance of river flow on stability can be positive or negative. If Qˆ− is
located close to the lowest value of Q, an increased variance is likely to increase
the size of the shaded area and decrease stability. If Qˆ+ is located close to E[Qt],
an increased variance is likely to decrease the size of the shaded area and increase
stability.
Consider a decreasing mean river flow. Because of the properties of f (Q),
established above, a decreasing mean river flow will decreases stability as long
as f
(
Qˆ−
)
≤ f
(
Qˆ+
)
, see figures 2.2–2.3. The reverse holds for increasing mean
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river flow. Because of symmetry of f (Q), we know that E[Qt] ≈ Q?, where Q?
equals Q for which f (Q) is maximised, see figure 2.1. Therefore, we can generalise
that f
(
Qˆ−
)
≤ f
(
Qˆ+
)
∀ Qˆ. Consequently, a decrease (increase) in mean river flow
decreases (increases) stability. More formally, given the above observations we
have:
1 −
∫ Qˆ+
Qˆ−
f (Q)dQ > 1 −
∫ Qˆ+
Qˆ−
f ′(Q)dQ if E[Qt]| f (Q) > E[Qt]| f ′(Q). (2.13)
This proofs the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the probability
density function of river flow. Stability decreases if mean river flow decreases. An
increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability.
Note that this proposition holds for both types of transfers, although the size
of the effect may be different.
We expect the stability of cooperation to be different for different sharing
rules. To verify this expectation, we compare Qˆ for the three sharing rules. In the
comparison, we set αE[Qt] = β = E[Qt] − γ, such that at Qt = E[Qt] the allocation
of water is similar for each sharing rule. In calculating Qˆ from equations (2.10)
and (2.11) we can ignore all constant elements, such as the punishment terms,
because they are equal for all three sharing rules. Because we assume that all
elements in Qˆ lie below E[Qt], we only look at the situation where Qt < E[Qt].
Note that if Qt < E[Qt], we have Qt − γ < αQt < β.
In case of type I transfers, we use equation (2.10), from which we cancel all
constant terms, which leaves the term −Bcu,t to be compared for the three sharing
rules. For type I transfers, this comparison gives DFDu > DPAu > DFUu ∀ Qt < E[Qt].
In case of type II transfers, we use equation (2.11), from which we cancel all
constant terms, which leaves the term (Bcu,t + B
c
d,t) − Bcu,t to be compared for the
three sharing rules. For type II transfers, this comparison gives DFDd > D
PA
d >
DFUd ∀ Qt < E[Qt]. Because both Du and Dd are single-peaked, we have for both
types of transfers:
QˆFU ⊂ QˆPA ⊂ QˆFD. (2.14)
Because stability is defined according to equation (2.12), stability is highest for FU
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and lowest for FD. Formally, from equations (2.12) and (2.14) we can construct:
1 −
∫ Qˆ+FU
Qˆ−FU
f (Q)dQ > 1 −
∫ Qˆ+PA
Qˆ−PA
f (Q)dQ > 1 −
∫ Qˆ+FD
Qˆ−FD
f (Q)dQ. (2.15)
This proofs the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the sharing rule.
It is higher for fixed upstream allocation than for proportional allocation and lowest for
fixed downstream allocation.
For type I transfers, this proposition is a direct consequence of the amount of
risk connected to low flows that is allocated to u. For FU, this risk is minimised
as u receives a fixed amount of water, constrained only by the amount of river
flow available. For FD, this risk is maximised because if river flow decreases by
one unit, the allocation to u may also decrease by one unit. For PA, this risk lies
somewhere between those of FU and FD.
For type II transfers, the intuition behind this proposition is that the transfer
includes a compensation for benefits foregone to u. For Qt < E[Qt], this compen-
sation is higher for FD than for PA and lowest for FU. Because of the sequential
setting of the stage game, d first receives water and then decides whether or
not to pay the transfer. The size of the transfer relative to the punishment term
determines whether d complies with the agreement. Clearly, incentives for non-
compliance are higher for FD than for PA and lowest for FU.
Taking a closer look at FU with type I transfers, we find that u can never
have an incentive to deviate from the agreement. To prove this result, we show
that Du for type I transfers—see equation (2.10)—is always negative for FU. First
we find the value of qu,t for which Du is maximised. Note that we can ignore
the punishment term and non-water transfers because they are constant, so we
consider the maximisation problem maxqu,t Bnu,t−Bcu,t. There are three possibilities:
1. if Qt < β < q¯u,t then qnu,t = Qt and q
c
u,t = Qt;
2. if β < Qt < q¯u,t then qnu,t = Qt and q
c
u,t = β;
3. if q¯u,t ≤ Qt then qnu,t = q¯u,t and qcu,t = β.
Clearly, in the last situation, Bnu,t − Bcu,t is maximised. We argue that the last situ-
ation includes Qt = E[Qt], because we assume that q¯u,t ≤ E[Qt]. This assumption
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is based on the idea that in the short term, u’s economy and infrastructure are not
designed to abstract and use (much) more water than is expected in a given year.3
Because we may assume that Du < 0 and that Du is maximised for Qt = E[Qt],
we know that Du < 0 for any level of Qt. It follows that Qˆ = ∅ for FU with type I
transfers. Hence Pr[Qt < Qˆ] = 1; FU with type I transfers is stable. This proofs
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Water allocation agreements with fixed upstream allocation and con-
stant transfers are stable for any level of river flow.
2.5 Asymmetry
In this section, we assess the effects on stability of asymmetry in political power
and benefit functions. For both factors we assess how they affect stability before
and after an agreement has been signed.
As described by LeMarquand (1977), the distribution of political power has
implications for the incentives for cooperation. In our model we can incorporate
this aspect through the level of , which we define here to be a measure of political
power for the upstream country. When benefit functions are symmetric, Kilgour
and Dinar (2001) have shown that in an efficient situation, the surplus benefit is
equally shared between the two countries; in our model this implies that  = 0.5.
Examples analysed by Zeitoun and Warner (2006), however, show that power
symmetry may be an exception.
When  < 0.5, d has more political power than u and therefore a stronger
bargaining position. As a result, the non-water transfer from d to u is lower than
in a situation with equally distributed political power. To assess the effect of
political power on stability, we take the derivative of equation (2.10) for type I
transfers and (2.11) for type II transfers, with respect to :
∂Du
∂
=
t+p∑
τ=t
(
δτ−tE
[(
Bnd,τ + B
n
u,τ
)
−
(
Bcd,τ + B
c
u,τ
)])
< 0, (2.16)
∂Dd
∂
=
(
Bcd,t + B
c
u,t
)
−
(
Bnd,t + B
n
u,t
)
+
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[(
Bcd,τ + B
c
u,τ
)
−
(
Bnd,τ + B
n
u,τ
)])
> 0.
(2.17)
3If q¯u,t  E[Qt], FU is unstable for Qt large enough.
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Because of equation (2.3), equation (2.16) yields a negative and (2.17) yields a
positive value. For type I transfers, an increase of  leads to a decrease of Du,
increasing the stability for each level of river flow. For type II transfers, an
increase of  leads to an increase of Dd, decreasing the stability for each level of
river flow. This result holds for each sharing rule. The intuition behind this result
is that when  is high, the non-water transfer is high relative to benefits foregone
to u, making cooperation more attractive to u and less attractive to d.
For type I transfers, changes in the distribution of political power after an
agreement has been signed have no effect on stability because the effect of 
on Du works via mI, which has been fixed. Of course, it is well possible that a
change in political power leads to renegotiations of the terms of the agreement,
with a more favourable outcome for the more powerful country. If the upstream
country is the winner of these renegotiations,  will increase, Du will decrease
and the agreement will be more stable. If the downstream country is the winner
of these renegotiations,  will decrease, Du will increase and the agreement will
be less stable.
Asymmetry in benefit functions between countries is assessed by scaling u’s
benefit function by a factor η: Bu,t = ηh(qu,t) and Bd,t = h(qd,t). To assess the effect
on stability for both types of transfers, we analyse how η affects Du and Dd by
taking the derivatives of equation (2.10) for type I transfers and (2.11) for type II
transfers, with respect to η:
∂Du
∂η
= h
(
qnu,t
)
− h
(
qcu,t
)
+ 
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
h
(
qnu,τ
)
− h
(
qcu,τ
)])
> 0, (2.18)
∂Dd
∂η
= (1 − )
[
h
(
qnu,t
)
− h
(
qcu,t
)]
+ (1 − )
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
h
(
qnu,τ
)
− h
(
qcu,τ
)])
> 0.
(2.19)
Equations (2.18) and (2.19) both yield positive values, because the non-coope-
rative benefits to u outweigh the cooperative benefits, both at current and ex-
pected levels of river flow. An increase of η leads to an increase of Du with
type I transfers and Dd with type II transfers, decreasing the stability for each
level of river flow. This result holds for each sharing rule. For any agreement,
the higher the marginal benefits of water use to u compared with those to d, the
lower the stability of cooperation. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
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For type I transfers, higher marginal benefits to u increase its expected payoffs
of noncompliance more than the transfer it receives from d. For type II transfers,
higher marginal benefits to u increase the transfer that d has to pay to u, giving d
a higher incentive to deviate.
For type I transfers, changes in η after an agreement has been signed can also
be calculated. Such a change may occur because of demographic or economic
developments. This effect does not influence mI, because mI has been fixed in
the agreement. Therefore, to assess the effect on stability, we analyse how η
affects Du by taking the derivative of equation (2.10) with respect to η, similar to
equation (2.18), but assuming that mI is fixed:
∂mI
∂η
= 0. (2.20)
Combining equations (2.18) and (2.20) gives:
∂Du
∂η
= h
(
qnu,t
)
− h
(
qcu,t
)
+
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
h
(
qnu,τ
)
− h
(
qcu,τ
)])
> 0. (2.21)
Equation (2.21) yields a positive value. For type I transfers, an increase of η after
an agreement has been signed leads to an increase of Du, decreasing the stability
for each level of river flow. This result holds for each sharing rule. For any
agreement, if marginal benefits to u increase after the agreement has been signed,
the stability of cooperation decreases.
The results of this section are summarised in proposition 2.4. Given deriva-
tives (2.16)–(2.19) and (2.21), a positive sign of the derivative indicates an upward
shift of the Du or Dd curve, see equations (2.10) and (2.11). Because these curves
are single-peaked, an upward shift of the Du or Dd curve decreases Qˆ− and in-
creases Qˆ+, which decreases the stability indicator 1 − ∫ Qˆ+Qˆ− f (Q)dQ. This proofs
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. Stability of a water allocation agreement depends on the level of
symmetry of the countries. For type I (type II) transfers, stability is higher (lower) when
the upstream county has more political power. For both types of transfers, stability is
higher when the upstream country has lower benefits of water use than the downstream
country.
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2.6 Numerical example
To illustrate propositions 2.1–2.3, we use the following numerical example:
Bi,t = 75qi,t − 1.5q2i,t E[Qt] = 40
δ = 0.95 α = 0.5
p = 5 β = 20
 = 0.5 γ = 20
The values for α, β, and γ are chosen such that at Qt = E[Qt] the allocation
of water is similar for each sharing rule. Because the countries have identical
benefit functions, the allocation is optimal when Qt = E[Qt].4 Furthermore, for
each sharing rule, cooperation is attractive to both countries for Qt = E[Qt],
because countries would never agree to cooperate if there was no expected gain
from cooperation.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 plot Du and Dd for different levels of Qt, for the three
sharing rules. In both figures we observe that the size of Qˆ for the three sharing
rules is according to equation (2.14). Corresponding to results 2 and 3, the
incentive to deviate is highest for FD and lowest for FU. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show
that efficiency does not guarantee stability. Because the countries have identical
benefit functions, PA provides a Pareto-efficient water allocation for each level
of Qt. Nevertheless, figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that this efficient allocation is not
always stable. The reason for the decrease in Du and Dd for Qt less than ±20 is
the decreasing gain of noncompliance relative to the punishment.
The stability of cooperation depends on the probability distribution of Q.
In this example we use an (approximately symmetric) gamma distribution to
describe f (Q) and f ′(Q). The effect of a change in the mean or variance of river
flow on the stability of cooperation is shown in figures 2.4 and 2.5, for PA and
both types of transfers. The mean river flow refers to the mean of f ′(Q), the
probability density function of Qt when climate change effects occur.5
4Because the countries have identical benefit functions in this example, PA will provide a more
efficient allocation than FU or FD when climate change effects occur: the total benefits of water use
are maximised. This property of the model is similar to results from efficiency studies that were
surveyed in section 2.1 (cf. Bennett et al., 2000).
5The calculation of expected benefits is still based on E[Q] = 40—the mean of the original prob-
ability density function f (Q)—because the agreement will not be immediately adapted at the first
signs of climate change effects on river flow. Governments need reliable information before they are
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Figure 2.2: The increase in expected payoffs due to noncompliance to u (for type
I transfers), for different levels of Qt and different sharing rules.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate proposition 2.1: a decrease in mean river flow
decreases stability. When mean river flow decreases beyond Qˆ+, the effect of
changes in variance switches sign, illustrating that an increase in variance can
have positive or negative effects on stability. Note that the fact that type I transfers
are more stable than type II transfers is due to this specific numerical example.
2.7 Discussion
The analysis presented here shows that climate change affects the stability of
water allocation agreements. The precise effect on stability depends on (i) the
characteristics of the river basin: its hydrological regime and the effects of climate
change on river flow, and (ii) the characteristics of the agreement: in particular
willing to change conditions of this type of agreements; long-term observations are needed before
a change in the probability distribution of river flow can be assessed. Note that a change in river
flow that results in a mean below 20 is not included in figures 2.4 and 2.5. For this type of extreme
changes in mean river flow it would not be realistic to assume that the expected level of river flow
remains E[Qt] = 40.
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Figure 2.3: The increase in expected payoffs due to noncompliance to d (for type
II transfers), for different levels of Qt and different sharing rules.
the sharing rule, the type of non-water transfers, the countries’ benefit functions,
and the distribution of political power. Because the results show that stability
decreases when water becomes more scarce, this result is relevant for river basins
in both arid regions and in regions where impact studies project large effects of
climate change on river flow.
Mendelsohn and Bennett (1997) find that the impact of climate change on
the mean river flow is a far more important determinant for efficiency than its
impact on the variance of river flow. Our model suggests that this conclusion
may not hold for the stability of cooperation. Stability is affected by changes in
both mean and variance of river flow, so both have to be taken into account when
negotiating agreements on water allocation.
Besides economic gain, there are other issues that affect the allocation of water
to riparian countries and the stability of cooperation. First, as the example of the
Nile river basin points out, acquired water rights can be an important determinant
in the allocation of river water. A sharing rule based on acquired rights is not
expected to be optimal from the points of view of efficiency and stability. Second,
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Figure 2.4: Stability—Pr[Qt < Qˆ]—of an agreement with a PA sharing rule when
climate change affects the mean river flow or the variance of river flow, for type I
transfers, u might deviate. Mean and variance are based on f ′(Q), the probability
density function of Qt when climate change effects occur. Similar graphs can be
derived for FU and FD, the only difference being a horizontal shift of the curves.
risk aversion might play a role. A country receiving a fixed allocation faces a
lower risk of flow variability than a country that receives a non-fixed allocation
or a proportional allocation (cf. Bennett et al., 2000). More risk-averse countries
will prefer fixed allocations over proportional allocations. We expect stability to
be positively affected by risk aversion as risk averse countries would appraise
the certitude of cooperative benefits above non-cooperative benefits more than
risk neutral countries.
Two approaches could be used to decrease the risk associated with low flows
and generate more stable agreements. First, both upstream and downstream
countries could decide to invest in reservoir capacity. When managed properly,
reservoirs can provide a buffer in water supply, decreasing the dependency on
river water in low flow years (Janmaat and Ruijs, 2007). Second, a water al-
location agreement can be extended with water trading, which could increase
stability (cf. Booker and Young, 1994). Water markets can improve the efficiency
of existing water allocations such that both countries benefit. There are, however,
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Figure 2.5: Similar to figure 2.4, for type II transfers, d might deviate.
some institutional impediments to transboundary water trading, as discussed in
chapter 1. Both approaches, though, may reduce the incentive to break an existing
agreement.
In theory, the use of punishment strategies enhances cooperation in a repeated
game. In our model, however, punishment decreases payoffs of both the pun-
ished and the punishing country, because the non-cooperative outcome gives the
punishing country lower payoffs than the cooperative outcome. Shortening the
punishment period is therefore always beneficial to the punishing country. This
undermines its credibility of actually going to punish in case of noncompliance.
A lack of credibility of punishment strategies can obstruct the effective use of
punishment strategies in international agreements on water allocation (Carraro
et al., 2005). Ansink (2009a, see chapter 3) assesses self-enforcing water allocation
agreements that solve this credibility problem. The examples in section 2.2, how-
ever, show that this type of behaviour is not common. Moreover, the punishment
period can be used by the harmed country to gain international support in the
dispute over water, which can strengthen its bargaining position in renegotia-
tions. Ideally, punishment is implemented in a linked game, which does not
affect the benefits of the punishing country.
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2.8 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter is to assess the stability of water allocation agree-
ments when climate change affects river flow. A game-theoretic model is con-
structed that analyses the stability of cooperation in water allocation between
two countries for three sharing rules. The stability of cooperation is expressed
in terms of the probability that one of the two countries does not comply with
the specified agreement actions, given that the countries maximise their expected
payoff stream (consisting of benefits of water use and non-water transfers).
For each sharing rule, deviation from agreement actions is found unattractive
to the downstream country (d) with constant transfers and unattractive to the
upstream country (u) with flexible transfers. The stability of agreements depends
on the probability distribution of Q. Our results show that a decrease in mean
river flow decreases the stability of cooperation. An increased variance can have
a positive or a negative effect on stability. Of the three sharing rules that were
analysed, agreements with FU are more stable than those with PA and FD, for
both constant and flexible transfers. With constant transfers, FU was found stable
for any level of river flow.
In addition to the probability distribution of river flow and the sharing rule,
three other factors are identified to affect stability of cooperation. The stability of
cooperation is higher if the absolute value of the punishment term is higher, and
if u’s benefits of water use are low relative to d’s benefits. If u’s political power is
large relative to d’s political power, stability is higher for constant transfers, but
lower for flexible transfers.
This chapter shows that the stability of water allocation agreements can be
affected by climate change. This chapter adds to the analysis of water alloca-
tion agreements by focusing on stability aspects, where others have focused on
efficiency aspects. Where Bennett et al. (2000) found that proportional alloca-
tions are more efficient in many situations, we find that proportional allocations
are less stable than fixed upstream allocations. Where Mendelsohn and Bennett
(1997) found that the largest impact of climate change on efficiency comes from
changes in the mean river flow, we find that both changes in mean and variance
affect stability. Because water allocation agreements need to be stable in order
to increase the efficiency of water use, the results of this chapter are important
for the design of water allocation agreements and especially the selection of a
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sharing rule.
Appendix: Derivations
Substituting equation (2.4) into equation (2.10) for type I transfers yields:
Du = Bnu,t − Bcu,t︸     ︷︷     ︸
≥ 0
−E
[
Bnu,t
]
+ E
[
Bcu,t
]
︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
≤ 0
−
t+p∑
τ=t
(
δτ−tE
[
Bcd,τ + B
c
u,τ − Bnd,τ − Bnu,τ
])
,︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
≤ 0
Dd = E
[
Bnu,t
]
− E
[
Bcu,t
]
︸              ︷︷              ︸
≥ 0
+ E
[
Bcd,t + B
c
u,t − Bnd,t − Bnu,t
]
︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
≥ 0
 + ( − 1) t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−t
) ,︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
R 0
with  and p such that Dd < 0 at E[Qt].
Substituting equation (2.5) into equation (2.11) for type II transfers yields:
Du = 
[(
Bnd,t + B
n
u,t
)
−
(
Bcd,t + B
c
u,t
)]
︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
≤ 0
+(1 − )
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bnu,τ + B
n
d,τ − Bcu,τ − Bcd,τ
])
,︸                                                       ︷︷                                                       ︸
≤ 0
Dd = Bnu,t − Bcu,t︸     ︷︷     ︸
≥ 0
+
[
Bcu,t + B
c
d,t − Bnu,t − Bnd,t
]
︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
≥ 0
+(1 − )
t+p∑
τ=t+1
(
δτ−tE
[
Bnu,τ + B
n
d,τ − Bcu,τ − Bcd,τ
])
.︸                                                       ︷︷                                                       ︸
≤ 0
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Chapter 3
Self-enforcing agreements
on water allocation∗
Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently
unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of
drought. The objective of this chapter is to analyse whether water allocation
agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of
bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining
game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide
whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions
such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show
that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained
in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink
the set of possible agreements to approach a unique self-enforcing agreement.
The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the “downstream
incremental distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns
all gains from cooperation to downstream countries.
∗This chapter is based on Ansink (2009a). Self-enforcing agreements on water allocation. Wa-
geningen University, mimeo.
49
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I analyse an agreement that is based on the outcome of a bargain-
ing game. This game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which
countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. The motivating
example for this particular setup are agreements on river water allocation.
In an international river basin, when water is scarce, countries may exchange
water for side payments (Carraro et al., 2007). This type of exchange is generally
formalised in a water allocation agreement. The aim of water allocation agree-
ments is to increase the overall efficiency of water use. This increase in efficiency
can be obstructed by the stochastic nature of river flow, because countries may
find it profitable to break the agreement in case of drought. A recent example
is Mexico’s failure to meet its required average water deliveries under the 1944
US-Mexico Water Treaty in the years 1992–1997 (Gaste´lum et al., 2009). Addi-
tional case study evidence on agreement breakdowns because of droughts can be
found in Barrett (1994a), Beach et al. (2000), Bernauer (2002), and Siegfried and
Bernauer (2007). Only a minority of current international agreements take into
account the variability of river flow (Giordano and Wolf, 2003; Fischhendler, 2004,
2008). Most agreements do not; they either allocate fixed or proportional shares,
or they are ambiguous in their schedule for water allocation. Both the efficiency
(Bennett et al., 2000) and stability (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008, see chapter 2) of such
agreements may be hampered. These effects could be worsened by the impacts
of climate change on river flow (McCaffrey, 2003; Drieschova et al., 2008).
In order to accommodate for stochastic river flow, Kilgour and Dinar (2001)
developed a flexible water allocation agreement that provides an efficient al-
location for every possible level of river flow. This agreement maximises the
overall benefits of water use, after which side payments are made such that each
country benefits from cooperation. This flexible agreement assures efficiency, but
not stability because it ignores the repeated interaction of countries over time.
Countries have an incentive to defect from the agreement when the benefits of de-
fecting outweigh the benefits of compliance. Note that there is no supra-national
authority that can enforce this type of international agreements. This implies
that a stable agreement has to be self-enforcing in the sense that both countries
should find it in their interest to comply with the agreement (Barrett, 1994b).1 In
1Often, the term self-enforcing agreement refers to agreements that satisfy internal and external
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such a setting, renegotiation-proofness of the agreement is a natural requirement
(Bergin and MacLeod, 1993; Barrett, 2003).
The objective of this chapter is to analyse self-enforcing water allocation agree-
ments. Each year, countries decide whether or not to comply with specified
agreement actions. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-
enforcing, given stochastic river flow.2 To do so, I construct a two-country re-
peated extensive-form game of river water allocation with stochastic river flow.
Before the start of the first stage game, the outcome of a bargaining game de-
termines the agreement specifications: water allocation and side payments. In
each stage game, as water flows from one country to the other, the countries act
sequentially in using water and making side payments. In doing so, they decide
to cooperate or defect; that is to comply with specified agreement actions or not.
Using the theory of repeated extensive-form games (Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky, 1995; Wen, 2002), I show that this game setting implies that any efficient
agreement can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. When rene-
gotiation-proofness is required, every subgame perfect equilibrium is renego-
tiation-proof, provided that side payments are sufficiently small. For sufficiently
high discounting, however, the set of possible agreements converges to approach
a unique self-enforcing agreement. This particular agreement implements the
“downstream incremental distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water alloca-
tion constructed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). The solution induced by this
agreement is efficient and assigns all gains from cooperation to the downstream
country, as discussed in section 3.4. This distribution of the gains from cooper-
ation contrasts with the assumption in much of the river sharing literature that
being upstream increases a country’s power in the basin (cf. LeMarquand, 1977;
Wolf, 1998; Barrett, 2003; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Carraro et al., 2007).
The results of this chapter are driven by the combination of the sequential
structure of the game with the requirement of renegotiation-proofness. The
sequential structure of the game leads to asymmetry in punishment options to
deter defection. The bargaining outcome is sensitive to assumptions on this
stability (Barrett, 1994b). I follow McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) by using the term to refer to the
enforcement of compliance with agreements once they are in place.
2This chapter is therefore a contribution to the challenge raised by Carraro et al. (2007): “Water
resources are intrinsically unpredictable, and the wide fluctuations in water availability are likely to
become more severe over the years. Formally addressing the stochasticity of the resource, as well as
the political, social, and strategic feasibility of any allocation scheme, would significantly contribute
to decreasing conflicts over water.”
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sequential structure. This clarifies that the distribution of bargaining power over
the riparian countries depends heavily on the design of the agreement.
This chapter makes three novel contributions. First, I provide a self-enforcing
agreement for river water allocation, that is generally applicable to agreements
in repeated extensive-form games. Second, I assess how the bargaining outcome
on agreement specifications can be affected by the prospect of playing a repeated
extensive-form game in which countries decide to comply or defect from the
agreement. Third, I analyse renegotiation-proofness in repeated games with an
extensive-form stochastic stage game.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2, the setting
of the game is presented. In section 3.3, I show that every efficient agreement can
be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium, but that requiring renegotiation-
proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing
agreement. In section 3.4, I describe that this particular agreement implements
the downstream incremental distribution. In section 3.5, I conclude.
3.2 Game setting
In this section I describe the setting of the game, including the bargaining game
and the subsequent repeated extensive-form game.
3.2.1 Model
Consider two countries i = 1, 2, that share a river and consider cooperation in
water allocation. The countries are ordered along a river with country 1 upstream
of country 2. This setting is relevant for situations where two countries share a
river or where two adjacent countries share river water, without the participation
of other riparians. An example of the latter situation is the Nile basin where the
Nile Waters Agreement implements water sharing between Egypt and Sudan,
without participation of Ethiopia and the other Nile countries.
Total river flow Qt in year t is drawn from probability distribution f (Qt). The
share of river flow that is added to the river in country i equals Qi,t = γiQt, with
γi ≥ 0 and γ1 + γ2 = 1. Water use xi,t is constrained by both availability and
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unidirectionality of river flow, and by upstream water use:3
0 ≤ x1,t ≤ Q1,t, (3.1)
0 ≤ x2,t ≤ Q1,t + Q2,t − x1,t. (3.2)
Under a water allocation agreement, countries trade water for side payments,
making both countries better off. Side payments si,t may be monetary or in-kind,
with:
s1,t = −s2,t. (3.3)
Countries receive payoffs pii,t, defined as the sum of benefits of water use and
side payments:
pii,t(xi,t, si,t) = bi(xi,t) + si,t. (3.4)
Benefit functions bi(xi,t) are increasing and concave with a maximum at x¯i.
An allocation plan for a given year t is a triple ωt = (Qt, xt, st) with river flow
vector Qt =
(
Q1,t,Q2,t
)
, water allocation vector xt = (x1,t, x2,t), and side payment
vector st = (s1,t, s2,t). An allocation plan ωt, subject to (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3), is
defined by the actions of the countries. Countries’ have two possible actions:
cooperate (C) or defect (D). When cooperating, countries choose their water use
or side payment based on the specified agreement actions. When defecting,
countries choose their water use or side payments non-cooperatively. In this
case, no side payments are made, sDt = (0, 0), and the unidirectionality of river
flow implies that country 1, being upstream of country 2, uses any water it needs:
xD1,t = min
{
Q1,t, x¯1
}
. Given Qt, four allocation plans are possible: the cooperative
allocation plan ωt =
(
Qt, xCt , s
C
t
)
, the defection allocation plan ωt =
(
Qt, xDt , s
D
t
)
,
and two allocation plans where one country cooperates and the other defects.
For the game to be interesting, I assume super-additivity:
b1
(
xC1,t
)
+ b2
(
xC2,t
)
≥ b1
(
xD1,t
)
+ b2
(
xD2,t
)
. (3.5)
Without this assumption, there would be no need for cooperation between the
two countries. Note that unidirectionality of river flow implies that country 1
can deliver water to country 2, but not vice versa. Combined, super-additivity
3Qt is the river flow that is available for use; it does not include the minimum instream flow that
is necessary to sustain the ecological functions of the river. Furthermore, note that xi,t denotes water
use, not water diversion (that may re-enter the water system as return flows).
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and unidirectionality imply that xC1,t ≤ xD1,t and that water is scarce in the sense
that:
Q1,t + Q2,t ≤ x¯1 + x¯2. (3.6)
3.2.2 Bargaining game
The outcome of the bargaining game determines the cooperative allocation plan
for each level of river flow. This allocation plan specifies the actions chosen by
countries when they cooperate as discussed in section 3.2.1.
In order to determine the cooperative allocation plan, I use the Nash bargain-
ing solution. This solution coincides with the limit case of a non-cooperative
alternating-offers bargaining game which gives strong foundations to its appli-
cation (Binmore et al., 1986). Given benefit functions and a disagreement point,
the Nash bargaining solution provides the cooperative allocation of water and
side payments. Here, the disagreement point equals the payoffs when both coun-
tries defect. The allocation of water and side payments in year t is such that it
maximises the Nash product given Qt:
arg max
xCt ,s
C
t
[
b1
(
xC1,t
)
+ sC1,t − b1
(
xD1,t
)]α [
b2
(
xC2,t
)
+ sC2,t − b2
(
xD2,t
)]1−α
, (3.7)
s.t.
(3.1) 0 ≤ x1,t ≤ Q1,t
(3.2) 0 ≤ x2,t ≤ Q1,t + Q2,t − x1,t
bi
(
xCi,t
)
+ sCi,t − bi
(
xDi,t
)
≥ 0 , i = 1, 2,
whereα reflects the countries’ bargaining power and the constraints are feasibility
constraints (3.1) and (3.2) and individual rationality constraints.4 In absence of
exogenous differences in bargaining power, αmay be endogenously determined
by the game structure in section 3.3. The Nash bargaining solution provides the
cooperative allocation planωt =
(
Qt, xCt , s
C
t
)
for each level of Qt, used in the water
allocation agreement.
The model setup assures that, given Qt, the Nash bargaining solution max-
imises the joint benefits of water use. Hence, the cooperative water allocation
4See Houba (2008) for a convex program to implement this type of bargaining solutions for water
allocation problems.
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vector xCt , induced by the solution, is efficient. Side payments are used to dis-
tribute the gains from cooperation according to the countries’ bargaining power.
Note that for a given level of Qt, there is a unique xCt that maximises joint benefits
of water use. There are many efficient allocation plans, though, distinguished by
their level of side payments. The Nash bargaining solution selects one of these
efficient allocation plans, depending on the level of α. In section 3.3, we will see
that the prospect of playing the repeated game described in the next subsection
may affect the level of α and hence the side payments specified in the agreement.
This completes the description of the bargaining game.
3.2.3 Repeated game
In a repeated game, the stability aspects of a water allocation agreement can be
analysed. In the repeated extensive-form game that follows the bargaining game,
country 1 is the leader and country 2 the follower, according to the direction of
river flow.5 Given an agreement, the stage game in year t is played as follows:
1. A value for Qt, which defines the values for Qi,t, is drawn from probability
distribution f (Qt) and observed by both countries.
2. Country 1 chooses its water use from the binary strategy set
{
xC1,t, x
D
1,t
}
. If
it complies with the agreement, country 1 plays x1,t = xC1,t. If it defects,
country 1 plays x1,t = xD1,t.
3. Country 2 observes the action played by country 1, which determines the
maximum value of x2, according to (3.2). Subsequently, country 2 chooses
its side payment from the binary strategy set
{
sC2,t, s
D
2,t
}
.
Note that because of super-additivity and the possibility of making side pay-
ments, the stage game is a two-country prisoner’s dilemma in extensive form,
see figure 3.1. Because sC2,t = −sC1,t < 0, country 2 has a dominant strategy in the
stage game: defect.
Consequently, in a one-shot game when binding contracts are not feasible, the
game has one subgame perfect equilibrium that yields the defection allocation
plan. When binding contracts are feasible, the analysis of Kilgour and Dinar
5This sequence of moves according to the countries’ geographical location seems most natural.
It follows from the fact that side payments can be “delayed” while water delivery cannot. The
alternative sequence of moves is briefly discussed in section 3.3.2.
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Figure 3.1: The stage game.
(2001) applies: a bargaining game contingent on Qt yields a Pareto-efficient
water allocation vector, with side payments such that the gains from cooperation
are equally shared. When the stage game is repeated and binding contracts are
feasible, Busch and Wen (1995) have shown that inefficient situations may arise,
including delay of the signing of an agreement.
The situation analysed in this chapter is different. I analyse a non-binding
water allocation agreement that is based on the outcome of a bargaining game,
and subsequent interaction of the countries in a repeated game.
This completes the description of the repeated extensive-form game.
3.3 Self-enforcing agreements
A self-enforcing water allocation agreement for the repeated extensive-form
game, described in section 3.2, is a pair of strategies that provides a subgame
perfect and renegotiation-proof equilibrium, as discussed in section 3.1. In this
section, using the two games described in section 3.2, I first show that every
efficient water allocation agreement can be sustained in a subgame perfect equi-
librium for sufficiently low discounting. Subsequently, I show how requiring
renegotiation-proofness affects this result.
3.3.1 Subgame perfect equilibria
Given a water allocation agreement that is based on the outcome of a bargain-
ing game, countries decide whether or not to comply with specified agreement
actions in each stage game of the repeated extensive-form game. In the repeated
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game, countries can be punished in case of defection. A standard strategy to
punish defection is to play a minimax strategy for a number of years. If the threat
of punishment is credible and sufficiently severe, no country has an incentive to
defect from agreement actions and cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium.
This property is generally known as the folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin,
1986). The theorem says that, given any feasible and individually rational payoff
vector pi? of the stage game, there exists δ < 1, such that the repeated game has a
subgame perfect equilibrium with average payoff vector pi? for all δ ∈
(
δ, 1
)
(The-
orem 1 in Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). This theorem holds generally for the
case of two players. The game in this chapter differs from the standard repeated
game in two respects; it features an extensive-form stage game and stochastic
river flow. Appropriate modifications of the folk theorem have been constructed
for both of these cases, and I briefly discuss these now.
The first modification concerns repeated games with an extensive-form stage
game. For this type of games, Sorin (1995) shows that the Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986) folk theorem generalises to extensive-form repeated games (see also Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky, 1995). Wen (2002) explains that the only condition for this
generalisation is that the stage game satisfies full dimensionality. Full dimension-
ality requires that the dimension of the set of feasible and individually rational
payoff vectors equals the number of players (two in this game). This condition
is satisfied through the prisoner’s dilemma payoff structure of the game. Hence,
the extensive-form stage game does not require modification of the Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) folk theorem.
The second modification concerns stochastic games. A stochastic game has
a (finite) collection of states, in each of which a particular stage game is played.
Dutta (1995) has shown that the folk theorem generalises to stochastic games
when two conditions are satisfied. The first necessary condition is that the indi-
vidually rational set of payoffs should not vary across histories. This condition
is satisfied because the states of the game are determined by Qt and thereby i.i.d.
given the exogenous distribution f (Q) (cf. Krzysztofowicz, 2001). Hence, Qt is
independent from Qt−1 and from countries’ previous actions. The second neces-
sary condition is full dimensionality, discussed above. Because both conditions
are satisfied, this folk theorem can be applied here. The theorem says that given
a certain payoff vector pi? that dominates the long-run average minimax payoffs,
there exists a δ? < 1, such that the stochastic game has a subgame perfect equi-
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librium that approximates the payoff vector pi? for all δ ∈ (δ?, 1) (Theorem 9 in
Dutta, 1995). Note that because Qt is determined exogenously, the set of payoff
vectors that dominate the long-run average minimax payoffs equals the set of
feasible and individually rational payoff vectors.6 This equality implies that for
the game in this chapter, we have δ = δ?. Hence, stochastic river flow does not
require modification of the Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem.
The fact that the game of this chapter features an extensive-form stage game
and stochasticity simultaneously is not problematic, because extensive-form
games may be regarded as a special form of stochastic games (Yoon, 2001). There-
fore, the extensive-form stage game and stochastic river flow do not prevent
application of the Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem. Consequently,
any agreement that improves upon minimax payoffs can be sustained in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium for δ ∈
(
δ, 1
)
. The rationality constraints in the Nash
product—see (3.7)—imply that the agreement is individually rational. More pre-
cisely, the Nash bargaining solution makes the countries coordinate on efficient
equilibria, so we know that the agreement is efficient. The above discussion is
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Any efficient water allocation agreement can be sustained in a subgame
perfect equilibrium for δ ∈
(
δ, 1
)
.
Consequently, the prospect of playing the repeated game cannot affect the
outcome of the bargaining game for this interval of the discount factor. For lower
values of the discount factor, the agreement cannot be sustained, so countries
may defect in equilibrium. In the next subsection we assess how the requirement
of renegotiation-proofness affects these results.
3.3.2 Adding renegotiation-proofness
A subgame perfect agreement may only be self-enforcing ex ante, because pun-
ishments may not be credible ex post once a value for Qt is drawn from probability
distribution f (Qt). Punishments are not credible when the punishment equilib-
rium is inefficient. Then, it is in both countries’ interest to renegotiate out of the
Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Hence, a self-enforcing agreement has to satisfy
6This equality does not hold when the transition rule between states depends on countries’ actions
or the previous state. This is relevant, for instance, when countries invest in reservoir capacity to
create a buffer for drought years.
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renegotiation-proofness. This requirement rules out equilibria where both coun-
tries are hurt by punishment (Bergin and MacLeod, 1993; Barrett, 2003). Formally,
I use the concept of a “weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium”, which says that
if countries agreed ex ante to play strategy σ, and if the history of the game
implies that continuation equilibrium σe conditional on σ is to be played, they do
not have a joint incentive to switch instead to another continuation equilibrium
σe
′
of σ (Farrell and Maskin, 1989). In other words, payoffs at any subgame must
not be dominated by payoffs at any other subgame. This concept of renego-
tiation-proofness is equal to “internal consistency”, used by Bernheim and Ray
(1989).
I adapt a punishment strategy suggested by Van Damme (1989) for the normal-
form repeated prisoner’s dilemma. He showed that for this game there exists a
punishment strategy, such that any subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma is renegotiation-proof, for sufficiently low discounting. This
particular punishment strategy is the “penance” strategy: Each country starts
with C and plays cooperatively as long as the other country does so. If country i
plays D in year t, then country j plays D until country i plays C. As soon as
country i has done so, its initial defection is “forgiven” by country j, and j also
returns to playing C (Van Damme, 1989). In the subgame perfect and renego-
tiation-proof equilibrium, if a country defects, it is punished for one period and
then the countries revert to the cooperative phase. This punishment phase is
renegotiation-proof because of the particular payoff structure of the prisoner’s
dilemma. Equilibria where one country plays C, while the other plays D are
never Pareto-dominated.
This penance strategy can be adapted to the setting of an extensive-form
prisoner’s dilemma with stochastic river flow. In the extensive-form game of this
chapter, countries have different means of punishing the other country. Country 1
is in control of water delivery to country 2, while country 2 is in control of the
side payment. If country 2 defects, the penance strategy prescribes that (D,C) is
played in the next stage game. If country 1 defects, however, it can be punished
within the same stage game by country 2 (by playing D), in addition to the
penance strategy of playing (C,D) in the next stage game. Therefore, under the
penance strategy, country 2 has an additional punishment option compared with
country 1. Note that in the extensive-form game, stage game payoffs occur at the
end of the stage game. This leads to an additional advantage for country 2: its
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additional punishment option is not discounted by country 1.
The implication of this asymmetry in punishment options is that for suf-
ficiently low values of δ, when renegotiation-proofness is required, country 1
cannot punish country 2 upon defection, while country 2 can punish country 1.
This is formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Given Qt, there exists δ > 0, such that:
(a) for δ ∈ (0, 1), there is a renegotiation-proof punishment to deter defection by coun-
try 1;
(b) for δ ∈
(
0, δ
)
, there is no renegotiation-proof punishment to deter defection by
country 2;
(c) for δ ∈
(
δ, 1
)
, there is a renegotiation-proof punishment to deter defection by country 2
provided that side payments are sufficiently small.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Consider the penance strategy described
above.
Given Qt, the immediate gain in payoffs of defection in year t to country 1
equals b1
(
xD1,t
)
− b1
(
xC1,t
)
. The total value of the punishment, both in the same
stage game and in the next stage game is sC1,t + δE
[
sC1,t+1
]
. Defection by country 1
is deterred when:
b1
(
xD1,t
)
− b1
(
xC1,t
)
− sC1,t ≤ δE
[
sC1,t+1
]
. (3.8)
Given the individual rationality constraint in (3.7), the LHS is non-positive while
the RHS of this inequality is non-negative for admissible values of δ. Hence,
defection by country 1 is deterred for any value of δ.
Given Qt, the immediate gain in payoffs of defection in year t to coun-
try 2 equals −sC2,t. The total value of the punishment in the next stage game
is δE
[
b2
(
xC2,t+1
)
− b2
(
xD2,t+1
)]
. Defection by country 2 is deterred when:
−sC2,t ≤ δE
[
b2
(
xC2,t+1
)
− b2
(
xD2,t+1
)]
. (3.9)
Given super-additivity and the concavity of the benefit function, both the LHS
and the RHS of this inequality are non-negative. It is easy to verify that there
exist parameter combinations for which the inequality is violated. For δ = δ,
(3.9) holds with equality. 
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For δ ∈
(
0, δ
)
, lemma 3.1 implies that country 2 can defect in every single
year, without being punished. This asymmetry in punishment options affects the
outcome of the bargaining game such that country 2 has all bargaining power (in
terms of the Nash bargaining solution in (3.7), α = 0). The resulting agreement
assigns all the gains from cooperation to country 2. Country 1 receives its mini-
max payoff; it is exactly compensated for sustaining the efficient water allocation
vector and is therefore indifferent between C and D. Any other (efficient) agree-
ment would be susceptible to defection by country 2. This particular agreement,
however, violates full dimensionality, which is a requirement for proposition 3.1.
Hence, an agreement where country 1 receives its minimax payoff cannot be a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore we have:
δ ≤ δ. (3.10)
For δ ∈
(
δ, 1
)
, lemma 3.1 implies that defection by both countries is deterred
with renegotiation-proof punishment strategies. By proposition 3.1, any efficient
agreement that uses these punishment strategies is also subgame perfect, because
full dimensionality is satisfied. Therefore we have:
δ ≥ δ. (3.11)
Combining (3.10) and (3.11), we have δ = δ. Together with lemma 3.1, this implies
that any water allocation agreement that can be sustained in subgame perfect
equilibrium is renegotiation-proof, provided that side payments are sufficiently
small, see (3.9). Recall that a self-enforcing water allocation agreements is a pair of
strategies that provides a subgame perfect and renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
Hence, the requirement of renegotiation-proofness shrinks the set of possible
self-enforcing agreements.
To be precise, for values of δ close to δ some agreements that are subgame
perfect are not renegotiation-proof. As δ approaches δ, the asymmetry in rene-
gotiation-proof punishment options increases, see (3.9). This asymmetry leads to
an (asymptotic) convergence of the set of self-enforcing agreements to approach
a unique self-enforcing agreement that assigns all the gains from cooperation
to country 2, as discussed above. Note though, that this particular agreement
itself is never reached, because it is not subgame perfect. The above discus-
sion is summarised in the following proposition that forms the main result of
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this chapter.
Proposition 3.2. For δ ∈
(
δ, 1
)
, any subgame perfect water allocation agreement is
self-enforcing, provided that side payments are sufficiently small. As δ approaches δ, the
set of possible agreements converges to approach a unique self-enforcing agreement that
assigns all the gains from cooperation to the downstream country.
The payoff distribution for this unique self-enforcing agreement is indicated
by S in the stylised payoff space presented in figure 3.2. In this figure, the solution
found by Kilgour and Dinar (2001) is indicated by KD; this solution assumesα = 12
which yields the “midpoint of the contract-curve”.
0
m
s
kd
pi1
pi2
b1
(
xD1
)
b2
(
xD2
)
Figure 3.2: A stylised payoff space; the thick line denotes the set of possible
payoffs for efficient agreements that can be sustained in a subgame perfect equi-
librium; M denotes minimax payoffs (i.e. payoffs under the defection alloca-
tion plan); S denotes the payoffs for the unique self-enforcing agreement when
δ ∈
(
0, δ
)
; KD denotes the payoffs for the Kilgour and Dinar (2001) solution.
The asymmetry in punishment options is a constraint on the allocation of
payoffs for a self-enforcing agreement when δ approaches δ.This asymmetry is a
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result of the specific sequential structure of the stage game in which it is assumed
that side payments are made after water is delivered. Given the unidirectional
flow of water, this seems the most natural structure of the stage game. This
structure can, however, be modified in the following two ways. First, water
deliveries and payments could be made in shorter intervals (e.g. monthly in-
stead of yearly), while retaining the same sequential structure of the stage game.
This change would increase the values of δ and δ, but it would not affect the
qualitative outcome of proposition 3.2. Second, the sequential structure could
be reversed such that first the side payment is made and only then water is de-
livered. This change would completely reverse the asymmetry in punishment
options, such that any subgame perfect agreement is self-enforcing provided that
side payments are sufficiently large.
Clearly, the solution induced by a self-enforcing agreement is very sensitive to
both the sequence of water deliveries and side payments (as specified in the water
allocation agreement), and the level of discounting. Using the sequence of the
stage game described in section 3.2 yields a set of self-enforcing agreements that
tends to favour the downstream country. This outcome is in contrast with much
of the river sharing literature in which it is assumed that being upstream increases
a country’s power in the basin. Nevertheless, it is in line with recent literature
that suggests that factors other than geography play a key role in determining
bargaining power and water allocation patterns in a river basin (Dinar, 2006;
Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zawahri, 2008b; Ansink and Weikard, 2009a).
3.4 The downstream incremental distribution
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) developed an axiomatic solution to water sharing,
which assures that each country receives a welfare level between a lower and
an upper bound. The lower bound is the welfare a country could achieve if all
countries make unilateral, non-cooperative, decisions on water use. This bound
is based on the principle of “absolute territorial sovereignty” and is similar to
the defection allocation plan of this chapter. The upper bound is the welfare
a country could achieve if upstream countries refrain from using water. This
bound is based on the principle of “absolute territorial integrity”. A compromise
of these two conflicting principles, where each country is guaranteed its lower
bound and aspires its upper bound, yields a unique solution. This solution
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allocates water such that each country’s welfare equals its marginal contribution
to a coalition composed of its upstream neighbours. Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
call this solution the “downstream incremental distribution”.
For the case of two countries, the water allocation vector induced by the
downstream incremental distribution is such that it assigns all the gains from
cooperation to the downstream country (Houba, 2008). Given proposition 3.2,
this distribution is implemented in the limit by the self-enforcing agreement
as δ approaches δ. The distribution of payoffs induced by the self-enforcing
agreement corresponds to the two-country case of the downstream incremental
distribution.
An alternative implementation of the downstream incremental distribution
is provided by Ambec and Ehlers (2008). They propose negotiation rules to
implement this distribution in a static setting, in which priority is given “lexi-
cographically to the most downstream user”. Given a set of players {1, 2, . . . , k},
player k proposes an allocation plan to the other players. If all accept, this allo-
cation plan is implemented. If any player declines the proposed allocation plan,
player k receives xDk,t = Qk,t and s
D
k,t = 0, and player k − 1 proposes an alloca-
tion plan, etc. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) show that the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of this game implements the downstream incremental distribution.
The Ambec and Ehlers (2008) game, however, assigns all bargaining power
exogenously to player k by giving him the advantage of making the first pro-
posal. No explanation is provided as to why this is a correct approach. This
weakness has been noticed by Van den Brink et al. (2007) and Houba (2008) who,
based on this assumption that downstream countries have all bargaining power,
found the downstream incremental distribution unconvincing (see also Khmel-
nitskaya, 2009). In the game described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter, the
distribution of bargaining power follows endogenously from the repeated game
setting of the model and the sequential structure of the stage game. This dynamic
setting provides a more realistic approach for non-cooperative bargaining on wa-
ter allocation than those provided by static models. Clearly, implementation of
the downstream incremental distribution is more convincing when the dynamic
setting is considered in which water allocation agreements are situated. This
implementation adds significant credibility to the axiomatic solution developed
by Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
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3.5 Conclusion
In the setting of this chapter, any efficient agreement can be sustained in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium for sufficiently low discounting. Requiring renego-
tiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to approach a unique
self-enforcing agreement. This is the agreement that assigns all bargaining power
and all gains from cooperation to the downstream country, and thereby imple-
ments the downstream incremental distribution.
I have used a non-cooperative approach to analyse the allocation of water in
international river basins. Related approaches have been applied to open-access
fisheries (Polasky et al., 2006), transboundary wildlife management (Bhat and
Huffaker, 2007), and international pollution (Germain et al., 2009). Analysis of
this topic using cooperative game theory is the subject of Dinar et al. (2006) and
Beard and MacDonald (2007). The non-cooperative approach comes closest to
actual negotiations on river water allocation. In many current agreements, the
allocation of water is—at least to some extent—based on average river flow. This
is an important reason for the instability of such agreements (cf. Drieschova et al.,
2008).
Kilgour and Dinar (2001) argued for a flexible agreement that adapts to avail-
able river flow. I have developed their approach one step further by accounting
for countries’ incentives to break the agreement. This chapter shows that any ef-
ficient water allocation agreement is self-enforcing, provided that side payments
are sufficiently small. In other words, these agreements are stable. This result
supports the approach by Kilgour and Dinar (2001), because given that flexible
agreements are efficient, they are stable too. This type of agreement is therefore
preferable over conventional agreements such as proportional allocations and
fixed flow allocations, which are generally inefficient and less stable (Ansink
and Ruijs, 2008). A related advantage of the self-enforcing agreement is that by
offering stability, it can withstand de-stabilising effects of, for instance, climate
change. A possible impact of climate change is an increased frequency of years
with low river flow. Because the self-enforcing agreement has water allocation
and side payments contingent on river flow, the agreement does not need to be
reconsidered when these impacts occur.
Based on the results of this chapter, a recommendation for countries that
meet to negotiate the allocation of river water is to explicitly account for stability
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issues in their negotiations. Ideally, a water allocation agreement specifies (i)
the sequence of water deliveries and side payments, taking into account renego-
tiation-proofness, (ii) the water allocation vector and side payments contingent
on river flow, and (iii) an appropriate punishment strategy based on the penance
strategy outlined in section 3.3.2. Such an agreement is self-enforcing, and always
more stable than any alternative agreement.
Although most water allocation agreements are bilateral, it seems straight-
forward to extend the analysis of this chapter to cover multilateral agreements.
Intuitively, the main results of this chapter would not be affected by adding more
countries. Difficulties may arise, however, when the distribution of river flow
(i.e. the parameters γi) is such that a certain country cannot be minimaxed. As
a result, full dimensionality may not hold, so that the folk theorem does not
carry over to the multilateral case. Such an extension is, however, left for future
research.
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Chapter 4
Contested water rights∗
In many international river basins disputes over property rights to water lead
to inefficient water allocation and a waste of resources. In this chapter, we
examine how contested water rights impede water trade. To show this, we
use a model in which property rights to water are contested because countries
have overlapping claims to water. In the model, countries decide whether to
bargain over the allocation of contested river water or not. If not, they engage in
conflict. In the conflict, countries spend their resources on production, which also
requires water, or on fighting to secure part of the contested water. The resulting
equilibrium is inefficient as both countries spend a positive amount of resources
on fighting which is not productive. However, a third party may be requested to
intervene in the looming conflict and allocate the water in an equitable way. The
results show that for certain model parameters countries prefer not to bargain an
efficient allocation, but to engage in conflict, hoping for third party intervention.
The mere possibility of third party intervention may give rise to an inefficient
equilibrium. Two new features of this chapter are the application of a conflict
model to the issue of water rights and the introduction of (overlapping) claims
to non-cooperative bargaining problems.
∗This chapter is based on Ansink and Weikard (2009a). Contested water rights. European Journal
of Political Economy 25(2), 247–260.
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4.1 Introduction
With growing population and increasing water demand, competition for water
in international river basins gets fiercer. In many cases, water rights are contested
and a source of conflict (Gleick, 1993; Wolf, 2007).1 In this chapter we want to
shed light on the question under which conditions countries will jointly define
property rights to contested water in transboundary river basins. Our motivation
for this analysis is the general absence of international trade in river water.
The economics discipline advocates water trade in order to maximise the
basin-wide benefits of this scarce resource (Easter et al., 1998). Even in situations
without a social planner who can allocate water to maximise benefits, efficient
outcomes are expected to prevail through bargaining. When water is scarce and
when property rights are well defined, a difference in the marginal value of water
between two users—greater than the costs of transferring the water—is expected
to lead to a trade in water (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Holden and Thobani,
1996). Nevertheless, the International Freshwater Treaties Database (Wolf, 1998)
contains only nine (out of 49) water allocation agreements where payments are
explicitly coupled to water delivery, see table 4.1.2 This is a surprisingly low
fraction of transboundary river basins where contractual agreements on water
are established. Especially so given the existence of over 250 transboundary
rivers world-wide, many of which face water scarcity.
The presence of contested water rights is, in our view, a major cause for
missing international water trade. We argue in this chapter that if water rights are
contested, this may obstruct water trade. To show this, we use a conflict model in
which water rights are contested. Conflict models have been introduced by Bush
and Mayer (1974). For an overview of the economics of conflict see Garfinkel and
Skaperdas (2007); recent applications of conflict models to contests over natural
resources include Wick and Bulte (2006) and Schollaert and Van de Gaer (2009).
The core idea is as follows. Two countries share a river and each claims a
portion of river water. Water is scarce and claims are overlapping, making water
a contested resource. Countries bargain over the allocation of contested river
1Some argue that conflict over water is a misconception, disqualifying water wars as a “myth”
(Barnaby, 2009). See chapter 1 for comments on this line of reasoning.
2We use a broad definition of water trade in this chapter. It includes the signing of water alloca-
tion agreements, when these agreements explicitly couple water allocation to side payments. Such
agreements can be interpreted as water trade contracts, whose specifications are determined in a
bargaining process.
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Table 4.1: Agreements on water allocation with payment details.
Basin (year) and agreement name Side payment details
Indus (1892): Amended terms of agreement
between the British Government and the
State of Jind, for regulating the supply of wa-
ter for irrigation from the Western Jumana
Canal.
Jind (India) made a fixed annual payment to Great
Britain for the delivery of water for the irrigation of
50,000 acres through newly constructed distribution
works.
Gulf of Aden drainage basin (1910): Con-
vention regarding the water supply of Aden
between Great Britain and the Sultan of Ab-
dali.
Great Britain agreed to make monthly payments to
the Sultan of Lahej for extracting groundwater.
Gash (1925): Exchange of notes between the
United Kingdom and Italy respecting the
regulation of the utilisation of the waters of
the River Gash.
Sudan (the United Kingdom) agreed to pay a share
of its income from irrigated agriculture to Eritrea
(Italy) for passing through the necessary water.
Na¨a¨ta¨mo (1951): Agreement between the
Government of Finland and Norway on the
transfer from the course of the Na¨a¨ta¨mo
(Neiden) river to the course of the Gandvik
river.
Norway receives water from the Na¨a¨ta¨mo basin to
be used for power generation and compensates Fin-
land for lost water power through a lump-sum pay-
ment of NKR 15,000.
Isonzo (1957): Agreement between the gov-
ernment of the Italian Republic and the gov-
ernment of the Federal People’s Republic of
Yugoslavia concerning the water supply of
the town of Gorizia.
Italy pays 58 million lira annually to Yugoslavia for
receiving 4.5 million MCM/year, which equals 85%
of the total river flow in the Isonzo.
Colorado (1966): Exchange of notes consti-
tuting an agreement concerning the loan of
waters of the Colorado river for irrigation of
lands in the Mexicali valley.
Mexico reimburses losses in power generation to
the USA for releasing 50 MCM in the fall of 1966 for
irrigation purposes (on top of its allocation accord-
ing to the 1944 Water Treaty).
Roya (1967): Franco-Italian convention con-
cerning the supply of water to the Commune
of Menton.
France made a one-time ITL 10 million payment
for diverting water from the Roya to supply the
village of Menton, while agreeing to pass through
a fixed share of its diversion to the Italian village of
Ventimiglia.
Helmand (1973): Helmand River Water
Treaty.
On top of its original allocation of 22 cubic metres
per second, Iran was to purchase an additional four
cubic metres per second from Afghanistan.
Orange (1986): Treaty on the Lesotho High-
lands Water Project between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa and
the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho.
South Africa agreed to make annual payments to
Lesotho for water transfers, increasing from EUR
14 million in 1998, when actual water deliveries
started, to EUR 24 million in 2004.
Sources: Compiled from Beach et al. (2000); Wolf (1999); Dinar (2006) and the International Freshwater
Treaties Database, available at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/.
Note: The table lists only those agreements where payments are explicitly coupled to water delivery.
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water. If the bargaining succeeds, property rights to water are defined, based on
which countries may trade water. If not, they engage in conflict. In the conflict,
countries spend their resources on production, which also requires water, or on
fighting to secure part of the contested water. The resulting equilibrium—the
“natural distribution” (Buchanan, 1975)—is inefficient as both countries spend a
positive amount of resources on fighting which is not productive. The natural
distribution serves as the disagreement point of the bargaining game. During
the bargaining each country may use its outside option and request intervention
by a third party.3 This third party would settle the conflict and allocate the water
in an equitable way. Successful intervention, however, cannot be expected with
certainty, so that conflict may still emerge. Hence, the mere possibility of third
party intervention may give rise to an inefficient equilibrium.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we apply a conflict model
to the issue of water rights. Although the lack of property rights has been
recognised as a problem in the water literature (Richards and Singh, 2001), no
supporting theory has been constructed yet.4 Conventional explanations for
missing international water trade in this strand of literature are mostly based on
empirical studies of the economic and demographic characteristics of riparian
countries. A key finding in this literature is that power distribution, governance,
scarcity, and trade relations are important determinants for riparians to either
have negotiated water allocation agreements or engage in international water
trade (Song and Whittington, 2004; Dinar et al., 2007; Dinar, 2007). In this chapter
we aim to shed light on these findings from a theoretical angle. A study close
to ours is Janmaat and Ruijs (2006), although they are more interested in the
probability of conflict over river water, while our focus is on the role of contested
water rights in explaining the general absence of water trade.
Second, we introduce the concept of (overlapping) claims in non-cooperative
3In the setting of international river basins interventions can be expected from international
organisations, such as the World Bank or the United Nations. These third parties are expected to
allocate the water in an equitable way, based on, for instance, the 1966 “Helsinki Rules” proposed
by the International Law Association. Note that the model developed in this chapter is applicable
to intranational water allocation too. In this case, a national government may act as the intervening
third party.
4Various reasons for poorly defined property rights have been proposed in the literature, most of
them related to hydrological characteristics. For example, Brennan and Scoccimarro (1999) discuss
difficulties of defining property rights to water, given the spatial and temporal setting of the resource;
see also Randall (1981) and Ward (2007). Return flows and conveyance losses are two important
characteristics that may hamper the determination of property rights too (Griffin and Hsu, 1993;
Chakravorty and Umetsu, 2003; Chakravorty et al., 1995).
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bargaining problems. These claims can be based on, for instance, historic water
use or a perceived “equitable” use of available river water (Daoudy, 2008). The
concept of claims has been introduced in the axiomatic approach to bargaining,
starting with O’Neill (1982) and Chun and Thomson (1992). The focus of this liter-
ature is the characterisation of solutions with certain attractive properties for the
division of contested resources. Our focus is on the strategic role that claims can
play in non-cooperative bargaining. Note that Grossman (2001) also constructs
a conflict model with claims; these claims are, however, not overlapping.
Our results show that, for certain model parameters, countries prefer not to
bargain an efficient allocation. Instead, they may prefer to stick to their claims,
hoping for a favourable settlement of the bargain by a third party. As intervention
might not occur or fail, conflict may emerge. Thus, the prospect of third party
intervention can cause persisting conflict and thereby obstruct water trade.
We analyse a bargaining game with probabilistic outside options. If an agree-
ment is reached, water rights are allocated according to the agreement, produc-
tion takes place and payoffs are realised. If either country opts out, a third party
is asked to intervene. Whether or not intervention will settle the conflict is uncer-
tain. If intervention is successful, water is allocated by the third party, production
takes place and payoffs are realised. If intervention does not occur or is unsuc-
cessful, or if bargaining breaks down for any other reason, conflict results. Both
countries invest in fighting to secure part of the contested water, production takes
place and payoffs are realised. We analyse the game backwards. Therefore the
remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2 we present the
conflict model and derive the natural distribution of water that determines the
disagreement point of the bargaining game. In section 4.3 we analyse countries’
incentives to bargain over the property rights to water or to take up their outside
option. In section 4.4 we illustrate the results using a numerical example. In
section 4.5 we discuss the results and conclude.
4.2 A conflict model for transboundary rivers
4.2.1 Model structure
In this section we construct a conflict model inspired by Grossman and Kim
(1995). Our conflict model is built on two assumptions that are relevant for
71
water allocation, thereby setting this model apart from conventional conflict
models. First, we assume that only water is fought over, instead of produce or
endowments. In general, property rights to goods and production factors have
been defined and are respected. Countries may, however, contest water resources
of a shared river, even when they respect property rights to all other goods. This
is caused by water being a flowing resource; any claimed property rights to water
are easily contested.
Second, we explore the role of claims to water that make (part of the) river
water a contested resource. There is ample evidence for the existence of claims
(Dellapenna, 2007), for instance in Asian river basins; see Wirsing and Jasparro
(2007). Clearly, these claims can be overlapping as is demonstrated by the vast
amount of conflicts over river water (Wolf, 1998). We assume that claims are
exogenous, they can be based on for instance historical use or irrigation needs
(Wolf, 1999). Claims are the main drivers of the results in this chapter. They
are both the cause of river water being contested and they form the basis for a
possible settlement.
The setting of the conflict model is as follows. A river flows from country 1
to country 2. River water W is normalised to unity, so water use wi can be seen
as the share of water used by country i (i = 1, 2), such that W = w1 + w2 = 1. Each
of the two countries has an initial endowment of resources ei that can be used as
production input xi or fighting input gi:
ei = xi + gi. (4.1)
Water is an input in the production function yi(wi, xi) with production increasing
in wi and in xi (hence decreasing in gi). Note that this production function
requires both water and non-water input. Irrigation is the obvious example
of a production function with water being one of the production factors (in
addition to, for instance, fertiliser). We use a simplified Cobb-Douglas production
function, where non-water input can be used to increase productivity, for instance
through irrigation efficiency:
yi(xi,wi) = (xiwi)αi with 0 < αi ≤ 12 , (4.2)
where αi are parameters that capture asymmetry between the countries in terms
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of agricultural productivity. Note that this production function reflects non-
increasing returns to scale. The differences between α1 and α2 on the one hand
and x1 and x2 on the other hand create opportunities for water trade as they
define the marginal productivity of water in each country.
In terms of fighting, a higher level of gi increases country i’s fighting capacity.
Note that “fighting” does not necessarily refer to military efforts. It may also
refer to lobbying or diplomatic activity. Moreover, even if it refers to military
efforts, open conflict need not occur (Skaperdas, 1992).
Because property rights to water are not established, water use depends on
countries’ water claims ci ∈ [0, 1] and their inputs to fighting (gi) to secure these
claims. As long as c1 + c2 ≤ 1, no water is contested. The interesting case is,
of course, where c1 + c2 > 1. The target of fighting is the portion of water that
is contested: c1 + c2 − 1 > 0. The portion of contested water that is secured
by country i is determined by a contest success function (CSF) pi(g1, g2), with
pi ∈ [0, 1]. We have p1 increasing in g1 and decreasing in g2. Similarly, p2 is
decreasing in g1 and increasing in g2. The interpretation of pi is country i’s
spending on fighting relative to the other country, which gives country i the
possibility to secure water.
Hirshleifer (1989, 2000) and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) discuss two com-
mon functional forms for a CSF. When the difference in inputs to fighting is consid-
ered important for the portion captured, a logistic form of the CSF is appropriate.
We will use the alternative and more common form where the ratio of inputs to
fighting is considered important for the portion captured:
p1 =
g1
g1 + g2
, (4.3)
p2 =
g2
g1 + g2
. (4.4)
The cost of fighting is production foregone. An equilibrium is obtained when,
for each country, its marginal costs of fighting equal its marginal benefits of
fighting, given the other country’s distribution of resources over production and
fighting.5 Note that the marginal benefits of fighting reflect the marginal benefits
of water use according to (4.2). There are three steps to determine the equilibrium
of the contest game. First, countries independently and simultaneously choose
5See Hirshleifer (1995) for further comments on the costs of fighting.
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levels of gi (which determines xi). Second, countries fight over the contested
water, securing pi(c1 + c2 − 1), based on the chosen levels of g1 and g2. This
determines water use wi:
w1 = 1 − c2 + p1(c1 + c2 − 1), (4.5)
w2 = 1 − c1 + p2(c1 + c2 − 1). (4.6)
The first terms in equations (4.5) and (4.6), 1 − c j, represent the amount of water
that is not contested by the other country (country j) and is therefore secure to
country i. The second terms represent the portion of contested water that is
secured through conflict. Third, countries receive payoffs pii, where payoffs are
due to production only. Using (4.1) and (4.2) we have
pi1 = y1(x1,w1) =
(
(e1 − g1)
(
1 − c2 + g1(c1 + c2 − 1)g1 + g2
))α1
, (4.7)
pi2 = y2(x2,w2) =
(
(e2 − g2)
(
1 − c1 + g2(c1 + c2 − 1)g1 + g2
))α2
. (4.8)
This completes the description of our conflict model; the equilibrium is deter-
mined in the following subsection.
4.2.2 The natural distribution of water
An equilibrium—the natural distribution—of the conflict model presented in
section 4.2.1 can be found by combining the countries’ best response functions.
Country 1’s best response is to choose g1 to maximise pi1 given g2 and vice versa.
Solving the first order conditions of the maximisation problem with respect to gi
gives the following best response functions:6
g1 =
√
c1(c1 + c2 − 1)g2(e1 + g2)
c1
− g2, (4.9)
g2 =
√
c2(c1 + c2 − 1)g1(e2 + g1)
c2
− g1. (4.10)
6A logarithmic production function of the form y(xi,wi) = lnαi(xiwi+1) yields similar best response
functions.
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Note that α1 and α2 do not appear in the best response functions.7 Differences in
productivity do not affect equilibrium levels of fighting. Also note that the best
responses do not depend on the other country’s resource endowment, only on
the portion of this endowment that is used for fighting.
Symmetric countries In the special case where the countries have equal claims
and resource endowments (i.e. c1 = c2 = c > 12 and e1 = e2 = e), countries have
equal fighting inputs g1 = g2 = g. To determine the natural distribution, the
system of two equations (4.9)–(4.10) can be easily solved for g:
g? =
(2c − 1
2c + 1
)
e. (4.11)
Equilibrium levels of fighting (denoted by ?) are increasing and linear in resource
endowments and increasing and concave in claims. Because of symmetry, water
is divided equally in the natural distribution: w? = 12 . Payoffs can be determined
by combining (4.7) with (4.11):
pi? =
( e
2c + 1
)α
. (4.12)
Equilibrium payoffs are increasing and concave in resource endowments and
decreasing and convex in claims.
When resource endowments increase, there is more fighting. Although in-
creasing inputs to fighting are costly, payoffs increase with resource endowments.
When claims increase, there is also more fighting. Given constant resource en-
dowments, this increase in fighting reduces the countries’ payoffs. Clearly, the
larger the share of contested water, the less efficient is the natural distribution.
These results are consistent with the standard comparative-static results for two-
player contest games (Malueg and Yates, 2005).
Asymmetric countries In the general case, without assuming symmetry, cal-
culation of the equilibrium is more complex. Solving the system of two equa-
tions (4.9)–(4.10) for g1 and g2 gives polynomials of degree three. Using Cardano’s
formula, equilibrium values of g?i can be expressed as a function of c1, c2, e1, and
7This is due to the simplified form of the Cobb-Douglas production function (4.2). It allows for an
analytical solution in the case of symmetric countries as shown below.
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e2.8 This function is analytically not tractable and, therefore, we resort to numer-
ical simulations over a wide range of parameter values. Our results show that
equilibrium fighting efforts, water allocation, and payoffs are well-behaved (see
figures 4.7–4.8 in the Appendix) and that the qualitative results of the symmetric
outcome also hold for asymmetric countries, as is demonstrated in section 4.4.
Again, increasing resource endowments causes an increase in fighting and pay-
offs. Increasing claims causes an increase in fighting but a decrease in payoffs.
It is possible to determine the ratio of both fighting inputs and water use in
the natural distribution. Rearranging the response functions (4.9)–(4.10) gives
(g1 + g2)2 =
(c1 + c2 − 1)g2(e1 + g2)
c1
, (4.13)
(g1 + g2)2 =
(c1 + c2 − 1)g1(e2 + g1)
c2
. (4.14)
By substitution and rearranging, the ratio of g1 to g2 in equilibrium is
g?1
g?2
=
c2(e1 + g?2 )
c1(e2 + g?1 )
. (4.15)
Hence, g?1 > g
?
2 if and only if c2(e1 + g
?
2 ) > c1(e2 + g
?
1 ). In equilibrium, the ratio of
inputs to fighting between country 1 and country 2 is a function of their claims
and endowments. A larger endowment gives a higher ratio of inputs to fighting.
A larger claim, however, gives a lower ratio of inputs to fighting, because having a
larger claim corresponds to the other country having a smaller uncontested water
claim, which will increase its inputs to fighting. These results are illustrated in
section 4.4.
With equilibrium levels of fighting determined, we can turn our attention to
water use in the natural distribution. Substituting and rearranging (4.5) and (4.6)
gives us the ratio of p1 to p2:
p1
p2
=
w1 + c2 − 1
w2 + c1 − 1 . (4.16)
Because (4.3) and (4.4) imply that g1/g2 = p1/p2, the right hand sides of (4.15)
8This function is available upon request. See e.g. Sydsaeter et al. (2000) for Cardano’s formula,
who advise against its use. The polynomials have at least one real root in the relevant range. It can
be shown that there is a unique interior solution such that 0 < g?i < ei. This proof is also available
upon request. I thank Rudi Weikard for mathematical advice.
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and (4.16) are equal. The relation between w1 and w2 in the natural distribution
is
w?1 + c2 − 1
w?2 + c1 − 1
=
c2(e1 + g?2 )
c1(e2 + g?1 )
. (4.17)
Because we normalise river water W to unity, we have w1+w2 = 1. By substitution
and rearranging we obtain the natural distribution of water:
w?1 =
c1[c2(e1 + g?2 ) + (1 − c2)(e2 + g?1 )]
c1(e2 + g?1 ) + c2(e1 + g
?
2 )
, (4.18)
w?2 =
c2[c1(e2 + g?1 ) + (1 − c1)(e1 + g?2 )]
c1(e2 + g?1 ) + c2(e1 + g
?
2 )
. (4.19)
In the natural distribution, water use is a function of the countries’ claims, en-
dowments and inputs to fighting. Note that equilibrium water use depends on
equilibrium values of fighting, of which we only know the ratio in equilibrium,
see (4.15). Hence, this system cannot be solved analytically, but results are easy
to compute for any specification of parameters.
Because resources are spent on fighting, the natural distribution is not effi-
cient. Total payoffs will increase if countries are able to prevent conflict. As
explained in section 4.1, we analyse this possibility in a bargaining game where
the natural distribution serves as the disagreement point. The interesting issue
is how countries’ incentives to bargain depend on the possibility of third party
intervention. This is the topic of the following section.
4.3 Bargaining or intervention?
In this section we analyse whether countries are successful in bargaining over the
property rights to water. Instead of bargaining, they may leave the bargaining
table and ask for third party intervention. We include this possibility as an
“outside option”, as discussed below. Countries bargain over the allocation of
contested river water. If bargaining succeeds, the Nash bargaining solution is
used to determine the allocation of water, and the game is finished. If one of
the countries leaves the bargaining table and opts out, third party intervention
will be successful with probability q, which settles the conflict. With probability
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(1 − q) conflict results and the natural distribution emerges.9
First, we discuss bargaining in more depth. Countries can prevent the inef-
ficient conflict equilibrium by defining property rights to water in a bargaining
game.10 This game can be modelled as a non-cooperative alternating-offers bar-
gaining game in the spirit of Rubinstein (1982). An obvious solution concept
for this bargaining game is the limit case, where the non-cooperative bargain-
ing solution approaches the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution (Binmore et al.,
1986). In the Nash bargaining solution, the choice of the disagreement point
drives the outcome. The natural distribution is used as the disagreement point
(D in figure 4.1), as it is the outcome under conflict when bargaining would break
down (cf. Muthoo, 1999, chapter 4). The Nash bargaining solution, denoted by(
piN1 , pi
N
2
)
is obtained by maximising the product of the countries’ gains in payoff
compared with their payoffs at the disagreement point (denoted by ?):(
piN1 , pi
N
2
)
= max
(w1,w2)
[(
e1w1
)α1 − ((e1 − g?1 )w?1 )α1] [(e2w2)α2 − ((e2 − g?2 )w?2 )α2] , (4.20)
subject to rationality constraints. The payoff frontier f is concave, see figure 4.1:
f =
 e1
(
e2 − pi1/α22
)
e2

α1
. (4.21)
The Nash water allocation (wN1 ,w
N
2 ) can be computed by solving the following
system of equations (Muthoo, 1999):
piN1 (0,w
N
1 ) − pi1(g?1 ,w?1 )
piN2 (0,w
N
2 ) − pi2(g?2 ,w?2 )
= − f ′(pi2) =
α1pi
1/α2−1
2
(
e1
(
e2 − pi1/α22
)
/e2
)α1
α2
(
e2 − pi1/α22
) , (4.22)
wN1 = 1 − wN2 . (4.23)
Note that for the case of symmetric countries, discussed in section 4.2.2, wN = 12 ,
and piN =
(
1
2 e
)α
.
This establishes the outcome of the Nash bargaining solution, denoted by N
9Later in this section we will use subjective probabilities qi.
10Buchanan (1975) argues that the resource allocation when moving away from (or, in our case,
preventing) conflict, is equal to the allocation in the natural distribution. The only difference is that
countries disarm (or do not arm), which increases total payoffs. We do not see why countries would
choose this specific allocation of water as a basis for the definition of property rights (cf. Houba and
Weikard, 1995).
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in figure 4.1. This outcome is self-enforcing as any deviation (i.e. investing in g
to secure more water) would imply a shift to the natural distribution, which is
worse for both countries in terms of payoff. In this respect, our model is different
from conventional conflict models where enforcement of a negotiated outcome
is necessary to prevent open conflict (see Anbarci et al., 2002 and Skaperdas, 2006
for discussions on how enforcement costs depend on the bargaining solution
used).
Alternatively, instead of bargaining over the property rights to water, a coun-
try can decide to leave the bargaining table and engage in conflict, anticipating
an intervention by a third party. Such an intervention may be requested by any
of the two countries, for instance by submitting a case to the International Court
of Justice. Three examples illustrate the effectiveness of third party intervention.
The first example is the 1953 US intervention on water allocation in the Jordan
river basin. This intervention occurred after a period in which the dispute on
Jordan river water became more and more tense. The following Johnston negoti-
ations resulted in an allocation of water that was originally based on the area of
irrigated land in each country. Although the Johnston Accord was never ratified,
its allocation has been used in agreements between Israel and Jordan (1994) and
Israel and the Palestinian authorities (1995), in which property rights to water
were finally established (Wolf, 1999). The second example is the 1951 interven-
tion by the World Bank in the dispute between India and Pakistan on the Indus
river basin. In 1948, India diverted water away from Pakistan’s irrigation canals,
breaking the 1947 Standstill Agreement. The World Bank successfully allocated
the contested water by assigning the three eastern rivers of the basin to India and
the three western rivers to Pakistan, which formed the basis of the 1960 Indus
Waters Treaty (Alam, 2002). The third example concerns the Euphrates basin,
where Iraq called for intervention by the Arab League in 1974 after it claimed
that Syria diverted too much water at the Tabqa dam. Although this intervention
failed and military threats increased, mediation by Saudi Arabia in 1975 was
successful. Beach et al. (2000) report that ultimately 40% of the Euphrates water
was allocated to Syria and 60% to Iraq.
Note that (successful) intervention cannot be expected with certainty. The ex-
amples above illustrate that interventions in water negotiations usually concern
the proposal of an allocation of water that is beneficial to all parties involved,
and includes some notion of “equity”. Equitable water allocation may be based
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on pragmatic principles such as population, irrigation needs, catchment size, or
historic use (Wolf, 1999; Van der Zaag et al., 2002). Alternatively, principles of in-
ternational water law such as “reasonable and equitable use” and “no significant
harm” can be applied, as summarised in the Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses
Convention, and the Berlin Rules (Salman, 2007). We assume that the third party
proposes an allocation of water, based on any of these principles, that satisfies
two requirements. First, the equitable allocation yields higher payoffs to both
countries compared to the natural distribution. Second, the equitable allocation
is efficient. Denote this equitable allocation by wEi . An appealing example is
an allocation of water that is proportional to the countries’ (exogenous) water
claims:
wE1 =
c1
c1 + c2
, (4.24)
wE2 =
c2
c1 + c2
. (4.25)
In the remainder of this chapter, we use this functional form for wEi . Furthermore,
we assume that the equitable allocation is enforced by the third party.
In choosing between bargaining property rights and opting out, hoping for
a possible settlement of claims through third party intervention, countries will
compare the associated payoffs. Stylised payoffs for the disagreement point
(the natural distribution) D, the Nash bargaining solution N, and the equitable
allocation E are shown in figure 4.1. Note that N is located on h, the highest
rectangular hyperbola relative to axes through D that has a point in common
with f . Because f is continuously decreasing, and both N and E are on f (no
resources are spent on fighting), if N is preferred by one country, then E is
preferred by the other.
When defining property rights using the Nash bargaining solution, coun-
try i’s payoff is according to (4.20). When opting out, hoping for intervention,
country i’s payoff depends on the subjective probability qi ∈ (0, 1) that third party
intervention occurs.11 Its payoff is the probability weighted sum of the payoffs
at the equitable allocation piEi (0,w
E
i ) and the natural distribution pii(g
?
i ,w
?
i ). Con-
11Perceptions of the likelihood of third party intervention and the probability of its success may
differ across countries. Note that we do not explicitly model the third party’s decision to intervene
as is done, for instance, by Chang et al. (2007). The parameters qi therefore capture all relevant
information on the expectation and success of intervention by a third party.
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D
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N
Figure 4.1: A stylised payoff space for countries 1 and 2. D denotes the disagree-
ment point (the natural distribution), N denotes the Nash bargaining solution,
E denotes the equitable allocation, f is the payoff frontier, and h is a rectangular
hyperbola relative to axes through D.
sequently, country i will prefer to define property rights in a bargaining game
rather than call for intervention, and vice versa, if
piNi (0,w
N
i ) ≥ qipiEi (0,wEi ) + (1 − qi)pii(g?i ,w?i ). (4.26)
The presence of possible third party intervention can be interpreted as an
“outside option” (Muthoo, 1999).12 If (4.26) is violated for country i, waiting
for third party intervention is a credible outside option. In figure 4.1, this may
be an attractive possibility for country 1. The outside option payoffs are on a
straight line connecting D and E (using probabilities qi and 1 − qi), as reflected
by (4.26). In figure 4.1, country 2 will always prefer a bargain. However, for a
12Conventionally, outside options have a time constraint. In this model, there is no time constraint,
but a probability constraint, see Muthoo (1999).
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sufficiently large q1, the outside option is attractive enough for country 1 to leave
the bargaining table; country 1 will not agree on the Nash bargaining solution N,
but hope for a third party intervention to obtain E.
The presence of an outside option as such does not obstruct an efficient
and immediate bargaining outcome. The country with an outside option has
a strategic advantage in the bargaining procedure. Consequently, its payoff in a
bargaining solution must be at least as high as its outside option payoff (Muthoo,
1999).
Without loss of generality, let country 1 have an outside option, as in figure 4.1.
Furthermore, let q˜1 denote the level of q1 for which (4.26) holds with equality.
When q1 < q˜1, the outside option is not credible and countries will bargain to
reach N. When q1 ≥ q˜1, the outside option is credible, leading to one of two
outcomes. Either q2 ≥ q1, then countries will bargain and country 1 receives
its outside option payoff as explained above. Or q2 < q1, then country 2 is
not willing to give in to country 1’s outside option—as it considers country 1
to overstate its subjective probability of third party intervention—leading to
emerging conflict with possibly third party intervention. Clearly then, what can
obstruct a bargaining outcome is a difference in the countries’ perceptions of the
probability of third party intervention.13
As shown, the bargaining solution depends on the perceived probability
of third party intervention in two ways. First, the probability of third party
intervention may influence the payoffs of the countries in the bargaining outcome,
as discussed above. Second, when the probability of third party intervention is
sufficiently large, it may cause a country to use its outside option.
4.4 Numerical example
For asymmetric countries, payoffs and water use in both the natural distribution
and the Nash bargaining solution cannot be determined analytically. Therefore,
and to provide further insights and illustrations we present a numerical example.
13 Note that, alternatively we could model different perceptions of the location of E, possibly
determined as the expected values of two different probability density functions. Such differences
in the perception of the location of E may be attributed, for instance, to a “self-serving bias” (cf.
Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). An alternative reason why countries would not bargain an efficient
outcome is a “long shadow of the future”. In a dynamic setting, initial conflict may permanently
increase future payoffs, for instance by eliminating the adversary (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000).
In the context of this chapter, however, this does not seem to be a plausible argument.
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Throughout this example we keep the parameters of country 2 constant at c2 = 0.7
and e2 = 1.5, while varying the parameters of country 1. Also, productivity
parameters are constant at α1 = α2 = 14 .
Figure 4.2 shows the best response functions (4.9)–(4.10) for the symmetric
case where c1 = c2 = 0.7 and e1 = e2 = 1.5. Equilibrium values for the natural
distribution are g?1 = g
?
2 = 0.25 and w
?
1 = w
?
2 = 0.5. A second equilibrium
where both countries do not fight at all (g1 = g2 = 0) is not stable because a
very small increase in fighting by one of the countries would cause a shift to the
other equilibrium. This instability can also be derived from the specification of
the contest success function in (4.3) and (4.4), given that resource endowments ei
are not too asymmetric. The figure shows that inputs to fighting are concave in
inputs to fighting by the other country.14
0 1
0
1
g2
g1
 
 1
2
Figure 4.2: Best response functions of countries 1 and 2 for the symmetric case
where c1 = c2 = 0.7 and e1 = e2 = 1.5.
Figure 4.3 shows the equilibrium values for g?i , w
?
i , and pi
?
i in the natural
distribution as a function of c1. Clearly, increasing claims lead to higher inputs to
fighting by both countries. Having a higher claim increases a country’s water use
and payoffs. Due to the production foregone because of fighting, total payoffs
decrease with increasing claims.
Figure 4.4 shows the equilibrium values for g?i , w
?
i , and pi
?
i in the natural
distribution as a function of e1. Increasing resource endowments leads to higher
inputs to fighting by the country with the higher endowment (not necessarily by
14Figure 4.6 in the Appendix provides a more general picture and shows the best response functions
for nine different combinations of c1 and e1.
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Figure 4.3: Natural distribution equilibrium values for g?i , w
?
i , and pi
?
i as a
function of c1 with e1 = 1.5 and c2 = 0.7.
both countries as can be seen in figure 4.8 in the Appendix). Having a higher
resource endowment increases a country’s water use and payoffs. Notwith-
standing the production foregone because of fighting, total payoffs increase with
increasing resource endowments.
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium values for g?i , w
?
i , and pi
?
i as a function of e1 with c1 =
c2 = 0.7 and e2 = 1.5.
Three additional model features for the natural distribution are obtained
using a range of simulations (see figures 4.7–4.8 in the Appendix); they are
partly illustrated by figures 4.3 and 4.4. First, inputs to fighting, water use,
and payoffs are increasing at a decreasing rate in a country’s own claim, see
figure 4.3. Second, despite the opportunity costs of fighting, a country’s payoff
increases with both its claims and its endowments, irrespective of the other
country’s claims or endowments, see figures 4.7 and 4.8 in the Appendix. Third,
just having a high claim, or just having high endowments does not necessarily
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make a country better off than its opponent in terms of payoffs. Claims and
endowments appear to be substitutes. This can be seen in the bottom-left panels
of figures 4.7 and 4.8 in the Appendix, where country 1’s payoff curves are below
country 2’s payoff curves.
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Figure 4.5: Preference of country 1 for N (bargaining) or E (waiting), as a function
of c1 and e1. Isolines indicate threshold values of q1 for which country 1 is
indifferent between N and E. Note that c2 = 0.7 and e2 = 1.5.
Parameter combinations of c1 and e1 determine the locations of the Nash
bargaining solution N and the equitable allocation E on the payoff frontier as
illustrated in figure 4.1. A comparison of payoffs in choosing between bargaining
and leaving the bargaining table hoping for third party intervention, is shown
for country 1 in figure 4.5. The figure shows isolines for threshold values of q1
such that (4.26) holds with equality as a function of parameter combinations
of c1 and e1. Recall that when (4.26) holds with equality, country 1 is indifferent
between bargaining property rights and opting out. As explained in section 4.3,
when N is preferred by one country, then E is preferred by the other. This implies
that the q1 = 1 isoline, where country 1 is indifferent between bargaining and
opting out, coincides with the q2 = 1 isoline. This is the case, for instance, at the
symmetric point where countries have equal claims and endowments, indicated
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by ? in figure 4.5. In the upper part of the figure where country 1 prefers to
bargain to reach N, country 2 will—for certain levels of q2—prefer to opt out and
hope for third party intervention. This implies that, given q1 and q2, bargaining
is more likely for parameter combinations of c1 and e1 close to the q1 = q2 = 1
isoline.
In this numerical example claims have almost no impact on the country’s
preference for bargaining. Note that even with a tiny overlapping claim (c1 close
to 0.3), there is a possibility that only one country prefers to bargain, leading
eventually to conflict. Endowments, however, have a high impact. The more
equal the distribution of resources endowments, the more likely it is that countries
bargain property rights to reach N.
The impact of claims on the preference for bargaining seems counter-intuitive:
starting in the symmetric point, when c1 increases, country 1 prefers to bargain.
One would expect that when c1 increases, E moves in a north-western direction
along the payoff frontier because water allocation in E is determined proportional
to claims, see (4.24). This would make E more attractive relative to N, as illustrated
in figure 4.1. A shift in relative claims, however, also affects the position of D
and thereby the position of N. When c1 increases, the position of D changes such
that N moves even further than E in the same direction along the payoff frontier.
Country 1’s payoff at N increases more than its payoff at E. Hence we find the
preference of country 1 for bargaining to reach N instead of hoping for third party
intervention E.
Note that for symmetric countries, N and E coincide and countries will always
bargain property rights. In figure 4.5, the difference between payoffs for N and E
are smaller the closer we get to the centre of the figure (where countries are
symmetric). This implies that for more symmetric countries, the threshold level
of qi to not bargain property rights becomes higher. In other words, conflict
between countries is more likely the larger the differences between them.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter develops a theory of how conflict over river water may emerge
through contested water rights. Formal property rights to water are not neces-
sarily established; one country may prefer not to bargain an efficient allocation.
Instead, it may prefer to engage in conflict, hoping for a third party intervention.
86
This result is illustrated using a numerical example in which, for certain param-
eter combinations, conflict in the natural distribution is an equilibrium outcome.
Apparently, the resolution of water disputes and resulting trade in water is not
necessarily an attractive option, even though trade is beneficial to both coun-
tries. Hence, we provide a theory for the lack of property rights over water in
transboundary river basins.
The Coase theorem applied to water resources implies that the efficient use
of water does not depend on the distribution of water rights. Transaction costs,
arising from uncertainty and contract enforcement, can obviously obstruct the
bargaining process over water (Richards and Singh, 2001). This chapter shows
that there is another potentially important obstruction to Coasean bargaining:
the presence of overlapping claims to water, making water a contested resource
for which property rights are disputed. The presence of claims has severe im-
plications for the efficiency of water use, because claims determine both the
equilibrium water use in the natural distribution, and consequently, the possi-
bilities to bargain a more efficient allocation of water. Clearly, claims combined
with subjective probabilities of third party intervention render the Coase theorem
inapplicable in the case of river water resources. Conflict is possible, with coun-
tries hoping for a third party to intervene. This obstructs water trade because
property rights to water fail to emerge.
Intervention by a third party in a conflict is not always desirable (cf. Chang
et al., 2007). Our model shows that the mere possibility of third party interven-
tion may cause an inefficient equilibrium of water use through investments in
fighting. This illustrates the problematic position of organisations whose aim
is to mediate or resolve international conflicts, such as the World Bank or the
United Nations. The existence of organisations that facilitate conflict resolution
may actually generate conflict. In other words, the prospect of conflict mediation
may crowd out the capacity of conflicting parties to resolve the conflict them-
selves. Our results also highlight the problem created by conflicting principles of
international law in water allocation (Salman, 2007). Conflicting principles may
cause countries to have different perceptions of what is an equitable allocation
which, in turn, may obstruct a bargaining solution; see footnote 13.
The model developed in this chapter describes a situation in which coun-
tries may end up in an inefficient equilibrium, instead of bargaining an efficient
outcome. Overlapping claims to productive resources and the presence of an
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information asymmetry cause this inefficiency. The model results depend on pa-
rameter combinations of countries’ resource endowments and claims, which are
presumed to be exogenous. It seems attractive to endogenise the claims. Given
the best response functions (4.9) and (4.10), and because claims have no cost,
this implies that in the natural distribution both countries would claim 100% of
the water. These extremely high claims would cause high inputs to fighting (see
figure 4.3) and consequently, low payoffs. In practice, however, claims are never
this high; countries generally do not invoke 100% claims (Wolf, 1999).15 Instead,
they base their claims on an observable criterion, such as irrigation needs or
historic use. In addition, 100% claims would not be credible to a third party that
would have to settle claims. Hence, endogenous claims are not a logical feature
of this model.
In this chapter, we have studied the case of two countries sharing a river.
Although our model is general enough for other applications, it can capture the
upstream-downstream character of a shared river. The geographical advantage
of the upstream country can be reflected by assigning it a higher claim. A
model of this type is relevant for other bargaining situations too, where claims
are overlapping and with the possibility of third party intervention. Possible
applications are: (i) countries’ claims to the control of a fishing area or a shared
aquifer; (ii) disputed territory; and (iii) partners’ claims to common property in
a divorce, where a court may settle the division of the property.
We see two logical extensions to the model described in this chapter. First,
instead of modelling the outcome of third party intervention proportional to
the countries’ water claims, it could be impacted by lobbying at the third party.
Second, repeated interaction between the countries may increase cooperation (cf.
Wolf, 1998) or induce conflict (cf. Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000). A dynamic
version of the model presented in this chapter may treat xi and gi as flows of
input to stocks of goods and weapons. These extensions, however, are left for
future work.
15A 100% claim by an upstream country reflects the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, a
100% claim by a downstream country reflects the principle of absolute territorial integrity.
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Appendix: Three figures
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Figure 4.6: Best response functions of countries 1 and 2, with c1 increasing in the
columns (0.5, 0.7, and 0.9), and e1 increasing in the rows (1, 1.5, and 2). Parameter
values of country 2 are constant at c2 = 0.7 and e2 = 1.5.
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Chapter 5
Sequential sharing rules
for river sharing problems∗
We analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the
resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular
situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents
to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing
problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy
problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed
class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing
problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a
sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In this
chapter, we first characterise a class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we
apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess
their properties, and compare them to four alternative solutions to the river
sharing problem.
∗This chapter is based on Ansink and Weikard (2009b). Sequential sharing rules for river sharing
problems. Paper presented at the 17th Annual Conference of the European Association of Environ-
mental and Resource Economists, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who
have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. Our choice for this
particular situation is motivated by the following two examples.
The first example is the distribution of intergenerational welfare (Arrow et al.,
2004). The agents are the generations, ordered linearly in time. Each generation
is endowed with certain resources, but also has a claim to inherit part of the
resources of the previous generation. A specific problem of this kind is the climate
change problem, where each generation adds to the stock of greenhouse gasses,
but also makes a claim to previous generations’ mitigation efforts (Dasgupta
et al., 1999; Weikard, 2004b; Davidson, 2008).
The second example is the river sharing problem (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002;
Parrachino et al., 2006; Carraro et al., 2007). This is the topic of this chapter. In
the river sharing problem, the agents are countries (or water users in general),
ordered linearly along a river. On the territory of each agent tributaries and
rainfall add water to the river. This constitutes the agent’s endowment of river
flow. Each country also has a claim to river water. These claims can be based on
any of a wide range of principles for river sharing (Wolf, 1999; Daoudy, 2008).
Two common principles for river sharing are absolute territorial sovereignty
(ATS) and absolute territorial integrity (ATI) (Salman, 2007). ATS prescribes
that each agent has the right to all water on his territory while ATI prescribes
that each agent has the right to all upstream water. Though these extreme
principles are not often invoked in practice, agents’ claims are often larger than
their endowments, as illustrated for instance by Egypt’s large claim to water in
the Nile river basin. Agents’ overlapping claims to river water make water a
contested resource (Ansink and Weikard, 2009a, see chapter 4).
In both examples, redistribution of the resource endowments may be de-
sirable, for instance when some agents have large endowments but only small
claims (cf. Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996). We exploit the linear order of agents
to determine this redistribution using an axiomatic approach. Using two very
natural requirements, the order of agents allows us to transform the river sharing
problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems that we call reduced
river sharing problems. Reduced river sharing problems are mathematically
equivalent to bankruptcy problems (Aumann and Maschler, 1985; Young, 1987;
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Moulin, 2002). Therefore we can use sharing rules from the bankruptcy literature
to solve these reduced river sharing problems. In each of these reduced problems,
water rights are allocated to an agent and the set of his downstream neighbours.
As in bankruptcy problems, our proposed class of solutions—denoted sequen-
tial sharing rules—is based on the agents’ claims. Sequential sharing rules are
constructed by the recursive application of a bankruptcy rule to the sequence of
reduced river sharing problems.
In a bankruptcy problem, a perfectly divisible resource (usually called the es-
tate in this literature) is to be distributed over a set of agents who have overlapping
claims. A solution to a bankruptcy problem is a sharing rule (or alternatively, a
rationing scheme), that is based on the agents’ claims to the resource. Various ax-
iomatic approaches to the construction of such sharing rules have been analysed
(cf. Herrero and Villar, 2001; Thomson, 2003).
In a river sharing problem, agents are ordered linearly, characterised by an
initial resource endowment and a claim to the resource. Claims are exogenous
and may be smaller or larger than an agent’s endowment. As in the bankruptcy
problem, we assume scarcity of the resource. River sharing problems differ from
bankruptcy problems in two ways. First, there is a difference in the position of the
agents. In the standard bankruptcy problem, all agents have equal positions. In a
river sharing problem, agents are ordered linearly, reflecting the direction of river
flow. Therefore, the agents’ claims have a sequential structure, linking the river
sharing problem to bankruptcy problems with a priority order (cf. Moulin, 2000).
Second, there is a difference in the initial state of the resource. In a bankruptcy
problem, the resource is initially completely separated from the agents. In a river
sharing problem, the resource is initially endowed to the agents. This endowment
of resources links our approach to reallocation problems (cf. Fleurbaey, 1994;
Klaus et al., 1997). Both differences play a key role in the construction of the class
of sequential sharing rules.
There are two reasons for solving river sharing problems using bankruptcy
rules.1 First, as indicated above, both types of problems have many common
properties. Because the properties of bankruptcy rules are well understood,
these rules are logical candidates to be applied to river sharing problems too.
1The standard approach to analyse river sharing problems is to apply non-cooperative game-
theoretic models (cf. Carraro et al., 2007; Ansink and Ruijs, 2008, see chapter 2). The merit of
the axiomatic approach employed in this chapter is to complement, support, and improve our
understanding of the outcomes of these strategic models.
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The second reason is based on current practices in water allocation. Many two-
agent water rights disputes are solved using variants of bankruptcy rules, for
instance equal sharing or sharing proportional to some objective criterion (for
instance population or the amount of irrigable land, see Wolf, 1999). Often, these
solutions are explicitly proposed by third parties or joint river basin committees,
but they can also be the result of negotiations between the agents. This chapter
shows the logical extension of such sharing rules for river sharing problems with
more than two agents.
This chapter makes two novel contributions. First, our approach extends
the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential (or spatial) structure of
both the agents and the resource to be shared.2 Second, we provide axiomatic
foundations for a class of solutions to the river sharing problem that satisfy some
attractive properties.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.2 we introduce the setting
of the river sharing problem. In section 5.3 the class of sequential sharing rules
is characterised. In section 5.4 we apply four sequential sharing rules, based
on four classical bankruptcy rules, to a numerical example. In section 5.5 some
properties of sequential sharing rules are assessed. In section 5.6 we compare our
approach to four alternative solutions to the river sharing problem. In section 5.7
we discuss the results and conclude.
5.2 The river sharing problem
Consider an ordered set N of n ≥ 2 agents located along a river, with agent 1 the
most upstream and n the most downstream. Agent i is upstream of j whenever
i < j. Denote by Ui = { j ∈ N : j < i} the set of agents upstream of i, and denote by
Di = { j ∈ N : j > i} the set of agents downstream of i. On the territory of i, rainfall
or inflow from tributaries increases total river flow by ei ≥ 0; e = (e1, . . . , en).
River inflow ei can be considered the endowment of i. This does not imply that
agent i has property rights to ei. Rights are assigned as a solution to a river
sharing problem, as discussed below. In addition to river inflow ei, each agent
is characterised by having a claim ci ≥ 0; c = (c1, . . . , cn) to river flow. We do not
impose which portion of an agent’s claim is directed to e1, e2, . . . etc.
2Branzei et al. (2008) also analyse bankruptcy rules in a flow network. In their approach, however,
the flows are cost functions that are used to implement bankruptcy rules in a network approach.
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This information suffices to define our river sharing problem.
Definition 5.1 (River sharing problem). A river sharing problem is a triple ω =
〈N, e, c〉, with N an ordered and finite set of agents, e ∈ Rn+ and c ∈ Rn+.
To delineate the setting of the river sharing problem, let the total available
water on the territory of agent i be denoted by
Ei ≡ ei +
∑
j∈Ui
(e j − x j), (5.1)
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a vector of allocated water rights. This is the sum of river
inflow on the territory of i and any unallocated upstream water. For the river
sharing problem to be relevant, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5.1. Agent n claims more than what is available to him: cn > En.
This assumption implies that cn > en, and it assures that there is contested
water throughout the river (see lemma 5.1, below). Without this assumption,
agent n could satisfy his claim completely and hence there would be no problem.
Denote by Ω the set of relevant river sharing problems that satisfy assump-
tion 5.1. A sharing rule allocates water rights to each agent.
Definition 5.2 (Sharing rule). A sharing rule is a mapping F : Ω → Rn that
assigns to every river sharing problem ω ∈ Ω a water rights allocation vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn), x ∈ Rn+, such that (a)
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ei, (b) 0 ≤ x ≤ c, and (c)
xi ≤ ei + ∑ j∈Ui e j ∀i ∈ N.
The allocation of water rights to agent i is Fi(ω) = xi. Requirement (a) of the
sharing rule imposes efficiency: no water rights remain unallocated. Require-
ment (b) says that agents receive a non-negative allocation that is bounded by
their claim. Requirement (c) is a feasibility constraint. Figure 5.1 illustrates a
river sharing problem for n = 4.
5.3 Characterisation of sequential sharing rules
Solutions from the bankruptcy literature cannot be directly applied to the river
sharing problem, because the resource is distributed over the agents. The linear
order of agents along the river and the unidirectionality of river flow enable us,
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Figure 5.1: The river sharing problem for n = 4; nodes are agents and arrows
indicate water flows.
however, to represent the river sharing problem as a sequence of reduced river
sharing problems. These reduced river sharing problems are mathematically
equivalent to bankruptcy problems. In this section we propose two axioms for
a solution to the river sharing problem. They lead to the definition of reduced
river sharing problems and they characterise the class of sequential sharing rules
using this definition.
Only n’s excess claim matters. For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉,
and each related problem ω′ = 〈N, e′, c′〉 such that e′ = (e1, . . . , en−1, e′n) and c′ =
(c1, . . . , cn−1, c′n) with e′n = 0 and c′n = cn − en, we have Fi(ω) = Fi(ω′) ∀i ∈ N.
This property says that allocation of upstream contested water should not
be affected by the part of the claim of agent n that can be satisfied with the
endowment of agent n. In other words, only n’s excess claim cn − en is effective
(by assumption 5.1, cn − en > 0). This is a mild requirement, because n is not
confronted with any claims from downstream agents. In addition, there is no
alternative use for en than to allocate it to n; endowment en is uncontested. Hence,
it is very natural that en is used to partially satisfy cn.
No advantageous downstream merging. For each river sharing problem ω =
〈N, e, c〉, and each related problem ω′ = 〈N′, e′, c′〉 such that N′ = N \ {n} and
e′ = (e1, . . . , en−2, e′n−1) and c
′ = (c1, . . . , cn−2, c′n−1), with e
′
n−1 = en−1 + en and c
′
n−1 =
cn−1 + cn, we have Fi(ω) = Fi(ω′) ∀i < n − 1.
This property pertains to the possibility that agents n − 1 and n consolidate
their claims and endowments and present themselves as a single claimant. The
axiom prescribes that the allocation to upstream agents is not affected by such
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behaviour. Note that the axiom is similar in spirit to the No Advantageous Merging
or Splitting axiom (see O’Neill, 1982; Thomson, 2003).
Together, Only n’s Excess Claim Matters and recursive application of No Advan-
tageous Downstream Merging prescribe that downstream river flow is first used to
(partly) satisfy downstream claims. Only claims in excess of downstream river
flow may affect upstream water allocation. Hence, to derive solutions we can
use excess downstream claims, which we denote by cDi :
cDi ≡
∑
j∈Di
(c j − e j). (5.2)
Consequently, the corresponding downstream endowments are eDi = 0. Only
n’s Excess Claim Matters and No Advantageous Downstream Merging are a first step
to approach the river sharing problem using bankruptcy rules by assuring that
downstream agents cannot claim something that they already possess.
Using (5.2), the two axioms lead directly to the representation of a river
sharing problem ω as a sequence (ω1, . . . , ωn) of reduced river sharing problems
ωi.
Definition 5.3 (Reduced river sharing problem). A reduced river sharing prob-
lem is a triple ωi = 〈Ni,Ei,Ci〉, with two agents Ni = {i,Di}, who have claims
Ci = {ci, cDi }, to the resource Ei.
Note that, in slight abuse of notation, we denote the second agent in the
reduced river sharing problem by Di. This set of agents is treated as a single
claimant. In each reduced problem ωi, available river flow Ei is distributed
between i and Di. By assumption 5.1, there is contested water throughout the
river, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. In each reduced river sharing problem the sum of claims exceeds available
water: Ei < ci + cDi ∀i ∈ N.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5.1 assures that a reduced river sharing problem is a river shar-
ing problem according to definition 5.1, with two agents and no endowment
downstream. Therefore, a sharing rule assigns to every reduced river sharing
problem ωi a water rights allocation vector x = (xi, xDi ), such that xi + xDi = Ei.
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A reduced river sharing problem is mathematically equivalent to a bankruptcy
problem.3 Hence, bankruptcy rules can be applied to any reduced river sharing
problem. In order to solve a river sharing problem, a bankruptcy rule is applied
to the sequence (ω1, . . . , ωn) of its reduced problems. Because of (5.1), however,
the reduced problems and their solutions are dependent on each other. Because
E1 = e1 by definition, ω1 is the only reduced problem whose outcome is inde-
pendent of the outcome of other reduced problems. Its solution—allocating x1
to agent 1—determines E2 which enables the formulation of and a solution to
ω2, etc. Hence, the sequence of reduced problems can be solved recursively in
the linear order of agents along the river. This is summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.1. For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉 and its corresponding
sequence of reduced river sharing problems (ω1, . . . , ωn), we have Fi(ω) = Fi(ωi) ∀i ∈ N.
The water rights allocated to each agent are equal for the solution of the river
sharing problem and for the recursive solution of its corresponding sequence of
reduced problems. Given the vectors of claims and endowments, the allocation to
agent i is therefore independent from the number of agents in Di, the distribution
of their claims (ci+1, . . . , cn) and the distribution of their endowments (ei+1, . . . , en);
only the aggregate claims
∑
j∈Di c j and endowments
∑
j∈Di e j matter.
Only n’s Excess Claim Matters and No Advantageous Downstream Merging char-
acterise a class of rules that we call sequential sharing rules. Sequential sharing
rules are constructed by the recursive application of a bankruptcy rule to the
sequence of reduced river sharing problems. In the next sections we focus on
four classical bankruptcy rules and assess the properties of their corresponding
sequential sharing rules.
5.4 Application
In this section we apply four sequential sharing rules, based on four classical
bankruptcy rules, to an illustrative river sharing problem. The four classical
rules are the proportional rule, constrained equal awards, constrained equal
losses, and the Talmud rule (Herrero and Villar, 2001). In our notation for two-
agent problems, the definitions of the four rules are as follows.
3 In the concluding section we will discuss a difference in interpretation.
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Proportional rule (PRO). For all ωi = 〈Ni,Ei,Ci〉 ∈ Ω, there exists λ > 0, such
that xPROi = λci and x
PRO
Di
= λcDi .
PRO assigns each agent a share of the resource in proportion to the agents’
claims.
Constrained equal awards (CEA). For allωi = 〈Ni,Ei,Ci〉 ∈ Ω, there exists λ > 0,
such that xCEAi = min{ci, λ} and xCEADi = min{cDi , λ}.
CEA assigns each agent an equal share of the resource, subject to no agent
receiving more than his claim.
Constrained equal losses (CEL). For all ωi = 〈Ni,Ei,Ci〉 ∈ Ω, there exists λ > 0,
such that xCELi = max{0, ci − λ} and xCELDi = max{0, cDi − λ}.
CEL assigns each agent a share of the resource such that their losses compared
to their claim are equal, subject to no agent receiving a negative share.
Talmud rule (TAL). For all ωi = 〈Ni,Ei,Ci〉 ∈ Ω, there exists λ > 0, such that
xTALi =
 min
{
1
2 ci, λ
}
if Ei ≤ 12
(
ci + cDi
)
,
ci −min
{
1
2 ci, λ
}
otherwise,
xTALDi =
 min
{
1
2 cDi , λ
}
if Ei ≤ 12
(
ci + cDi
)
,
cDi −min
{
1
2 cDi , λ
}
otherwise.
TAL assigns each agent his uncontested share of the resource and divides the
contested part equally.
As discussed in section 5.1, many two-agent water rights disputes are solved
using variants of bankruptcy rules. The practice of sharing water proportional
to some objective criterion corresponds to the application of PRO in case that
the agents’ claims are based on the same principle for water sharing. CEA
corresponds to equal sharing when claims are sufficiently high, whereas CEL
corresponds to equal sharing when claims are equal. The principles of ATS and
ATI are approximated in situations where the upstream agent has either a very
high or very low claim compared to the downstream agent, for any of these four
classical rules.
To illustrate how a solution to the river sharing problem is calculated, table 5.1
shows the steps to the solution to a river sharing problem for n = 4 and using
101
PRO. In this example, the values chosen for e and c illustrate a river sharing
problem in which the major share of river flow originates on the territory of
agent 1, while the largest claim is made by agent 4.
Table 5.1: Example of the calculation of x using PRO.
i ei ci ⇒ Ei cDi ⇒ xPROi xPRODi ⇒ pPROi
1 80 50 80 90 29 51 0.57
2 10 10 61 90 6 55 0.61
3 10 20 65 80 13 52 0.65
4 10 90 62 - 62 - 0.69
In table 5.1, the river sharing problem is described by the first three columns
that represent the set of agents N and the vectors e and c. The first reduced river
sharing problem is ω1 = 〈N1,E1,C1〉, with two agents N1 = {1,D1}, who have
claims C1 = {c1, cD1 }, to the resource E1. E1 = 80 is calculated using (5.1) and
cD1 = 90 is calculated using (5.2). The solution using PRO yields x = (29, 51).
This solution (i.e. xD1 = 51) is used as input for the second reduced river sharing
problem ω2, etc. The last column of table 5.1 provides values for pi ≡ xi/ci: the
proportion of agent i’s claim that is allocated to him. This column shows that
the sequential sharing rule based on PRO generates a solution with different
values for pi. In a bankruptcy problem, PRO yields a constant value for pi. This
difference illustrates that taking account of the linear order of agents and their
endowments indeed affects the solution to the river sharing problem.
Table 5.2 continues on the example given in table 5.1 by comparing solutions
for three different combinations of claims and endowments of river flow, for the
four rules described above. It illustrates how changes in claims or endowments
affect the different solutions. In case 2 of table 5.2, c2 increases from 10 to 30
compared with case 1. This increase in claims of agent 2 causes an increase in x2,
as illustrated by PRO (6→ 16), CEA (10→ 25), CEL (0→ 10), and TAL (5→ 15).
This Claims Monotonicity property is further examined in section 5.5. In case 3
of table 5.2, e2 increases from 10 to 30 compared with case 1. This increase in
endowment of agent 2 causes an increase in x for all agents, as illustrated by PRO
((29, 6, 13, 62) → (33, 8, 16, 73)), and can be verified for the other three rules too.
This Resource Monotonicity property is also further examined in section 5.5.
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Table 5.2: Comparison of solutions for three different combinations of claims and
endowments of river flow.
i ei ci ⇒ xPROi pPROi xCEAi pCEAi xCELi pCELi xTALi pTALi
case 1
1 80 50 29 0.57 40 0.80 20 0.40 25 0.50
2 10 10 6 0.61 10 1.00 0 0.00 5 0.50
3 10 20 13 0.65 20 1.00 10 0.50 10 0.50
4 10 90 62 0.69 40 0.44 80 0.89 70 0.78
case 2
1 80 50 25 0.50 40 0.80 10 0.20 25 0.50
2 10 30 16 0.54 25 0.83 10 0.33 15 0.50
3 10 20 12 0.59 18 0.88 10 0.50 10 0.50
4 10 90 57 0.63 28 0.31 80 0.89 60 0.67
case 3
1 80 50 33 0.67 40 0.80 30 0.60 30 0.60
2 30 10 8 0.77 10 1.00 0 0.00 5 0.50
3 10 20 16 0.79 20 1.00 15 0.75 13 0.63
4 10 90 73 0.81 60 0.67 85 0.94 83 0.92
5.5 Properties
In this section we assess the properties of sequential sharing rules, focusing on
the four rules introduced in the previous section. We limit ourselves to two
monotonicity properties and two of the characterising properties of the class of
priority rules used by Moulin (2000). When a bankruptcy rule satisfies a property,
this does not necessarily imply that its corresponding sequential sharing rule also
satisfies this property. For some properties, however, the implication does hold.
Some of these are appealing properties for the setting of a river sharing problem,
including the following two monotonicity properties.
Claims monotonicity. For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉, each i ∈ N,
and each related problem ω′ = 〈N, e, (c′i , c−i)〉 such that c′i > ci, we have Fi(ω′) ≥
Fi(ω).
This property says that that any agent i should not be worse off with a larger
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claim.
Resource monotonicity. For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉, each i ∈ N,
and each related problem ω′ = 〈N, (e′i , e−i), c〉 such that e′i ≥ ei, we have F(ω′) ≥
F(ω).
This property says that no agent should be worse off when some agent has
a larger endowment.4 No agent looses loses regardless of his position along the
river.
Moulin (2000) characterises a class of priority rules for bankruptcy problems
with a priority order, which is related to our approach (see section 5.6.3). The four
characterising properties that he employs are Upper Composition, Lower Composi-
tion, Scale Invariance, and Consistency. The first two of these are difficult to assess
in the context of a river sharing problem. Scale Invariance and Consistency can be
assessed and we will see that Consistency can be satisfied, while Scale Invariance is
satisfied by sequential sharing rules that are based on any bankruptcy rule that
satisfies Scale Invariance itself.
Scale invariance. For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉, each i ∈ N, all
λ ≥ 0, and each related problem ω′ = 〈N, λe, λc〉, we have F(ω′) = λF(ω).
This property says that a rescaling of endowments and claims (or a change of
the unit in which they are measured) does not affect the solution to any agent.
The definition of Consistency requires some explanation. The property says
that agents receive the same allocation whether or not a subset of N has left with
their allocation. Following Moulin (2000), let this subset be a single agent j ∈ N.
Denote by ω the river sharing problem including j and denote by ω′ the river
sharing problem where j has left. Agent j leaves by eliminating the j’th element
from both the set of players and the claims vector. Because agent j leaves with
his allocation x j = F j(ω), this amount has to be deducted from the endowments
vector. In a standard bankruptcy problem, we have E′ = E − x j. In a river
sharing problem, the problem is to find a suitable endowments vector e′. The
vector difference e − e′ can then be regarded as the contribution of each agent’s
endowment to the allocation of water rights to agent j. Formally:
Consistency. For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉, each i, j ∈ N, i , j,
and each related problem ω′ = 〈N′, e′, c′〉 such that N′ = N \ { j}, c′ = c \ {c j}, and
4This property implies that Drop Out Monotonicity (no agent is worse off whenever one of the
agents decides to drop out), introduced by Ferna´ndez et al. (2005), is satisfied.
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e′ =
(
e′1, . . . , e
′
j−1, e
′
j+1, . . . , e
′
n
)
, with e′ feasible and efficient such that
∑
i≤k
(
e′i − ei
)
≤
0 ∀k < j and ∑k∈N′ (e′k − ek) = e j − x j, we have Fi(ω) = Fi(ω′)
The following proposition covers the four axioms discussed in this section.
Proposition 5.2. The following relations between the properties of bankruptcy rules and
their corresponding sequential sharing rules hold:
(a) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Claims Monotonicity, its corresponding sequential
sharing rule satisfies Claims Monotonicity.
(b) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Resource Monotonicity, its corresponding sequential
sharing rule satisfies Resource Monotonicity.
(c) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Scale Invariance, its corresponding sequential sharing
rule satisfies Scale Invariance.
(d) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity, there
exists an endowment vector e′ such that its corresponding sequential sharing rule
satisfies Consistency.
Proof. See Appendix.
Because PRO, CEA, CEL, and TAL satisfy Claims Monotonicity, Resource Mono-
tonicity, and Scale Invariance (Moulin, 2002; Thomson, 2003), this proposition
immediately leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Sequential sharing rules based on PRO, CEA, CEL, and TAL satisfy
Claims Monotonicity, Resource Monotonicity, Scale Invariance, and Consistency.
Note that proposition 5.2 implies that to satisfy Consistency, a sequential shar-
ing rule need not be based on a bankruptcy rule that satisfies Consistency. The
construction of sequential sharing rules assures that every bankruptcy rule that
satisfies Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity, has a corresponding se-
quential sharing rule that satisfies Consistency for some feasible endowment vec-
tor e′.
A final property discussed in this section relates to an agent’s position in the
order of agents and how this affects his allocation. No general statement can be
made on whether it is favourable for an agent to be located upstream or down-
stream in the river. An agent’s allocation of water rights can be affected positively
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or negatively by the combination of the vectors of claims and endowments as
well as the specific sequential sharing rule used, as illustrated by table 5.2. For
a sequential sharing rule based on PRO though, we can infer that downstream
agents are always better off in terms of the portion of their claim that they receive.
As illustrated by table 5.2, the values of pPROi increase with i (for case 1,
pPRO = (0.73, 0.76, 0.79, 0.82)). This is not a coincidence, as proposition 5.3 shows:
Proposition 5.3. The sequential sharing rule based on PRO satisfies the following
property. For each i, j ∈ N, pPROi ≤ pPROj if and only if i < j.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition says that the sequential sharing rule based on PRO always
favours downstream agents. The explanation is that all water is allocated pro-
portional to claims while endowments need not be shared with upstream agents.
E1 is allocated proportional to claims to agents 1 and D1. E2 is allocated propor-
tional to claims to agents 2 and D2, etc. If e2 = 0, then E2 = xD1 = E1 − x1 and by
proportionality to claims we have pPRO1 = p
PRO
2 . If e2 > 0, then E2 = xD1 + e2 and
we have pPRO1 < p
PRO
2 ; agent 2 can never be worse off than agent 1, because he also
receives, proportional to his claims, part of the additional resource e2. A special
case occurs if e j = 0 ∀ j > i, then pPROj is constant for all j ∈ Di (see proposition 5.4
in section 5.6).
5.6 Comparison to four alternative solutions
In this section, we compare our solution to four alternative solutions that can
be applied to river sharing problems. The first of these is only relevant for the
special case where all river water is endowed to agent 1, while the other agents
have no endowments. Bankruptcy rules can be directly applied in this case, when
ignoring the order of the agents. The second solution is a generalisation of the
first one. It applies bankruptcy rules directly to the river sharing problem, while
treating endowments and the linear order as a feasibility constraint. The third
solution is similar in spirit to the class of priority rules constructed by Moulin
(2000). The fourth solution is the one proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
Although each of these four solutions possesses some attractive features, they
also have disadvantages compared to the approach presented in this chapter.
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The first solution is only valid for a special class of river sharing problems. The
second solution does not allow for differential treatment of agents that have equal
claims but different endowments. The third solution strongly favours upstream
agents, while the fourth solution strongly favours downstream agents.
5.6.1 Direct application of bankruptcy rules
If all water originates at the head of the river: ei = 0 ∀i > 1, and the ordering of
the agents is not considered, then bankruptcy rules can be directly applied to this
class of river sharing problems.
At first sight, this approach seems unrelated to the sequential sharing rules.
There is a class of rules, however, for which this approach replicates the sequential
sharing rules. This class of rules includes all bankruptcy rules that satisfy No
Advantageous Merging or Splitting (O’Neill, 1982; Thomson, 2003). PRO is one of
the bankruptcy rules in this class. Hence, the solution given by application of
the sequential sharing rule based on PRO corresponds to the solution given by
PRO itself applied to the river sharing problem. This is stated in the following
proposition.5
Proposition 5.4. The sequential sharing rule based on PRO satisfies the following
property. If ei = 0 ∀i > 1, then pPROi = e1∑ j∈N c j ∀i ∈ N.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition says that for this class of river sharing problems, the char-
acterising properties of PRO also hold for its corresponding sequential sharing
rule. Consequently, each agent receives the same proportion of his claim. Clearly
then, differences between the solutions induced by PRO and by its corresponding
sequential sharing rule are completely driven by the distribution of the claims
over the agents. These differences are not a result of the linear order of the agents.
This result implies that the proportional solution to a bankruptcy problem
equals the proportional solution to a sequence of reduced bankruptcy problems
(i.e. bankruptcy problems in which the available resource is distributed between
agent i and the set of other agents Di). Hence, this class of river sharing problems
is a generalisation of the bankruptcy problem. Note, however, that from the river
5A proposition and proof for the full class of rules that satisfy No Advantageous Merging or Splitting
is omitted.
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sharing perspective this class of problems reflects a very special case, because of
its specific assumption that all water originates at the head of the river (although
some rivers come close to resembling this extreme structure).
5.6.2 Constrained direct application of bankruptcy rules
Bankruptcy rules can be applied to river sharing problems in general, if the en-
dowments and linear order of the agents are considered as feasibility constraints.
For example, a sharing rule based on CEA implements CEA, constrained by fea-
sibility. Two agents with equal claims therefore receive the same water rights
(if feasible) no matter their location in the basin. Because the endowments and
order are treated as a feasibility constraint only, this approach preserves Equal
Treatment of Equals when possible, and ignoring the differences in location of the
agents.
Constrained direct application of bankruptcy rules is an attractive solution
in the sense that it treats the river sharing problem as a bankruptcy problem to
the largest extent possible. This approach is used by I˙lkilic¸ and Kayı (2009), who
model allocation rules in a network structure, (see also Bergantin˜os and Sanchez,
2002).
In our solution, however, the Equal Treatment of Equals property is not neces-
sarily satisfied. Two agents with equal claims and endowments may end up with
different allocations, even if an equal allocation would be feasible. This differ-
ence is driven by the agents’ position in the linear order of agents and depends
on the sequential sharing rule that is applied. Agents’ location in the order of
agents and their endowment both matter for the solution, also when feasibility
is not a binding constraint. Our approach allows these distinctive features of the
river sharing problem to determine the solution. The position in the linear order
does not just constrain the set of possible solutions, but assigns significance to an
agent’s endowment with a particular amount of water.
5.6.3 Priority rule in the spirit of Moulin (2000)
As discussed in section 5.5, the class of priority rules constructed by Moulin
(2000), is related to our approach. In fact, the bankruptcy problem studied in
Moulin (2000), including an ordered set of agents, is a special case of the river
sharing problem. The ordering of agents is according to a complete, transitive,
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and antisymmetric binary relation, which is equivalent to the linear order in our
approach. In our notation, the priority rules satisfy:
∀i, j ∈ N with i < j, if x j > 0, then xi = ci.
In words, priority rules allocate water rights to upstream agents until their claim
is met in full, before the next agent is served.
Again, as in the previous approach, we have to treat the endowments and
linear order of the agents as a feasibility constraint. Hence, when ci > Ei, agent j =
i + 1 is allocated a positive amount of water rights only when e j is positive. This
approach is an extreme rule in the sense that it strongly favours upstream agents
over downstream agents.
5.6.4 Sharing a river based on Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
Recently, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) proposed an axiomatic solution that is
based on ATS and ATI, as discussed in section 5.1. These two principles are
used as a lower bound and aspiration upper bound to the welfare of a coalition
of agents, with welfare originating from water and side payments. Ambec and
Sprumont (2002) show that there is a unique welfare distribution that provides
a compromise between these two principles: water is allocated such that each
agent’s welfare equals his marginal contribution to a coalition composed of all
upstream agents (see also Herings et al., 2007).
Comparison of the class of sequential sharing rules and the solution proposed
by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) is not straightforward because their solution is in
terms of welfare while we follow the bankruptcy literature by having a solution
in terms of the resource to be distributed. Comparison is only possible if we
assume that benefits are linear in water use.6 In that case, the solution proposed
by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) falls in the class of sequential sharing rules. In
fact, it is an extreme case of this class of rules in which xi = ei ∀i ∈ N. The solution
allocates to each agent the rights to his own endowment. Obviously, this solution
is independent of the claims vector because Ambec and Sprumont (2002) do not
consider claims in their model.
This approach may be an attractive compromise of ATS and ATI but we
question its applicability for two reasons. First, Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
6Ambec and Sprumont (2002) assume strictly increasing and strictly concave benefits of water use.
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find a solution to the river sharing problem using a combination of lower and
upper bounds to welfare. Uniqueness of this solution follows by construction
because of the implicit assumption that lower and upper bounds coincide for
the most upstream agent. In other words, it is assumed that the most upstream
agent does not aspire a higher welfare level than what he can secure himself.
This assumption is driving the solution. Second, the solution by Ambec and
Sprumont (2002) assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream agents which
is not very convincing, as noted by Van den Brink et al. (2007), Houba (2008), and
Khmelnitskaya (2009).
5.7 Discussion and conclusion
A remaining issue to discuss is whether a reduced river sharing problem, al-
though mathematically equivalent to a bankruptcy problem, can indeed be inter-
preted as such. The answer to this question depends on the interpretation of Ei,
the resource that is to be distributed between i and Di. In a bankruptcy problem,
the resource is separated from the agents. In a reduced river sharing problem,
Ei is the river flow available to agent i. If we do not consider claims, this en-
dowment could be interpreted as agent i’s “property rights” (as in the Walrasian
framework and as in the ATS principle, see section 5.1). The redistribution of
water is then equivalent to the redistribution of the property rights to water.
In our interpretation, overlapping claims imply that endowments do not
constitute property rights. Thus a sharing rule is needed to introduce such
rights. Ei is not interpreted as a property right, but as a resource whose level
may influence the solution to a river sharing problem, depending on the sharing
rule used. In this case, Ei is separated from the agents and, hence, a reduced
river sharing problem is fully equivalent to a bankruptcy problem. Although
this interpretation gives additional support to the use of sequential sharing rules,
we do not claim this interpretation to be more convincing than the alternative.
We leave it to the reader to judge the merits of both interpretations.
In this chapter we analyse a river sharing problem with linearly ordered
agents who have resource endowments and claims to this resource. We construct
a class of sequential sharing rules, by transforming the river sharing problem to a
sequence of reduced river sharing problems. These reduced problems are math-
ematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using
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bankruptcy rules. This approach for solving river sharing problems contrasts
with alternative approaches by allowing agents’ position in the order of agents
and their endowment to play an important role in the solution. A solution to
a river sharing problem is determined by the combination of endowments and
claims and the selected bankruptcy rule.7
The results of this chapter can be readily adopted for application in negoti-
ations on national or international river sharing problems. The approach to be
followed is to jointly agree on the sharing rule to allocate water rights to the most
upstream agent, who then leaves the negotiation table with his allocation. The
same sharing rule is then used sequentially to allocate water rights to the other
agents.
A remaining question is whether this negotiation procedure has any credible
non-cooperative foundations. The n-player “sequential share bargaining” proce-
dure, proposed by Herings and Predtetchinski (2007) appears to be a promising
approach. Sequential share bargaining is an n-player extension of the Rubinstein-
Ståhl bargaining model, in which the players’ shares are determined sequentially
according to a fixed order, and require unanimous agreement. Its resemblance to
sequential sharing rules is apparent. A complete analysis of this implementation,
however, is left for future work.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of lemma 5.1
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose that the lemma does not hold, then ∃i ∈ N : Ei ≥ ci + cDi , which can
be written as (i) Ei +
∑
j∈Di e j ≥ ci +
∑
j∈Di c j. By construction we have (ii) En =
Ei +
∑
j∈Di e j − xi −
∑
j∈Di\{n} x j By substitution and rearrangement of (i) and (ii) we
obtain:
En − cn ≥ ci − xi +
∑
j∈Di\{n}
(c j − x j).
7Two related approaches are the following. Goetz et al. (2008) apply sequential sharing rules to
irrigation water allocation, based on (Barbera` et al., 1997). The domain of their paper is different,
however, as they focus on strategy-proof rules for situations with single-peaked preferences and,
unlike Klaus et al. (1997), no initial endowments. Coram (2006) implements a sequential bidding
game to allocate water. This approach also assigns an important role to agents’ endowments and
their location in the river, but its scope is clearly different from ours.
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Because definition 5.2 requires that x ≤ c, we know that the RHS of this weak
inequality is non-negative. This implies that En ≥ cn, which violates assump-
tion 5.1. 
Proof of proposition 5.2
Proof. Because a reduced river sharing problem is mathematically equivalent to a
bankruptcy problem, in any reduced river sharing problem, Claims Monotonicity,
Resource Monotonicity, and Scale Invariance are satisfied (Moulin, 2002; Thomson,
2003). The remainder of the proof is for each axiom separately.
(a) Claims Monotonicity Consider a river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉, and
a related problem ω′ = 〈N, e, (c′i , c−i)〉 such that c′i > ci. In any reduced problem
ω′j, j < i, Claims Monotonicity implies that x
′
D j
≥ xD j and therefore x′j ≤ x j. By (5.1),
this gives E′i ≥ Ei. Because Claims Monotonicity is satisfied in reduced river
sharing problem ωi, and because E′i ≥ Ei, it follows that c′i > ci ⇔ Fi(ω′) ≥ Fi(ω).
(b) Resource Monotonicity Consider a river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉, and
a related problem ω′ = 〈N, (e′i , e−i), c〉 such that e′i ≥ ei. In reduced problem ω′1,
Resource Monotonicity implies that x′1 ≥ x1 (and x′D1 ≥ xD1 ). By (5.1), this gives
E′2 ≥ E2. This argument can be repeated to show that forω′2, Resource Monotonicity
implies that x′2 ≥ x2 (and x′D2 ≥ xD2 ), etc. It follows that e′i ≥ ei ⇔ F(ω′) ≥ F(ω).
(c) Scale Invariance Consider a river sharing problemω = 〈N, e, c〉, and a related
problem ω′ = 〈N, λe, λc〉, with λ > 0. In reduced problem ω′1, Scale Invariance
implies that x′1 = λx1 and x
′
D1
= λxD1 . By (5.1), this gives E′2 = λE2. This argument
can be repeated to show that for ω′2, Scale Invariance implies that x
′
2 = λx2 (and
x′D2 = λxD2 ), etc. It follows that F(ω
′) = λF(ω).
(d) Consistency Denote by e′′i = e
′
i − ei ∀i ∈ N′ the difference in endowments
to agent i between e and e′. Feasibility requires
∑
i≤k e′′i ≤ 0 ∀k < j. Efficiency
requires
∑
k∈N′ e′′k = e j − x j.
To prove the proposition, we show how to construct the vector difference e′′,
first for the case where j = 1 and then for the case where j ≥ 2. Note that excess
downstream claims may be lower in ω′ compared with ω. Using (5.2), we have
c′Di = cDi − c j + e j −
∑ j+1
k=i+1 e
′′
k ∀i ≤ j − 1, so that c′Di ≤ cDi ∀i ≤ j − 1.
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Suppose j = 1. By construction, x1 ≤ e1, so we can set e′′2 = e1 − x1. This gives
E′2 = e2 + e1 − x1 = E2, while satisfying efficiency and feasibility, and we are done.
Suppose j ≥ 2. Consider reduced problem ω′1. We have E′1 = e1 + e′′1 ≤ E1.
Because c′D1 ≤ cD1 , by Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity there exists
e′′1 ≤ 0 such that x′1 = x1. Using this value of e′′1 , we have x′D1 = xD1 + e′′1 .
Now, consider reduced problem ω′2. We have E
′
2 = e2 + e
′′
2 + x
′
D1
= e2 + e′′2 +
xD1 + e′′1 , and because of feasibility e
′′
2 ≤ −e′′1 , such that E′2 ≤ E2. Because c′D2 ≤ cD2 ,
by Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity there exists e′′2 ≤ −e′′1 such that
x′2 = x2. Using this value of e
′′
2 , we have x
′
D2
= xD2 + e′′2 .
The same argument can be repeated up to and including reduced prob-
lem ω′j−1.
Now, consider reduced problem ω′j+1. We have:
E′j+1 = e j+1 + xD j−1 + e
′′
j+1
= e j+1 + e′′j+1 +
∑
k≤ j−1
(
ek − xk + e′′k
)
.
We can set e′′j+1 = e j − x j −
∑
k≤ j−1
(
e′′k
)
. This gives:
E′j+1 = e j+1 + e j − x j +
∑
k≤ j−1
(ek − xk) = E j+1.
while satisfying efficiency and feasibility, and we are done. 
Proof of proposition 5.3
Proof. We first show that the proposition holds for j = i + 1.8 Following from
definition 5.2 and the definition of PRO, xi = λci, with λ = pi = Eici+cDi
. For j = i+1,
we should verify whether:
pi =
Ei
ci + cDi
≤ E j
c j + cD j
= p j.
We do so by by contradiction. Suppose that pi > p j, then:
Ei
E j
>
ci + cDi
c j + cD j
.
8For ease of notation, the superscript PRO is omitted.
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Substituting E j = Ei + e j − xi, and xi = ciEi/(ci + cDi ), and re-ordering terms gives:
c j + cD j >
(ci + cDi )(Ei + e j)
Ei
− ci.
Substituting c j + cD j = cDi + e j, re-ordering, and cancelling terms gives:
Ei > ci + cDi ,
which contradicts lemma 5.1. By transitivity of the order of the agents, the
proposition also holds for j = i + k ∀k ≥ 1. 
Proof of proposition 5.4
Proof. Following from definition 5.2 and the definition of PRO, xi = λci, with
λ = pi = Eici+cDi
.9 Hence, we have (i) xDi =
Ei
ci+cDi
cDi .
Because ei = 0 ∀i > 1, by (5.1) we have (ii) Ei+1 = xDi and by (5.2), we have (iii)
cDi = ci+1 + cDi+1 .
Using (ii) and (iii), we have (iv) pi+1 = Ei+1ci+1+cDi+1
=
xDi
cDi
. Combining (i) and (iv),
we obtain pi+1 = Eici+cDi
= pi. 
9For ease of notation, the superscript PRO is omitted.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The overall objective of this thesis is to analyse water allocation in transboundary
river basins, with a focus on the strategic interaction between riparian countries
in their decisions on water use. In chapters 2–5, I have analysed and discussed
various aspects of this strategic interaction, using game-theoretic models. In this
final chapter, I will first summarise the results and draw some overall conclusions
in section 6.1. Then, I will discuss the results of this thesis in the context of
practical water management issues in section 6.2. Finally, in section 6.3, I describe
the relevance of this thesis for issues other than transboundary water allocation.
6.1 Summary of results
In short, the results of this thesis are the following.
In chapter 2, I assess the stability of various water allocation agreements
under climate change impacts on river flow. The agreements differ in terms of
the sharing rule that they employ and in terms of the side payments (constant
or flexible). The results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the
stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or
a negative effect on stability. The type of side payment—in the context of this
chapter—does not really affect stability. What matters is the distribution of risk
related to low river flows over the countries. This risk originates mainly from
the sharing rule, which distributes water—and hence the shortage of water when
there is less than expected—over the countries. Due to the sequential structure of
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water deliveries and side payments, agreements where a fixed amount of water is
allocated to the upstream country, offer the largest stability. The only agreement
that offers stability for any level of river flow has such a sharing rule, and has
constant side payments, based on expected levels of river flow (instead of actual
levels).
Chapter 2 offers the first thorough analysis of the stability of water allocation
agreements in transboundary river basins. It extends the research of Bennett and
Howe (1998) and Bennett et al. (2000), who studied efficiency and stability in a
national context, and it enhances the literature on flexibility of water allocation
agreements, initiated by Kilgour and Dinar (1995, 2001), by studying the stability
of different agreement designs. In addition, chapter 2 provides an economic ra-
tionale for agreement noncompliance, as observed by for instance Barrett (1994a),
Beach et al. (2000), Bernauer (2002), and Gaste´lum et al. (2009), which may in-
duce water conflicts (Dinar and Dinar, 2003; Dombrowsky, 2007; Wolf, 2007). The
results of this chapter are admittedly subject to the credibility of the punishment
strategy employed. When punishments are not considered credible, none of the
analysed agreements can offer stability for any level of river flow. This result
begs the question whether any water allocation agreement can be fully stable.
This topic is covered in chapter 3.
In chapter 3, I analyse self-enforcing water allocation agreements. Self-
enforcement implies that the agreement is sustained in subgame perfect equi-
librium and is renegotiation-proof. I model the agreement as the outcome of
a bargaining game, which is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in
which countries decide whether to comply with the agreement. The results show
that, for sufficiently low discount rates, every efficient agreement can be sus-
tained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Not all of these agreements, however, are
renegotiation-proof. Depending on parameter combinations, the set of possible
agreements may shrink to approach a unique self-enforcing agreement, which
assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries. This solution corre-
sponds (and so implements) the “downstream incremental distribution” (Ambec
and Sprumont, 2002).
Chapter 3 offers a general framework for analysing the stability of agreements
in a repeated extensive-form game. Specifically, the methodology employs the
literature on folk theorems in repeated games (e.g. Yoon, 2001; Wen, 2002) to as-
sess self-enforcement in the sequential and stochastic setting of water allocation
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agreements. In addition, the chapter adds to the literature on renegotiation-proof
equilibria (Bergin and MacLeod, 1993; Barrett, 2003) by analysing the existence
of renegotiation-proof agreements in extensive-form games, an unexplored topic
as of yet. Chapter 3 shows that self-enforcing agreements exist and how they
distribute the gains from cooperation. Stability, therefore, can be attained by
careful design of the water allocation agreement. This result, if implemented in
practice, could potentially eliminate noncompliance with water allocation agree-
ments. This chapter is therefore a contribution to the challenge raised by Carraro
et al. (2007): “Formally addressing the stochasticity of the resource, as well as
the political, social, and strategic feasibility of any allocation scheme, would sig-
nificantly contribute to decreasing conflicts over water”. So far, however, an
implicit assumption has been that contracts (i.e. agreements) over water can be
easily signed. This assumption ignores that property rights to water are often
ambiguous, disputed, and a source of conflict. The presence of contested water
rights potentially obstructs the signing of agreements. This topic is covered in
chapter 4.
In chapter 4, I use a conflict model in which countries have overlapping claims
to water such that water rights are contested. Countries may end up in a costly
conflict equilibrium. Before that happens, however, they bargain over the allo-
cation of river water in order to avoid conflict. During the bargaining process,
countries may request third-party intervention to settle the conflict, which suc-
ceeds with a certain probability. The results show that exactly this probabilistic
outside option may prevent the countries from reaching a bargaining agreement
on the property rights to water. Hence, the prospect of third party intervention
may obstruct the capacity of countries to settle their conflict themselves.
Chapter 4 provides two new contributions to the literature on the economics
of conflict. First, it is the first application of an economic conflict model to the
issue of water rights. Although conflicts on water have been studied extensively
(cf. Gleick, 1993; Wolf, 2007), no supporting economic theory for the existence
of conflicts had been proposed. This chapter does so. Second, it is the first
study to introduce claims in a conflict model. Although claims to water, or to
a resource in general, play an important role in many conflicts (Murphy, 1990;
Cressey, 2008), they have not been modelled formally as of yet. The inclusion
of claims in this chapter allows a better understanding of their particular role
in a conflict. Chapter 4 identifies a possible cause for the existence of persisting
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conflicts over river water in some river basins.1 One of the causes of conflict
over river water is that countries perceive the current allocation as unfair. The
literature on fair allocations of river water does not extend far beyond “equal
sharing” and the conflicting principles of international water law as discussed
in chapter 1. A formal treatment using axiomatic foundations would give new
perspectives on the fair sharing of river water.
In chapter 5, I construct such a formal axiomatic model, in order to derive
attractive sharing rules for river water. To do so, I adapt a well-established
strand of the literature that studies bankruptcy problems and apply it to the
river sharing problem. The results show that by doing so, it is possible to
transform each bankruptcy rule to a corresponding sequential sharing rule for
river water. Many attractive properties of these bankruptcy rules are preserved
in this transformation. Uncovering the relation between a sharing rule and its
properties can make the fairness aspects of water allocation more transparent to
the countries involved.
Chapter 5 presents a novel axiomatic approach for water allocation, tailored
to the specific linear setting of a river basin. This approach combines the river
sharing literature with the literature on bankruptcy problems (Moulin, 2002;
Thomson, 2003). It widens the applicability of bankruptcy rules by generalising
bankruptcy problems to river sharing problems that contain information on the
sequential structure of the agents and the resource to be shared. In addition,
the chapter provides an alternative axiomatic approach to river sharing to the
one presented by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). This axiomatic analysis does not
model strategic behaviour directly, but approaches it from an alternative point of
view, describing the outcomes of a strategic situation in terms of its properties.
Thereby, it complements the strategic models of chapters 2–4.
Three conclusions can be drawn from this thesis as a whole. First, increasing
water scarcity or stochasticity does not necessarily obstruct the signing of interna-
tional agreements on water allocation. It may, however, make these agreements
more prone to defection. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that some agreements
are more stable than others and that careful design of the agreement provides
stability. These results hold for any level of water scarcity. Hence, in the face of
climate change and water use developments outlined in chapter 1, international
agreements on water allocation, when properly designed, are sufficiently capable
1Admittedly, other causes are possible, some of which are mentioned in chapter 4.
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to cope with water scarcity and stochasticity.
Second, the status quo situation of claims and property rights matters for both
the probability of conflict over river water, and the outcome of negotiations on
water allocation. Chapter 4 demonstrates how the presence of claims to water
and the absence of water rights may affect the distribution of water in a conflict
equilibrium. Resource-rich countries and those with larger claims receive larger
allocations of water in equilibrium. This distribution of claims and resources
would naturally translate into a more advantageous bargaining position in a
bargaining game over water as outlined in chapter 3. Hence, these factors matter
and drive the outcome of a strategic process toward cooperation.
Third, there is not a unique “fair” allocation of transboundary river water.
Chapter 5 proposes a class of sharing rules and described some alternative ax-
iomatic approaches to water allocation, in addition to the principles for water
sharing listed in chapter 1. This multitude of sharing rules signals the difficulties
that any neutral third party faces in a decision on how much water to allocate
to each country. Factors that may be included in a water allocation decision are
a country’s claim, its own endowment of water, and its geographical position
in the river basin. The above-mentioned sharing rules do not agree on which
factors to include and how they should affect the allocation.
To conclude this section, I address an issue that is present implicitly or ex-
plicitly throughout chapters 2–5. This issue is whether, all other things being
equal, an upstream country is (or should be) allocated more or less water than
a downstream country? The short answer is that this question is impossible to
answer. The slightly longer answer is as follows. Consider the following three
approaches, based on the methodology used in chapters 3–5. Using the strategic
bargaining model of chapter 3, the downstream country will be weakly better off,
as its punishment options in case of noncompliance weakly dominate those of
the upstream country. Using the contest model of chapter 4 would result in equal
sharing, because in this chapter, any geographical advantage is reflected by the
countries’ claims. Using the axiomatic model of chapter 5 could result in a mul-
titude of solutions depending on the choice for a specific sequential sharing rule.
The various strategic models described in this thesis do not agree on upstream-
downstream allocation, and even provide very different outcomes. Clearly then,
this thesis does not solve the transboundary water allocation problem. It does,
however, provide insight into the strategic aspects that play an important role in
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this problem and its possible solutions.
6.2 Recommendations for water management
The results of this thesis bring about a number of recommendations and sugges-
tions for water management at the international level. These recommendations
expand on the set of recommendations described briefly at the end of chapter 3.
A first recommendation is to start cooperation based on a common perception
of the status quo situation. This common perception includes a mutual accep-
tance of aspects like the presence of claims to water, perceived property rights,
and official water use data. Consequently, the negotiation process on the speci-
fications of a water allocation agreement or on a jointly supported principle for
water sharing can begin. In this process, countries have common priors and com-
plete information, which facilitates cooperation. Chapter 4 shows that in absence
of common priors (in particular on the probability of third-party intervention),
the bargaining process may break down, leading to persistent conflict. Two ex-
amples illustrate this recommendation. First, in the case of the Ganges, India
and Bangladesh could not agree on the accuracy of each other’s hydrologic data
(Beach et al., 2000), obstructing cooperation for many years. Second, only four
decades after the start of their negotiations, the water dispute between Jordan
and Israel on the waters of the Jordan river was solved at an official level in their
1994 bilateral agreement.2 One of the main reasons for the break-through in this
ongoing dispute was a change in the basis of negotiations. Prior to this agree-
ment, negotiations were based on perceived property rights which the countries
could not agree upon. The allocation of water in the 1994 agreement was based
on objectively defined irrigation needs, which made it acceptable to both parties
(Wolf, 1995, 1999; Haddadin, 2000).
A related suggestion concerns third parties such as the United Nations and
the World Bank. Chapters 1 and 4 discuss the conflicting principles for water
allocation in international law (cf. Salman, 2007). This situation of conflicting
principles translates into uncertainty on expectations regarding third parties’
opinion on water allocation. Chapter 4 shows the inefficiencies that may result.
Hence, the suggestion for these parties is to be completely transparent on the
2Note that this agreement was never ratified and water has remained a source of dispute between
Israel and its neighbours.
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principle for water allocation that they use in conflict mediation or intervention
in water rights disputes.
A second recommendation is to allow for flexibility in transboundary water
allocation agreements. From chapters 2 and 3, it is clear that flexibility mitigates
the disrupting effects of stochastic river flow. This recommendation does not
only pertain to hydrological stochasticity of river flow though. It also relates
to changes in the institutional setting, for instance when river flow decreases
as a result of water use increase by an upstream country that is not part of an
agreement. This situation is presently occurring in several river basins, including
the Nile, where downstream Egypt and Sudan have an agreement in place but
upstream Ethiopia is expected to increase its water abstraction in the coming
years (though Egypt may use its regional power to press Ethiopia not to do so).
Another example is the Ganges basin where Nepal is not part of the Ganges Treaty.
Nepal does, however, offer ample opportunities to augment river flow in the dry
season using reservoir storage, which would significantly reduce damage caused
by water scarcity and increase the benefits of cooperation (Bhaduri and Barbier,
2008a). The strict practice of bilateral negotiations by India, has obstructed such
an agreement (and its benefits) to date (Crow and Singh, 2000).
Related suggestions were made in the concluding section of chapter 3, viz.
the specifications of a water allocation agreement (e.g. specification of water
allocation and side payments contingent on river flow, and specification of an
appropriate punishment strategy).
A third and final recommendation is to dispose of the concept of fairness in
the context of international water allocation, because it allows for conflicting out-
comes. There does not exist a dominant principle for water sharing that will bring
about a fair allocation. Moreover, although it may be easy to reach agreement
on general principles of fair water sharing, it is harder to implement these prin-
ciples in a specific case (cf. Zeitoun, 2009). This is nicely illustrated by the 1997
United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, which was adopted
by the General Assembly with an overwhelming majority (103 votes for and 3
against), although this convention was not particularly favourable for upstream
states and its principles are a source of dispute in many conflicts (McCaffrey
and Sinjela, 1998). The class of sequential sharing rules proposed in chapter 5
is just one of many possible approaches to arrive at a “fair” allocation. A more
pragmatic approach would be to focus on desirable properties (see chapter 5) for
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the allocation of water. Properties are more tangible than the concept of fairness,
which is sometimes embodied in these properties, and a small list of properties
may already single out one possible sharing rule for water allocation.
6.3 Relevance
In this section I first describe the relevance of the approach used in this thesis
for issues outside water allocation in transboundary river basins. Then, I will
provide some comments on the general relevance of the methodology used in
chapters 2–5.
Issues other than transboundary water allocation for which the approach and
results of this thesis are relevant include those with a clear upstream-downstream
setting. Three of these issues are (i) water quality in transboundary river basins,
(ii) transboundary air pollution, and (iii) intergenerational sharing. I will discuss
these now.
The first issue is water quality in transboundary river basins. This issue
features the same geographical and institutional setting as transboundary water
allocation, discussed in chapter 1 (cf. Sigman, 2002). Water polluted upstream
with e.g. nutrients or heavy metals may create ecological damage or water treat-
ment costs downstream. An important aspect of water quality is that pollutant
concentration depends in a complex way on various processes related to disper-
sion and decay of pollutants. This implies that there is no direct relation between
upstream pollution and downstream damage. Nevertheless, with appropriate
simplifications, the issue of water quality in transboundary river basins can be
approached using the same type of game-theoretic models as used in this thesis.
Alongside the game-theoretic strand of literature on water allocation, a sepa-
rate game-theoretic literature on optimal levels of water quality and cost sharing
of water treatment has developed. Some examples of this literature are the fol-
lowing. Several studies have focused on water quality in shared waters along
the US-Mexico border. Fischhendler (2007) reviews cost-sharing solutions to pol-
lution reduction in the Tijuana basin on the US-Mexico border and finds that
there is a trade-off between perceived fairness and effectiveness of solutions. His
results show that the polluter-pays-principle is not effective and was therefore
replaced by other cost-sharing principles that better offset the asymmetric situa-
tion between the two countries. Fernandez (2009) reviews sharing rules in terms
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of pollution and side payments for cooperative agreements between the US and
Mexico. The analysis builds on Fernandez (2002a,b) and includes asymmetries in
abatement costs and pollution damage. Her results show the effect of the various
rules on the size of side payments to be made. An explicit axiomatic analysis on
water pollution sharing is presented by Ni and Wang (2007), based on the analysis
of Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Other studies include Gengenbach (2009) who
analyses the effects of coalition formation in wastewater treatment, and Van der
Veeren and Tol (2001) who assess the optimal distribution of abatement measures
to reduce nutrient pollution in the Rhine basin.
The second issue is transboundary air pollution by e.g. chemicals, particu-
lates, and gaseous compounds, from both anthropogenic and natural sources.
Air pollution in one country may—depending on wind speeds, humidity, and
other factors—cause damage from deposition in a downwind country, including
health effects, and damage to vegetation. As is the case for water pollution,
dispersion and decay of air pollutants complicate the relation between pollution
and damage. In addition, depending on the type of pollution, stock and flow
effects can be distinguished.
Reviews of game-theoretic approaches to model air pollution games are pro-
vided by Missfeldt (1999) and Folmer and Van Mouche (2000). A large part of
this literature is devoted to studying the so-called acid rain game starting with
Ma¨ler (1989), Newbery (1990), and Folmer and Van Mouche (2002). Emissions
of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides cause wet and dry deposition of acids
downwind, with adverse effects on water, soils, and vegetation. Meteorologi-
cal models are used to model the transport and transformation of the pollutants
across countries. Stock effects are included by using a differential game as is done
by Ma¨ler and De Zeeuw (1998), with an application to Great Britain and Ireland
(see also Kaitala et al., 1992). Our approach is better suited for air pollution with
pure flow pollutants. More precisely, those pollutants with a short lifetime which
can therefore be considered flow pollutants. These include the above-mentioned
nitrogen oxides, but also suspended particulate matter and carbon monoxide
(Liu and Lipta´k, 2000).
For the issues of water quality and air pollution, material from each of the
chapters 2–5 seems relevant, given the almost identical setting of the problems.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide insight into the design of contracts on emission pre-
vention. Chapter 4 shows how the lack of property rights to clean water and air
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may lead to conflict. Chapter 5 provides an axiomatic approach to the sharing of
the burden of pollution abatement.
The third and final issue is intergenerational sharing of welfare, briefly men-
tioned in chapter 5. The upstream-downstream element in this issue relates to
time where the current generation is “upstream” of future generations. Sharing
of welfare relates to pollution and the use of natural resources on the one hand,
and investment in education, research, and capital accumulation on the other.
The balance between these two factors, and possibilities for substitution between
natural and man-made capital, determines the potential for the distribution of
welfare between generations (cf. John et al., 1995; Arrow et al., 2004). The ac-
tual distribution is a trade-off between different measures of equity and time
preference, to which a large literature is devoted (cf. Chichilnisky, 1996).
For intergenerational sharing of welfare, especially chapter 5 seems relevant.
It may provide additional insight into the efforts that each generation should
undertake to safeguard future welfare by approaching the issue as a bankruptcy
problem. Each generation is then faced with the (excess) claim to welfare from the
infinite stream of future generations. Desirable properties for intergenerational
sharing can then be used to determine current consumption patterns, abatement
levels, or conservation measures. The strategic models of chapters 2–4 are less
suitable for this issue as future generations do not have the option to negotiate
in the present. Negotiations between generations are only possible when one
distinguishes between the “older” and “younger” generation, currently alive.
Such a distinction is for instance being made in debates on pension schemes
(e.g. Weikard, 2004a). In this case, chapters 2–4 may provide some insight into
strategic aspects of intergenerational sharing.
Finally, some comments on the general relevance of the methodology. The
approach of chapters 2 and 3 is relevant for any type of agreement in a stochastic
setting. The stability of agreements has been studied in other contexts too,
including open-access fisheries (Polasky et al., 2006) and transboundary wildlife
management (Bhat and Huffaker, 2007). My contribution is a.o. the inclusion
of sequentiality of actions provided by the upstream-downstream setting. This
addition has an important effect on the desirable specifications of agreements
and highlights that contract details can have important consequences on stability
and hence efficiency.
Part of the methodology used in chapter 4 consisted of the inclusion of claims
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in a resource contest model. It allows to model a conflict where both claims and
investment in arms or lobbying jointly determine the outcome of the conflict.
This methodology seems promising for other types of resource contests where
claims play an important role, such as contested territories (Ansink, 2009b). The
methodology can be easily adapted to suit the specific conditions of a certain
resource contest.
The approach taken in chapter 5 is not only suited for river sharing problems
and intergenerational sharing. Other types of (re-)distribution problems seem
applicable too, including those where the ordering of agents is not in space or
time, but according to an exogenously given priority-ranking. An example is
the (re-)distribution of water between various economic sectors. This topic is
a pressing policy issue in for instance California and Australia, where continu-
ing water scarcity and lack of options to increase water supply ask for drastic
policy responses. These responses concern the re-distribution of water rights
to those sectors that are deemed more important than others. The axiomatic
approach that I present in this thesis may serve as a guideline to make the ap-
propriate decisions. In general, the approach taken in chapter 5 can be applied
to any distribution problem that differs in one or more aspects from the standard
bankruptcy problem. Because the properties of bankruptcy rules are well under-
stood, this approach provides immediate insight into the properties of different
solutions. It is therefore an attractive approach whenever an axiomatic analysis
is relevant to the problem at hand.
6.4 Final words
To conclude this thesis, recall the theme of the 2009 World Water Day stated in the
opening lines of this thesis: “Shared Water—Shared Opportunities”. This thesis
shows that countries that share water indeed share opportunities. The challenge
lies in whether and how these opportunities can be transformed into cooperation
in order to reap its benefits.
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Summary
Water is scarce. Globally, many river basins are faced with a decrease in water
supply through the impacts of climate change. At the same time, demographic
trends and economic growth contribute to increased water demand. Jointly,
changes in supply and demand will cause a further increase of water scarcity.
In transboundary river basins, this development puts pressure on interna-
tional relations as water is a valuable resource for a.o. households, agriculture,
and industry. In some basins, countries have organised the allocation of river
water resources through joint river basin committees or formal water allocation
agreements. In the majority of transboundary river basins though, there is no
cooperative management framework in place. Even the existence of a commit-
tee or agreement, however, may not be sufficient to prevent conflict over water.
Committees may be powerless due to conflicting international principles for wa-
ter allocation, and agreements may be broken when the short-term benefits of
noncompliance are substantial.
Open questions are how cooperation in water allocation can be improved, and
how to design international agreements such that countries will not break them.
Underlying these questions are the issues of contested property rights to river
water and the design of attractive sharing rules for river water. The objective
of this thesis is to analyse water allocation in transboundary river basins, using
game-theoretic models. This type of models is well-suited to analyse the strategic
interaction between riparian countries regarding their decisions on water use.
Although existing game-theoretic models of water allocation in transbound-
ary river basins have analysed a fair range of topics and river basins, many
issues remain to be researched. To mention a few, the stability of agreements is
a topic that has not been settled completely yet. Also, existing studies do not
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demonstrate which factors cause actual negotiations on water allocation to be so
cumbersome and lengthy. In addition, the axiomatic approach has hardly been
used to design attractive sharing rules for water and makes for a wide open re-
search area. After an introduction of the problem at hand and a concise literature
review in chapter 1, these topics are covered in chapters 2–5 of this thesis.
In chapter 2, I assess the stability of various water allocation agreements
under climate change impacts on river flow. The agreements differ in terms of
the sharing rule that they employ and in terms of the side payments (constant
or flexible). The methodology employed is a two-country game-theoretic model
of water allocation. This approach continues on existing studies that focus on
the efficiency of water allocation, while the focus of this chapter is stability. The
results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an
agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect
on stability. The type of side payment—in the context of this chapter—does
not really affect stability. What matters is the distribution of risk related to low
river flows over the countries. This risk originates mainly from the sharing rule,
which distributes water—and hence the shortage of water when there is less than
expected—over the countries. Due to the sequential structure of water deliveries
and side payments, agreements where a fixed amount of water is allocated to
the upstream country, offer the largest stability. Clearly, this chapter provides
an economic rationale for agreement noncompliance. Unstable sharing rules are
expected to contribute to noncompliance and possible conflict over water.
In chapter 3, I analyse whether ex ante stable water allocation agreements
exist at all. I do so by using the notion of self-enforcement. Self-enforcement
implies that the agreement is sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium and is
renegotiation-proof. The water allocation agreement is modelled as the outcome
of a bargaining game, which is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in
which countries decide whether to comply with the agreement. The agreement
is specified by a water allocation schedule and side payments, both contingent
on river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discount rates, ev-
ery efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Not
all of these agreements, however, are renegotiation-proof. Depending on pa-
rameter combinations, the set of possible agreements may shrink to approach
a unique self-enforcing agreement, which assigns all gains from cooperation
to downstream countries. This solution corresponds (and so implements) the
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“downstream incremental distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water alloca-
tion. Stability, therefore, can be attained by careful design of the water allocation
agreement. This chapter extends the repeated game literature to assess self-
enforcement and renegotiation-proofness in the sequential and stochastic setting
of water allocation agreements.
In chapter 4, I analyse situations where water rights are contested and a source
of conflict. The methodology employed is a conflict model. More specifically, I
use a conflict model in which countries have overlapping claims to water such
that water rights are contested. Before moving to a costly conflict equilibrium,
countries bargain over the allocation of river water in order to avoid conflict.
In addition, countries may opt to request third-party intervention to settle the
conflict. The results show that exactly this intervention possibility may prevent
the countries from reaching a bargaining agreement on the property rights to
water, leading to the conflict equilibrium. This chapter thereby identifies one
possible cause for the existence of persisting conflict over river water in some
river basins. It offers the first application of an economic conflict model to the
issue of water rights, and is the first study to introduce claims in a conflict model,
which allows a better understanding of their particular role in a conflict.
In chapter 5, I assess an axiomatic approach to the allocation of river water.
This approach is tailored to the upstream-downstream setting of countries along
a river basin. Methodologically, I define a river sharing problem such that it can
be approached as a bankruptcy problem, an axiomatic approach to resource allo-
cation in which resources are insufficient to meet all demands. Bankruptcy rules
for bankruptcy problems are shown to have corresponding sequential sharing
rules for river sharing problems. Many attractive properties of these bankruptcy
rules are preserved in this transformation. Uncovering the relation between a
sharing rule and its properties can make the fairness aspects of water allocation
more transparent to the countries involved. This chapter widens the applica-
bility of bankruptcy rules by generalising bankruptcy problems to river sharing
problems that contain information on the sequential structure of both the agents
and the resource to be shared. In addition, it provides one of the first axiomatic
approaches to river sharing.
Three conclusions can be drawn from this thesis as a whole. First, increas-
ing water scarcity or stochasticity does not necessarily obstruct the signing of
international agreements on water allocation; it may, however, make these agree-
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ments more prone to defection. Second, the status quo situation of claims and
(perceived) property rights matters for both the probability of conflict over river
water, and the outcome of negotiations on water allocation. Third, there is not a
unique “fair” allocation of transboundary river water. Overall, this thesis does
not solve the transboundary water allocation problem. It does, however, provide
insight into the strategic aspects that play an important role in this problem and
its possible solutions.
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Samenvatting
Water is schaars. Wereldwijd hebben veel rivieren te maken met een afname van
watertoevoer en een toename van variantie door de effecten van klimaatveran-
dering. Tegelijkertijd zorgen demografische ontwikkelingen en economische
groei voor een toename van de vraag naar water. Gezamenlijk veroorzaken deze
ontwikkelingen in aanbod en vraag een toenemende schaarste van water.
In grensoverschrijdende rivieren kan deze ontwikkeling internationale re-
laties onder druk zetten. Water is namelijk een kostbaar product voor o.a.
huishoudens, landbouw, en industrie. In sommige rivieren hebben landen de
verdeling van water uitbesteed aan internationale commissies of formeel vast-
gelegd in een waterverdelingsverdrag. In de meerderheid van grensoverschrij-
dende rivieren echter, is er geen enkele vorm van formele samenwerking. Zelfs de
aanwezigheid van een internationale commissie of internationaal verdrag is soms
niet toereikend om conflicten over water te voorkomen. Commissies hebben
te maken met een gebrek aan machtsmiddelen en conflicterende internationale
principes voor waterverdeling, terwijl verdragen kunnen worden geschonden
wanneer de baten op korte termijn hoog genoeg zijn.
Open onderzoeksvragen zijn hoe samenwerking in waterverdeling kan wor-
den verbeterd, en hoe internationale verdragen zo kunnen worden ontworpen dat
ze niet worden verbroken. Onderliggende onderwerpen zijn de aanwezigheid
van betwiste eigendomsrechten op water en het ontwerp van aantrekkelijke
verdeelregels voor rivierwater. Het doel van dit proefschrift is het analyseren van
waterverdeling in grensoverschrijdende rivieren met behulp van speltheoretis-
che modellen. Dit type modellen is geschikt voor het analyseren van strategische
interactie tussen landen die een rivier delen, in hun beslissingen omtrent wa-
tergebruik.
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Ondanks het feit dat bestaande speltheoretische modellen al zijn toegepast
op een aantal aspecten van internationale waterverdeling, is er een aanzienlijk
aantal aspecten die tot nog toe onderbelicht zijn. Om er een paar te noemen; de
stabiliteit van waterverdragen is een onderwerp waar nog geen eenduidige con-
clusie over bestaat. Daarnaast hebben bestaande studies nog niet kunnen aanto-
nen welke factoren ervoor zorgen dat onderhandelingen over waterverdeling zo
problematisch kunnen verlopen en lang kunnen duren. Ten slotte is de axioma-
tische methode nog vrijwel niet gebruikt voor het ontwerpen van aantrekkelijke
verdeelregels voor water; een open onderzoeksveld. Na een introductie van het
probleem en een literatuuroverzicht in hoofdstuk 1, worden deze onderwerpen
behandeld in hoofdstukken 2–5 van dit proefschrift.
In hoofdstuk 2 evalueer ik de stabiliteit van verscheidene waterverdelingsver-
dragen onder de effecten van klimaatverandering op het debiet van rivieren.
Deze verdragen verschillen in de verdeelregel voor water en in financie¨le com-
pensatie (constant of flexibel). De methodologie die gebruikt wordt in dit hoofd-
stuk is een twee-landen speltheoretisch model voor waterverdeling. Deze metho-
de bouwt voort op enkele bestaande studies die zich focussen op de efficie¨ntie van
waterverdeling, terwijl dit hoofdstuk focust op stabiliteit. De resultaten tonen
aan dat met een afname van het gemiddelde debiet de stabiliteit van een verdrag
ook afneemt, terwijl een toename van de variantie van het debiet een positief of
negatief effect kan hebben op stabiliteit. In de context van dit hoofdstuk heeft het
type compensatie geen effect op stabiliteit. Wat wel van belang is, is de verdeling
van risico gerelateerd aan een laag debiet over de twee landen. Deze verdel-
ing is gebaseerd op de verdeelregel, die water—en daarmee het tekort aan water
wanneer er minder is dan verwacht—verdeelt over de landen. Door de opeenvol-
gende structuur van waterlevering en betaling van compensatie, zijn verdragen
waarbij het bovenstroomse land een vaste hoeveelheid water toebedeeld krijgt,
het meest stabiel. Dit hoofdstuk presenteert een duidelijk economische oorzaak
voor het schenden van waterverdelingsverdragen. Instabiele verdeelregels dra-
gen bij aan deze mogelijkheid en de daarmee samenhangende conflicten over
water.
In hoofdstuk 3 analyseer ik het bestaan van ex ante stabiele waterverdel-
ingsverdragen. Dit doe ik met behulp van het concept zelf-afdwingbaarheid.
Zelf-afdwingbaarheid houdt in dat een verdrag wordt ondersteund in een deel-
spel perfect evenwicht, en dat het verdrag bestand is tegen heronderhandelingen.
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Het verdrag is in dit hoofdstuk gemodelleerd als de uitkomst van een onderhan-
delingsspel, en wordt gekarakteriseerd door een waterverdeling en compensatie,
voor elk mogelijk debiet. Deze onderhandeling wordt gevolgd door een herhaald
spel in extensieve vorm, waarin landen besluiten of ze zich al dan niet voegen naar
het verdrag. De resultaten tonen aan dat, voor een voldoende lage discontovoet,
elk efficie¨nt verdrag kan worden ondersteund in een deelspel perfect evenwicht.
Echter, niet al deze verdragen zijn bestand tegen heronderhandelingen. Afhanke-
lijk van de waarden van parameters kan de verzameling van mogelijke verdragen
krimpen tot het een uniek zelf-afdwingbaar verdrag benadert, dat alle baten van
samenwerking toewijst aan het benedenstroomse land. Deze uitkomst is gelijk
aan (en implementeert daarmee) de “benedenstroomse toenemende verdeling”,
een axiomatische uitkomst voor waterverdeling. Klaarblijkelijk kan stabiliteit
bereikt worden door middel van een zorgvuldig ontwerp van een waterverdel-
ingsverdrag. Dit hoofdstuk breidt de bestaande literatuur over herhaalde spelen
uit middels een analyse van zelf-afdwingbaarheid en bestandheid tegen heron-
derhandelen in de opeenvolgende en stochastische omstandigheden die ken-
merkend zijn voor onderhandelingen over water.
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseer ik situaties waarin waterrechten worden betwist
en daarmee een bron van mogelijke conflicten vormen. De methodologie die
gebruikt wordt in dit hoofdstuk is een conflictmodel. Om precies te zijn ge-
bruik ik een conflictmodel waarin landen overlappende claims op water hebben,
zodat waterrechten worden betwist. Voordat zij eventueel uitkomen in een
onaantrekkelijk conflict-evenwicht, onderhandelen landen over de verdeling van
water om zo een conflict te voorkomen. Daarnaast hebben de landen de mogelijk-
heid om, tijdens de onderhandelingen, een neutrale derde partij te vragen om te
intervenie¨ren. De resultaten tonen aan dat juist deze mogelijkheid van interven-
tie kan voorkomen dat landen een succesvol onderhandelingsresultaat bereiken
over de betwiste waterrechten. In plaats daarvan wacht hen het onaantrekkelij-
ke conflict. Dit hoofdstuk identificeert hiermee een mogelijke oorzaak voor het
ontstaan en voortduren van conflicten over water. Het biedt de eerste toepassing
van een economisch conflictmodel op het onderwerp waterrechten, en het is ook
de eerste studie die claims introduceert in zo’n conflictmodel. Dit geeft een beter
inzicht in de rol van claims in conflict-situaties.
In hoofdstuk 5 evalueer ik een axiomatische methode voor het waterverdel-
ingsvraagstuk in rivieren. Deze methode is speciaal toepasbaar in de boven-
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stroom-benedenstroom situatie die typerend is voor de verdeling van rivierwa-
ter. Methodologisch gezien definie¨er ik een waterverdelingsprobleem op zo’n
manier dat het geanalyseerd kan worden als een faillissementsprobleem. Ik laat
zien hoe verdeelregels voor faillissementsproblemen ieder een corresponderende
verdeelregel voor waterverdelingsproblemen hebben. Veel aantrekkelijke eigen-
schappen van deze faillissementsregels blijven bewaard in deze transformatie.
Deze eigenschappen zijn sterk verwant aan het aspect rechtvaardigheid dat een
belangrijke rol speelt bij waterverdeling. De verzameling van verdeelregels
voor waterverdelingsproblemen die in dit hoofdstuk wordt gepresenteerd heeft
gemakkelijk identificeerbare eigenschappen door hun verwantschap aan faillisse-
mentsregels. Dit hoofdstuk verbreedt de toepasbaarheid van faillissementsregels
door het generaliseren van faillissementsproblemen tot waterverdelingsproble-
men die informatie bevatten over de lineaire structuur van zowel de agenten
(bijv. landen) als het rivierwater. Daarnaast biedt dit hoofdstuk een van de eerste
axiomatische benaderingen voor de verdeling van rivierwater.
Dit proefschrift bevat drie algemene conclusies. Ten eerste: toenemende
schaarste en stochasticiteit van het debiet in rivieren verhindert niet noodzakelij-
kerwijs het opstellen van internationale waterverdelingsverdragen; het kan deze
verdragen echter minder stabiel maken. Ten tweede: de aanwezigheid van claims
en eigendomsrechten—al dan niet terecht—zijn van belang voor zowel de kans op
conflict over water als de uitkomst van onderhandelingen over waterverdeling.
Ten derde: er bestaat geen unieke “rechtvaardige” verdeling van grensoverschrij-
dend rivierwater. In zijn algemeenheid geeft dit proefschrift daarmee geen
oplossing voor het probleem van waterverdeling in grensoverschrijdende riv-
ieren. Het geeft echter wel inzicht in de strategische aspecten die een belangrijke
rol spelen in dit probleem en zijn mogelijke oplossingen.
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